本研究嘗試結合兩個關於中國財政與金融的分析模型。首先將史宗瀚（Victor Shih）設計的派系關係指標引進王紹光（Shaoguang Wang）對於大陸各省人均財政轉移支付的分析模型，探討1995~2010年間派系關係對於大陸各省人均財政轉移支付的影響。接著將人均財政轉移支付納入史宗瀚對大陸各省國家銀行貸款額度的分析模型，結果發現：（一）各省領導人的派系關係確實會影響該省的人均財政轉移支付金額。在宏觀政策適度從緊的年份，具有非技術官僚派系關係的省份可以獲得較高額的人均財政轉移支付，和技術官僚有派系關係的省份獲得的人均財政轉移支付金額則較低；（二）在宏觀政策適度從緊的年份，獲得人均財政轉移支付金額愈高的省份，當年該省所獲得的國家銀行貸款額度就愈低；（三）在積極財政政策和經濟刺激計畫期間，具有非技術官僚派系關係的省份，由於已經透過派系關係爭取到更高額的財政轉移支付，因此獲得的國家銀行貸款額度要比沒有 派系關係的省份還來得低。 This paper aims to integrate two statistical models on Chinese financial politics. The first step is to incorporate the factional ties index designed by Victor Shih into a model on provincial transfer payment developed by Shaoguang Wang to investigate the impact of factions on the amount of transfer payment received by each province between 1995 and 2010. The next step is to introduce the provincial transfer payment variable into Victor Shih’s model on provincial state bank loans in China during the same period. The major findings are: (1) The effect of factional ties’ on the amount of transfer payment received by each province is most significant during an anti-inflationary policy period. Provinces with factional ties to the General Secretary and other non-technocratic leaders tend to receive higher amount of transfer payment while provinces with factional ties to the Premier and other technocratic leaders tend to receive lower amount of transfer payment. (2) During an anti-inflationary policy period, provinces with higher transfer payment tend to receive lower loans from the state banking system. (3) During a fiscal stimulus policy period, provinces with factional ties to the General Secretary and other non-technocratic leaders tend to receive lower loan-to-deposit ratio from the state banking system because these provinces already received higher transfer payment from the center that year.