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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/121838

    Title: 中國大陸金融監管困境的制度性分析
    The Institutional Analysis of the Regulatory Predicaments in China’s Financial Sector
    Authors: 蔡中民
    Tsai, Chung-Min
    Keywords: 中國大陸;金融產業;政府監管;一行三會
    China;Financial Industry;State Regulation;Yihang Sanhui (One Bank and Three Commissions)
    Date: 2018-12
    Issue Date: 2019-01-10 15:02:11 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 中國大陸在經歷了多年的高速經濟增長後,許多問題也相應而生,例如鋼鐵產能過剩、煤電矛盾、太陽能板企業破產、股市狂跌、地方政府債務高築等,無一不對中央政府造成嚴重的挑戰。就金融產業而言,快速成長的同時也突顯了監管體系的脆弱。國有企業較私有企業享有更為容易的銀行融資以及政策優惠,甚至有能力對抗監管單位的約束。為何過往的一行三會監管架構無法有效治理?監管體制的設計有何缺陷?為何在威權主義國家中,竟然會產生監管俘虜的困境?本文旨在回答上述問題,並以新制度主義的研究途徑,從歷史制度論的角度切入檢視中國大陸金融產業監管體制的演進過程。本文認為監管體制的不足之根源在於制度設計的矛盾,亦即中國大陸在採用西方國家新自由主義式的監管體制時,配合國家特殊的政治體制而轉換為行政主導式的監管邏輯。以致監管單位無法規範市場行為,陷入監管失靈的困境。本文嘗試釐清中國大陸政府監管的政治經濟學,以提供威權體制下的國家與市場關係進一步的思考。
    After undergoing rapid economic development for many years, China is beginning to see many new problems emerging, such as overproduction, contradiction between the coal and electricity, bankruptcy of the solar panel industry, the crash of the stock market, a huge local debt, and others. In the financial industry, while there has been a rocketing growth and a rise in innovative production, the regulatory system still has failed to manage the market. The state-owned enterprises enjoy easier banking loan and preferential policies than their private counterparts and are even able to challenge the regulatory agencies. Why has the former regulatory structure of yihang sanhui (one bank and three commissions) been unable to govern the industry? What are the problems about the regulatory designs? Why did the regulatory capture happene in an authoritarian state? This article aims to answer these questions by adopting a new-institutionalist approach and exploring the evolvement of regulatory system in China’s financial industry. This article also argues that the insufficiency of regulatory capacity has its roots in the institutional contradiction. That is to say, while China was adopting the Western style neoliberal regulatory system, it also has converted the system into an administrative-oriented one in order to fit into China’s unique political regime. In the end, the regulatory agencies have been unable to regulate the market and suffered from regulatory failure. This article illustrates the political economy of China’s state regulation and sheds lights on the state-market relationship in the authoritarian state.
    Relation: 中國大陸研究, 61(4), 57-74
    Data Type: article
    DOI: 10.30389/MCS.201809_61(4).0003
    Appears in Collections:[中國大陸研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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