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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124947

    Title: 關稅與環境政策之政治經濟分析
    Political economy analysis of tariff and environmental policy
    Authors: 魯宛憶
    Contributors: 賴育邦
    Keywords: 利益團體
    Interest Groups
    Environmental Policy
    Trade Policy
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-08-07 16:50:14 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文以Xing (2006)的三階段賽局及Grossman and Helpman (1994)的利益團體模型為基礎,並採用Fredriksson (1999)的福利函數設定,探討當市場結構為雙占,兩國廠商的商品於本國進行數量競爭時,在兩個遊說立場相左的利益團體影響下,關稅政策與環境政策的關聯。
    This thesis demonstrates a situation in which two interest groups provide political contributions to influence trade policy and environmental policy in their favor. The basic model is based on Xing (2006) and Grossman and Helpman (1994). To investigate how the tariff affects environmental policy in the presence of lobbying, I establish an international duopoly model containing three stages, in which firms competing in terms of quantity in the domestic market. Pollution arises in the process of production and does not travel across the border.
    I show that the equilibrium policies of the domestic country depend on the externality effect and the rent-shifting effect. I also find that under certain conditions, the externality effect can outweigh the profit-shifting effect. In this case, the domestic country’s emission fee will exceed the Pigouvian tax. Then by endogenizing the tariff, this thesis finds that a negative tariff will be given to the imported goods and the emission fee will decline. However, the emission fee will be set below the Pigouvian tax, if the rent-shifting effect is dominant. Under such circumstances, the domestic country will charge a positive tariff, and set a higher emission fee. As to the foreign environmental policy, which is not subject to the plague of the interest groups, the emission fee will be likely set below the Pigouvian tax.
    Reference: Barnett, A. H. (1980), “The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly,” American Economic Association, 70: 1037-1041.
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    Gawande, K., Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000), “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82: 139-152.
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    Lai, Y. B. (2007), “The political economy linkage between trade liberalization and domestic environmental regulations,” Public Choice, 133: 57-72.
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    Xing, Y. (2006), “Strategic Environmental Policy and Environmental Tariffs,” Journal of Economic Integration, 21: 861-880.
    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255001
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900269
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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