在美國高地棉補貼案中，上訴機構裁定美國的境內支持措施即使未違反農業協定第6.3條之削減承諾，亦會因為違反SCM協定第3.1(b)條而被禁止。上訴機構所持理由之一即在於，依據農業協定第21.1條之規定，除非二規定間包含相互排斥之義務，遵守一項規定必然會違反另一項規定，才有衝突存在。然而以此一衝突定義，適用在農產品之出口補貼措施上即會產生不合理之結果。問題主要的爭點即在於衝突的定義為何？WTO協定中之各條文間，在何種情況下，構成衝突關係而會產生排除適用之效果？在何種情形下應屬累積適用，而必須符合所有規定之要件？針對這些問題，本文就WTO協定條文間之適用關係先予以簡單說明。其次，再就協定中已有明文規定之衝突條款及其在實務上之運用加以介紹。最後並就適用衝突條款時所可能發生之問題加以探討，期待能就WTO協定間複雜的累積適用關係及排除適用關係加以釐清。 In the case of U.S. upland cotton initiated by Brazil to argue that certain U.S. subsidies for the domestic production of upland cotton, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s findings that Step 2 payments to domestic users of U.S. upland cotton were subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods that were inconsistent with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement. The United State argued that Step 2 payments were better characterized as part of its amber box domestic support program and were subject to “reduction commitment” under Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement. According to the preamble of Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, the latter should prevail over the Articles of the SCM Agreement. The Panel rejected this argument, stating that no conflict existed between the two provisions unless they contained mutually exclusive obligations. The narrow definition of conflict will lead to an unanticipated outcome should it be applied to the export subsidies for agricultural products. The core and important questions are what the definition of the conflict is and what kinds of relationship between the provisions of the WTO Agreements are accumulative and exclusive. This article attempts to make a description of the conflict clauses inserted in the WTO Agreements and discuss the related problems that arise from their application.