兩岸政治談判，首先必須提問的是：「誰」跟「誰」在談？這兩個「誰」涉及到協商主體的問題，也是談判身分的問題。主體與身分是共生的主從關係，主體決定身分，身分則對外彰顯主體。詳言之，有主體才有身分，協商主體確定後，才衍生出談判身分；但是身分除了由協商主體來設定外，也需要談判對象（對手）的承認或接受，談判才可能進行，如此將回過頭來影響雙方對協商主體的認定。因此，談判身分反應了背後的協商主體，怎樣的身分說明了怎樣的主體。\r 為探討談判所涉及的協商主體與身分問題，本論文除了檢視國際協議文件的一般形式及行政委託形式，所呈現的協商主體及身分外；也分析了行政委託形式的現行兩岸多項協議，所呈現的協商主體及身分。研究結果發現，過去我方政府與國外所簽署的國際協議文件，不管是一般形式或行政委託形式，都能確保背後的協商主體與身分；但是兩岸之間的行政委託協議，則協商主體及身分嚴重去政府化，不可能作為兩岸未來政治談判的模式。\r 在上述的思維下，本研究另創「國家為主體、元首為身分」等四種協商主體與身分，就「統一協議」等七種兩岸政治協議，以半結構式的問卷訪問了海峽兩岸紅藍綠陣營80 位熟悉兩岸關係的學者及智庫專家，經統計分析結果，獲得對本論文主題極有意義的研究發現。那就是，在統一與獨立協議皆無法化解反對一方的歧見下，「統合協議」或「維持現狀以後統一協議」是兩岸目前可以磨合的模式；同時，欲磨合這兩個模式的協商主體與簽署身分，都以「政府為主體、首長為身分」的歧見最小。 A discussion of potential future cross-Strait political negotiations must first address the question of who would be negotiating with whom. This question involves issues of subjectivity and identity. Who are the subjects of the negotiation and what are their identities? Subjectivity and identity are interdependent. Subjectivity determines identity while identity reflects subjectivity outwardly. In other words, identity derives from the subject. Only after determining the subjects of a negotiation can their identities be constituted. But the identity of the subject of a negotiation cannot be determined solely by the subject itself. A negotiation can proceed only after this identity has been recognized and accepted by the other party to the negotiation. This requirement for mutual recognition in turn affects each side’s identification of the subjects of the negotiation. Therefore, the identity of the negotiating parties reflects their subjectivity. The identity of a negotiating entity reflects the type of subject it is. This paper first examines relevant documents to analyze the identity and subjectivity of the negotiating parties in standard international negotiations between Taiwan and foreign countries and in executive-delegate format negotiations between Taiwan and China. This analysis suggests that while both the international and executive-delegate formats have ensured the subjectivity and identity of the negotiating parties, cross-Strait executivedelegate negotiations have been overly de-governmentalized and therefore this format cannot serve as a model for future political negotiations between Taipei and Beijing. To address this problem, this study developed four possible subjectidentity types for the negotiating entities, such as “state as subject, leader as identity,” and eight possible cross-Strait agreements, including a unification agreement. A survey of 80 experts on cross-Strait relations in Taiwan and Mainland China was conducted to identify preferences with respect to the subjectivity and identity of the negotiating parties and the substance of potential agreements. Statistical analysis of the survey data shows opposition from the other side would preclude negotiations for either unification or Taiwan independence, but that the possibility exists for the two sides to negotiate an agreement to “integration” or to “maintain the status quo until eventual unification,” though such negotiations would be highly contentious. The study suggests that negotiations conducted in a “government as subject, leader as identity” format would have the best chance of garnering acceptance by both sides.