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    題名: Asymmetric tax competition in the presence of lobbying
    作者: Lai,Yu-Bong
    賴育邦
    貢獻者: 政大財政系
    關鍵詞: Capital mobility;Globalization;Interest groups;Political economy;Public good;Tax competition
    日期: 2012-11
    上傳時間: 2013-08-26 16:11:30 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This paper incorporates the influence of interest groups into the asymmetric tax competition model to explain the phenomenon that small countries do not necessarily set lower capital tax rates than large countries. In addition to the effciency effect considered by the standard model, which leads the smaller country to
    set a lower capital tax rate, this present paper also takes account of the political effect arising from lobbying. We show that the smaller country may face less downward political pressure. If the political effect outweighs the efficiency effect, then the smaller country sets a higher tax rate than the larger country. This result has several welfare implications, which are in contrast to the conventional consequences.
    關聯: International Tax and Public Finance
    資料類型: article
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-012-9258-4
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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