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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/122165
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122165

    Title: 具銀行相關經驗之董事對借款條件之影響:以聯貸市場為例
    The effect of the board of directors’ banking experience on syndicated loan features
    Authors: 詹凌菁
    Chan, Ann Ling-Ching
    Jian, Yu-Ting
    Contributors: 會計系
    Keywords: syndicated loans;director experience;banking industry;information asymmetry
    Date: 2018-05
    Issue Date: 2019-01-25 11:42:44 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study investigates the effect of a board of directors with experience in the banking sector on the features of syndicated loans. We argue that the inclusion of directors with banking experience on the board may alleviate information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, thereby reducing loan spreads and affecting the portion of the loan retained by the lead arrangers. Moreover, directors with banking experience can assist firms with high information asymmetry, to obtain loans on better price term and influence the share of lead arrangers. We test these predictions empirically using a sample of syndicated loans made to US firms over the period of 2001 to 2014 (excluding the years 2008 and 2009). Our empirical results suggest that firms that have directors with more banking experience enjoy lower syndicated loan spreads. We also find that directors with banking experience do not influence the share of loans retained by lead arrangers. We then divide the sample into high and low information asymmetry groups. The evidence suggests that among firms with high information asymmetry, directors with banking experience are negatively associated with loan spreads and positively associated with the proportion of loan facility held by lead arrangers. These relationships are not observed in firms with low information asymmetry.
    Relation: Journal of Contemporary Accounting, Vol.19, No.1, pp.41-75
    當代會計, 19卷1期 , 41 -75
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.6675/JCA.201805_19(1).02
    DOI: 10.6675/JCA.201805_19(1).02
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

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