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|Title: ||Why does a firm keep "Sleeping Patents"? From the perespective of quality and depreciation|
|Keywords: ||sleeping patent|
|Issue Date: ||2009-09-18 18:55:55 (UTC+8)|
|Abstract: ||We investigate why a firm hold “Sleeping Patents” in a two period model. Two main results are found by our simulation analysis. First, the larger the depreciation measure of the new patent goods is, the greater the possibility of not exercising new patent is, even if the new patent is still more profitable than the old in one-stage model. Second, the possibilities to exercise the less profitable patent increases if a monopolist can commit its stage-two quantity in stage one.|
|Reference: ||Arya, A. and B. Mittendorf (2004), “Purchasing Sleeping Patents to Curtail Budget Padding.”|
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Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. (1978), “Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Economic
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0092351011|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文|
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