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    題名: A Political Economy of Tax Havens
    作者: 鄭竹君;朱巡;Lai, Yu-Bong
    貢獻者: 財政系
    關鍵詞: Capital mobility;Interest groups;Lobbying;Tax havens;Tax competition;F21;H41;H73
    日期: 2014-09
    上傳時間: 2015-04-27 15:19:46 (UTC+8)
    摘要: The welfare effect of the existence of tax havens on high-tax countries has not been conclusive in the theoretical literature. Some papers show that the existence of tax havens is harmful to high-tax countries, while other studies argue that the opposite could occur. We aim to address a question: Do these welfare-reducing or welfare-enhancing properties still hold in the presence of lobbying? We find that the welfare-enhancing property does not hold, provided that the policy-maker attaches a sufficiently large weight to the political contribution received. Moreover, we point out that the cooperation among high-tax countries in restricting the international tax planning activity can lead to a lower level of social welfare in all high-tax countries.
    關聯: International Tax and Public Finance, 1-20
    資料類型: book/chapter
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-014-9338-8
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 專書/專書篇章

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