English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 11 |  Items with full text/Total items : 88866/118573 (75%)
Visitors : 23568298      Online Users : 248
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122796

    Title: 公共社會企業下的民營化政策與中立性
    Privatization neutrality theorem under public social enterprises
    Authors: 賴紫琳
    Lai, Tzu-Lin
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    Lai, Tzu-Lin
    Keywords: 民營化中立性定理
    Privatization neutrality theorem
    Mixed oligopoly model
    Subsidy policies
    Free entry and exit
    Public social enterprises
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-04-01 15:05:41 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文考慮公營廠商屬於公共社會企業(public social enterprises,文後簡寫為PSE),即公營廠商目標函數不包含民營廠商利潤,並建構一個包含考慮補貼政策的異質性混合寡占市場模型,來探討民營化中立性定理以及最適的民營化政策。依據本文的研究結果顯示在公營廠商的目標屬於PSE模式下,(1) 不管是長期抑或是短期,也無論是產品同質或異質模型,民營化中立性定理均不成立。此一結果明顯異於傳統目標函數的模式下,僅有在長期之下民營化中立性才會不成立的結果。 (2) 在長期下最適民營化政策為「部分民營化」,此一結果也明顯與傳統文獻,不管是產品同質抑或是產品異質模型其均為完全國營化的政策。(3) 長期下,當產品為同 (異) 質時,最適補貼額為0 (負)。此一結果與傳統模式下,產品為同 (異) 質時,最適補貼額為0 (正) 有所不同。
    This paper considers the case where the public firm belongs to public social enterprises (PSE); that is, the objective function of public firm does not include the profits of private firms. A differentiated mixed oligopolistic market model which considers the subsidy policy is constructed. We discuss the privatization neutrality theorem and the optimal privatization policy. The major findings are: supposed that the public firm belongs to the PSE model. (1) No matter whether it is long run or short run, or whether the product is homogeneous or heterogeneous, the privatization neutrality theorem does not hold. This result is obviously different from the traditional result for which privatization neutrality does not hold in the long run. (2) In the long run, the optimal privatization policy is “partial privatization”. This result is also clearly different from the traditional model for which is a fully state-owned policy. (3) In the long run, when the product is homogeneous (heterogeneous), the optimum subsidy is 0 (negative). This result is different from the traditional model in which when the product is homogeneous (heterogeneous), the optimal subsidy is 0 (positive).
    Reference: Anderson, S.P., de Palma, A. and Thisse, J.F., (1997), “Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry,” European Economic Review, Vol.41, pp. 1635-1654.
    Cato, S. and Matsumura, T., (2012), “Long-Run Effects of Tax Policies in a Mixed Market,” Finanz Archiv, Vol.69, pp.215-240.
    Chang, C. W., Wu, D. R. and Lin, Y. S., (2018), “Price control and privatization in a mixed duopoly with a public social enterprise,” Journal of Economics, Vol.124, pp. 57–73.
    Fujiwara, K., (2007), “Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly,” Journal of Economics, Vol.99, pp.51-65.
    Hamada, K., (2018), “Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives,” Japanese Economic Review, Vol.69, pp.59-68.
    Kato, S. and Tomaru, Y., (2007), “Mixed oligopoly, privatization, subsidization, and the order of firms' moves: Several types of objectives,” Economics Letters, Vol.96, pp.287-292.
    Matsumura, T., (1998), “Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly,” Journal of Pubilc Economics, Vol.70, pp.473-483.
    Matsumura, T. and Kanda, O., (2005), “Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets,” Journal of Economics, Vol.84, pp.27-48.
    Matsumura, T. and Okumura, Y., (2017), “Privatization Neutrality Theorem in Free Entry Markets,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol.17, pp. 2194-6124.
    Myles, G., (2002), “Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result for the general case,” Economics Bulletin, Vol.12, pp.1-6.
    Poyago-Theotoky, J., (2001), “Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result,” Economics Bulletin, Vol.12, pp.1-5.
    Ramani ,V. and Saha, B., (2012), “Optimal Privatization and Entry in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly,” Indian Institute of Management Udaipur Research Paper, No. 2012-2171274.
    Wang, L.F.S. and Chen T.L., (2010), “Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?,” Journal of Economics, Vol.100, pp. 33-49.
    Wang, L.F.S., Lee, J.Y. and Hsu, C.C., (2014), “Privatization, foreign competition, and social efficiency of free entry,” International Review of Economics & Finance, Vol.31, pp. 138-147.
    White, M.D., (1996), “Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization, ” Economics Letters, Vol.53, pp.189-195.
    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1032550182
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.001.2019.F07
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    018201.pdf1183KbAdobe PDF0View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback