關係風險的產生來自於夥伴的投機傾向與情境因素，而資產專屬性、作業複雜性、以及知識移轉等是屬於較容易引發關係風險的合作情境。為克服關係風險問題，廠商可採取網絡、資訊、經濟與契約等四類控制機制。交易成本理論雖然對關係風險提出因應，但對管理控制的適切性仍未有足夠了解。本研究認為管理控制的程度需同時考慮關係風險以及預期的合作價值，並了解各種控制機制間的關係性質。透過對資訊電子業合作案的量化分析，本研究結果顯示，當關係風險與預期合作價值上升時，廠商的整體控制程度將會提高。此外，預期合作價值高的合作案也具有較高的關係風險。對四類控制機制的相關分析發現，經濟控制與契約控制之間具有顯著正相關，資訊控制與網路控制、經濟控制、契約控制間亦存在顯著正相關。對控制機制之間替代或互補關係的了解，將有助於廠商以更有效率的方式組合控制機制並管理合作關係。 Abstract: Relational risks come from partners' opportunism and circumstances surrounding cooperation. Cooperative conditions with asset specificity, task complexity, or knowledge transfer tend to elicit relational risk. Firms could adopt four kinds of control mechanisms-network, information, economic control, and contract- to deal with the problem of relational risk. Although transaction cost theory has pointed out some treatments for this problem, it hasn't fully examined the issue of the adequacy of managerial control. This study proposed that the degree of control should depend on the relational risk and the expected cooperation values, and the relationships among control mechanism should be understood. We collected data from cooperation projects in information technology industry, and the results showed that cooperations with high relational risks and high expected values tend to be associated with increased control. Further exploratory analyses of the four control mechanisms revealed that economic control is positively related to contract control, and information control is positively related to other three control mechanisms. It would be helpful for firms to arrange cooperations by means of the understanding of the substitutive or complementary relationships among these control mechanisms.