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Political economy analysis of tariff and environmental policy
|Issue Date: ||2019-08-07 16:50:14 (UTC+8)|
|Abstract: ||本文以Xing (2006)的三階段賽局及Grossman and Helpman (1994)的利益團體模型為基礎，並採用Fredriksson (1999)的福利函數設定，探討當市場結構為雙占，兩國廠商的商品於本國進行數量競爭時，在兩個遊說立場相左的利益團體影響下，關稅政策與環境政策的關聯。|
This thesis demonstrates a situation in which two interest groups provide political contributions to influence trade policy and environmental policy in their favor. The basic model is based on Xing (2006) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). To investigate how the tariff affects environmental policy in the presence of lobbying, I establish an international duopoly model containing three stages, in which firms competing in terms of quantity in the domestic market. Pollution arises in the process of production and does not travel across the border.
I show that the equilibrium policies of the domestic country depend on the externality effect and the rent-shifting effect. I also find that under certain conditions, the externality effect can outweigh the profit-shifting effect. In this case, the domestic country’s emission fee will exceed the Pigouvian tax. Then by endogenizing the tariff, this thesis finds that a negative tariff will be given to the imported goods and the emission fee will decline. However, the emission fee will be set below the Pigouvian tax, if the rent-shifting effect is dominant. Under such circumstances, the domestic country will charge a positive tariff, and set a higher emission fee. As to the foreign environmental policy, which is not subject to the plague of the interest groups, the emission fee will be likely set below the Pigouvian tax.
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255001|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[財政學系] 學位論文|
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