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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/125521
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/125521


    Title: 買賣雙方及房屋屬性對於不動產議價空間的影響
    How attributes of houses, buyers and sellers influence price concession of the real estate market in Taiwan
    Authors: 劉家愷
    Liu, Chia-Kai
    Contributors: 陳明吉
    劉家愷
    Liu, Chia-Kai
    Keywords: 議價空間
    買賣雙方屬性
    特徵價格模型
    性別差異
    年齡差異
    Price concession
    Characteristics of buyers and sellers
    Hedonic price model
    Gender differences
    Age difference
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-09-05 15:43:00 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文研究房屋屬性、買賣雙方屬性與房地產議價空間在台灣的關聯。本文使用民國98年到104年某仲介公司提供之成交價格資料,分析台灣全區及人口最多之四大都市,分別為台北市、新北市、台中市、高雄市,在迴歸模型中分次探討加入房屋屬性變數和買賣雙方屬性變數對議價空間的影響。
    實證結果發現,大部分房屋屬性對於議價空間的影響皆統計上顯著,如房屋坪數、屋齡、建物房數、建物廳數等,僅少數房屋屬性由於地區上差異轉為不顯著。而買賣雙方屬性中,性別對房價議價空間不具統計上顯著性,也再次解釋在台灣地區,性別差異在價格談判能力上不具影響;年齡則有統計上顯著性,買方年齡中,除台中市外,年齡越大,房屋議價空間越小,呈反向關係;賣方年齡中,除高雄市外,賣方年齡越大,房屋議價空間越大,呈正向關係。買賣方影響力則在不同城市間具有差異,以台灣全區、台北市、新北市、高雄市資料來看,買方影響力較大,而台中市則為買方影響力較大。
    在性別差異的比較中,買賣雙方無論為同性或異性對於議價空間皆無影響,但考慮到年齡差異的組合比較後,發現賣方為男性且年齡在61~80歲對於買方不同性別和年齡層有明顯的統計顯著結果,相較於其他年齡層,買方在41~60歲的年齡層,議價空間有偏低的現象。
    This study examines how attributes of houses as well as buyers and sellers influence price concession of the real estate market in Taiwan. We utilize a real estate firm’s sales data from 2009 to 2015 to analyze the housing market in Taiwan as a whole, and in the four largest cities, Taipei, New Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung. We congregated properties’, buyers’, and sellers’ characteristics into regression analysis as variables, to inspect their statistical significance on price concession.
    The empirical results show that the majority of housing characteristics listed, such as size, age of building, number of rooms, and number of living areas, are statistically significant on price concession. Only a few attributes are statistically insignificant due to regional preferences. For attributes of buyers and sellers, gender is also statistically insignificant on price concession, indicating that in Taiwan gender caused minimal difference in bargaining power. On the other hand, age is statistically significant, with a positive relationship between seller’s age and price concession with the exception of Kaohsiung, and a negative relationship between buyer’s age and price concession with the exception of Taichung. The party with bigger bargaining power also variates between different cities, while buyer holds a bigger influence in Taipei, New Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Taiwan as a whole, in Taichung the power leans more toward the seller.
    As for gender differences, neither are sellers’ nor buyers’ gender are statistically significant towards price concession. But when we take age groups into consideration, male sellers that are 61~80 years old is statistically significant towards buyers of other gender and age groups, especially when the buyer is at 41~60 years old, statistics show the range for price concession is lower.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    1063570172
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1063570172
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900840
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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