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Lobbying for Tariff and the Optimal Entry Mode of the Multinational Firm
|Issue Date: ||2010-12-09 16:01:52 (UTC+8)|
In the trend of globalization, the multinational firm with superior technologies intend to employ various strategies for entering the foreign markets. Confronting these international competitions, then the host country firm usually utilize the political contribution to sway the policy. In this paper, we examine the relationships among the multinational firm, host country firm, and the domestic government by the political contribution model. Going with the political contribution from the host country firm, the domestic government usually works out the policy by considering the tradeoff between political contribution and social welfare. Eventually, the multinational firm selects an optimal entry mode with a given tariff to enter the markets which determined by lobby. Our result demonstrates that besides the tariff and cost difference, the social welfare is also crucial to the choice of entry mode. Different social welfare weight brings out various policies which will influence the entry mode of multinational firm. Only when the domestic government takes social welfare seriously, the multinational firm will choose the entry mode which makes the government’s utility larger.
|Reference: ||蔡宜臻、邱俊榮 (2009)，「跨國廠商的進入模式－直接投資、出口與授權決策」，經濟論文，第 37 卷 1 期，1-26。|
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255015|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[財政學系] 學位論文|
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