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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124222


    Title: 脫黨參選的賽局分析:其他政黨先行決策模型
    Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacy: A Model of the Other Party Decision Maker as a First Mover
    Authors: 史新媚
    Shih, Hsin-Mei
    Contributors: 王智賢
    Wang, Jue-Shyan
    史新媚
    Shih, Hsin-Mei
    Keywords: 脫黨參選
    資訊不對稱
    序列均衡
    Renouncing party membership
    Information asymmetry
    Sequential equilibrium
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-07-01 11:04:57 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 在台灣的選舉中,基於政黨內派系的競爭、黨內資源的分配不均、政見方向的分歧等因素,未獲提名者與黨內產生衝突的情形時有所聞,面對這樣的情況,對手政黨的決策者需做出應對,未獲提名者也需考量各項情況以決定是否脫黨參選。本文考慮未獲提名者面臨不知道他黨決策者型態之資訊不對稱情況下,利用賽局模型分析他黨決策者決定採取積極或消極行為後,未獲提名者是否脫黨參選之情形。根據求出的序列均衡,我們得知當未獲提名者可感受到其未脫黨而原政黨勝選後的利益時,未獲提名者更容易採取不脫黨參選之策略。另外,若他黨決策者採消極作為,未獲提名者也無法搶走其票源時,策略型的他黨決策者則更容易採取積極作為。
    Due to the competition among party factions, unequal allocation in party resources and different political perspectives, it is a common phenomenon in Taiwan’s elections that un-nominated aspirant has a confrontation with their own party. Under this condition, the decision maker of other party has to make a response, and the un-nominated aspirant also needs to consider every circumstance in order to decide whether to renounce membership of party or not. Considering the situation that the un-nominated aspirant faces asymmetric information, this paper uses the game model to analyze if the un-nominated aspirant will run as candidate after other party makes aggressive or passive action. According to the sequential equilibrium, we conclude that when un-nominated aspirant can share the winning benefits with their own party, there will be higher possibility of choosing not to run as candidate for un-nominated aspirant. Moreover, when the decision maker of other party adopts passive action and un-nominated aspirant can’t take away votes from rival parties, it will be more likely for decision maker of other party with strategic type to act aggressively.
    Reference: 一、中文文獻

    王業立 (2016),比較選舉制度,台北:五南圖書出版公司,第六版,頁125。

    王業立、楊瑞芬 (2001),「民意調查與政黨提名:1998年民進黨立委提名與選舉結果的個案研究」,選舉研究,8:2,1-29。

    吳重禮 (2001),「民意調查應用於提名制度的爭議:以1998年第四屆立法委員選舉民主進步黨初選民調為例」,選舉研究,9:1,81-111。

    徐永明、陳鴻章 (2007),「黨內派系競爭與政黨選舉命運-以民進黨為例」,政治科學論叢,31,129-174。

    姚立明 (2007),「“公辦初選”與“黨辦初選”」,台灣民主季刊,4:2,141-149。

    崔曉倩、吳重禮 (2007),「政黨與未獲提名候選人之參選決策分析」,選舉研究,14:1,119-143。

    郭銘峰 (2012),「日本眾議院選舉政黨重複提名策略與效應:選區層次之分析」,政治科學論叢,51,161-215。

    二、英文文獻

    Andre, A., S. Depauw, M. S. Shugart and R. Chytilek (2017), “Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems: Do preference votes matter? ”, Party Politics, 23:5, 589-600.

    Bawn, K., M. Cohen, D. Karol and S. Masket (2012), “A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics”, Cambridge, 10:3, 571-597.

    Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers.

    Fell, D. (2006), “Democratization of Candidate Selection in Taiwanese Political

    Parties”, Journal of Electoral Studies, 13:2, 167-198.

    Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982), “Sequential Equilibrium”, Econometrica, 50, 863-894.

    Ranney, Austin (1996), Governing: An Introduction to Political Science. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

    Schattschneider, E. E. (1942), Party Government. New York, NY: Holt, Rineheart and Winston.

    Wang, J. S. and M. Y. Lin (2012), “Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacy”, Modern Economy, 3, 653-657
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    106255004
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1062550041
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900082
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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