本文研究問題是，為何2002 年溫州金融改革方案中，僅有利率市場化政策失敗？在中國大陸威權體制下，由中央政府主導的改革為何會在地方失敗？金融體制改革被視為近年來中國大陸經濟改革的重心之一，利率市場化更是其中的關鍵項目。而溫州早於1980 年代，即自行於農村信用合作社推動利率市場化，2002 年更被中央列為全國唯一的金融綜合改革試驗區，其中一項改革內容即為農村信用社利率浮動改革，但改革最終於2004 年被中央宣佈停止。本文以斷裂式威權體制的框架，分析中央、省、市三個層次中，不同行動者面對利率市場化改革的邏輯，探究支持與反對改革的行動者邏輯交織下，如何影響改革結果。本文認為，由於中央考量其他行動者利益，未能貫徹改革，地方亦缺乏足夠誘因提出相關政策配合，兩者邏輯互動下使改革成效有限，未達目標，迫使中央停止改革。 This article will answer two questions:（1）Of all the Wenzhou financial reform measures in 2002, why the interest rate reform measure failed out particularly, while other measures had succeeded?（2）In an authoritarian system, why a centrally-directed reform would fail in local governance? The Wenzhou financial reform was deemed as one of the most important issues in China’s economic development, particularly the interest rate reform. Wenzhou spontaneously promoted marketization reforms of interest rates since the 1980s. Wenzhou was also ranked as the only financial reform zone to practice the interest rate reform in 2002, yet it stopped in 2004. This article adopted the fragmented authoritarianism theory to elaborate why the interest rate reform failed, and from three separate levels – central, provincial, and prefecture/city – we analyzed how these different and nested logic actors had lead to reform failure. From qualitative research, we concluded that the central government had less power to carry out the reform, thus the performance could not accomplish expectant goals. Meanwhile, there had not been incentives for local governments to propose relevant policies to promote interest rate reforms. Eventually, the central government had no choice but to terminate the reform.