中國大陸上海市居民委員會與福建省村民委員會是中國大陸基層選舉的先行者，本文比較兩者的選舉動員模式，發現在居委會選舉中，發動動員者是居委會和積極份子，形成幾乎無競爭或半競爭的選舉。村委會選舉除了村委會和積極份子發動動員，候選人亦具備利益誘因發動動員，同時村民基於利益，亦協助候選人拉票，形成半競爭或競爭的選舉。究其原因，居委會選舉因缺乏參與所需利益，形成參與困境，且城市多為生人社會，缺乏\r動員基礎，居委會和積極份子僅基於人情、感性因素動員；相對地，村委會選舉仍具備參與所需利益，且農村多為熟人社會，使候選人和村民更投入選舉。除了基於人情動員，更出現為勝選而生的利益動員。村、居委會的動員基礎不盡相同，其中村委會選舉的動員基礎使民主選舉中的競爭成為可能，而居委會以人情作為動員基礎，也在在考驗著現代化下的人際關係是否能支撐政治動員。 China’s grassroots election originated from the developments of Shanghai neighborhood committees and Fuxiang village committees, and therefore, the paper compares these two modes of electoral mobilization. In the study, it discovers that elections’ initiators in NCs are only the committees and activists and forms almost non-competitive or semi-competitive elections. On the other hand, besides the VCs and their activists, the VC candidates are one of initiators who also offer considerable incentives to launch mobilization. Meanwhile, villagers based upon self-interests would like to help pull votes. In this way, the VCs’ elections become semi-competitive or competitive. As a result, the NCs have difficulty activating elections due to the lack of participatory interests and most cities are so called stranger societies, so the NCs and activists can only mobilize residents by interpersonal affection and perceptual factors. Whereas there are many incentives in the VCs’ elections based upon the political and economic developments in China and villagers are mostly acquaintances, so candidates and villagers give much more input into the elections. Besides the mobilization by interpersonal affection, it appears “interest mobilization” which is born to win an election. Although the mobilization bases in the VCs and NCs are not quite the same, the VCs’ mobilization base makes competitive elections in democracy become possible, and the NCs’ base of interpersonal affection tests whether people’s relationship under modernization can support political mobilization.