English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 11 |  Items with full text/Total items : 88645/118187 (75%)
Visitors : 23496546      Online Users : 278
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 文學院 > 哲學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/118953
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118953


    Title: 知覺、他者與邏輯:護法《成唯識寶生論》之哲學研究
    Perception, Others, and Logic: A Philosophical Study on Dharmapāla's Cheng weishi baosheng lun
    Authors: 胡志強
    Hu, Chih-Chiang
    Contributors: 林鎮國
    胡志強
    Hu, Chih-Chiang
    Keywords: 護法
    所緣
    因明
    成唯識寶生論
    唯識二十論
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-07-27 12:09:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 《成唯識寶生論》是護法(Dharmapāla 530-561)對世親(Vasubandhu 約4-5世紀)《唯識二十論》(Viṃśikā-vṛtti)的重要註釋書,本文環繞著知覺問題而對《寶生論》展開四組相關議題之哲學探索:知覺及其所緣(ālambana),夢、記憶與知覺,他心問題,因明論證。嘗試反思,藉著對知覺經驗之分析(特別是針對沒有外在對象的知覺經驗),護法《寶生論》是否證成了唯識?本文嘗試性的結論是,護法以因明證成了唯識。然而,因明論證是特定脈絡下、有限制的類比論證。儘管如此,因明之限制對佛教而言未必是缺點,反而是緣起性空的體現。

    護法所成立的基本論式:[宗]緣色等識不取外境,[因]由斯似境相故,[喻]如眩瞖人見髮蠅等。外境不存在,一切唯識就是其立宗(緣色等識不取外境)的意涵。為了回應論敵的質疑(處時定、相續不定、作用等不應成),護法進而成立以此論式為原型的其他論式。上述論式基本上符合因三相的要求,不僅如此,在當時的印度脈絡下,佛教教內、教外都有明確文獻證據顯示,人們認為《二十論》開宗明義使用因明立量,《寶生論》研究是這塊拼圖中的關鍵之處。

    護法因明立量中所使用的同喻(瞖眼人、夢、餓鬼等),代表的是沒有色等外境卻有知覺經驗的例子,而這也是唯識與外境實在論爭辯的關鍵之處。護法利用陳那(Dignāga 約480-540)《觀所緣論》(Ālambanaparīkṣā-vṛtti)所緣二條件來論證,瞖眼人、餓鬼的所緣並非色等外境。本文分析指出,就其當時脈絡而言,護法論證有其理據。另一方面,所緣二條件與當代知覺因果論(The causal theory of perception)有所相通,其中非正常知覺與正常知覺可具有共同要素(例如似外境現),則是支持實在論的非此即彼論(disjunctivism)所極力反對的。本文對非此即彼論提出嘗試性的批評,以支持護法與知覺因果論。另外,針對夢喻,論敵主張夢境是一種回憶,源自於過去對外境的知覺。護法的回應指出夢境不是回憶;夢的經驗有如知覺經驗而且與回憶經驗大異其趣,因此夢仍是沒有色等外境卻有知覺經驗的例子。本文也藉由當代研究與論證,支持護法的論證。

    唯識學是一種多元的識的理論,雖然實際並沒有外境,藉由共同的業,因而在各自的識中顯現並認識到同樣對象,知覺的互為主體性因而可能。另外,根據護法的詮釋,他心智僅以他心為增上緣,緣取自心中所顯現的他心之相,其所緣仍不離識,並非緣取外境(離識之境),唯識學仍維持其一致性。最後,從護法對《二十論》的解讀可知,《二十論》不僅有立也有破,因明論證的過程必須立自破他。筆者認為護法的因明論證解讀更能呼應,世親在《二十論》最後所說的:「我已隨自能,略成唯識義(vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)」。
    Reference: (一)古典文獻
    大域龍[=陳那]造,玄奘譯。《因明正理門論》。CBETA T32, no. 1628。
    五百大阿羅漢等造,玄奘譯。《阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論》。CBETA T27, no. 1545。
    天親[=世親]造,真諦譯。《大乘唯識論》。CBETA T31, no. 1589。
    天親[=世親]造,瞿曇般若流支[或菩提流支]譯。《唯識論》。CBETA, T31, no. 1588。
    世親造,玄奘譯。《阿毘達磨俱舍論》。CBETA T29, no. 1558。梵本見Pradhan, Prahlāda (ed.). 1967. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Abhidharmakoshabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Inst.
    世親造,玄奘譯。《唯識二十論》。CBETA T31, no. 1590。梵、藏、漢對照、校訂與梵本解讀,參考釋惠敏 1997。
    玄奘譯。《瑜伽師地論》。CBETA T30, no. 1579。
    玄奘譯。《解深密經》。CBETA T16, no. 676。
    商羯羅主造,玄奘譯。《因明入正理論》。CBETA T32, no. 1630。
    婆藪盤豆[=世親]造,真諦譯,《阿毘達磨俱舍釋論》,CBETA T29, no. 1559。
    清辨造,玄奘譯。《大乘掌珍論》。CBETA T30, no. 1578。
    眾賢造,玄奘譯。《阿毘達磨順正理論》。CBETA T29, no. 1562。
    陳那造,玄奘譯。《觀所緣緣論》。CBETA T31, no. 1624。
    陳那造,真諦譯。《無相思塵論》。CBETA T31, no. 1619。
    普光。《俱舍論記》。CBETA T41, no. 1821。
    窺基。《因明入正理論疏》。CBETA T44, no. 1840。
    窺基。《成唯識論述記》。CBETA T43, no. 1830。
    窺基。《唯識二十論述記》。CBETA T43, no. 1834。
    護法造,玄奘譯。《大乘廣百論釋論》。CBETA T30, no. 1571。
    護法造,義淨譯。《成唯識寶生論》。CBETA T31, no. 1591。
    護法造,義淨譯。《觀所緣論釋》。CBETA T31, no. 1625。
    護法等造,玄奘譯。《成唯識論》。CBETA T31, no. 1585。

    (二)中日文研究資料
    山口益。2011a [1953]。〈唯識二十論の原典解釋:調伏天造「唯識二十論釋疏」譯解〉,山口益、野澤靜證,《世親唯識の原典解明》。京都:法藏館,頁1-131。
    山口益。2011b [1953]。〈觀所緣論の原典解釋:調伏天造「觀所緣論釋疏」譯解〉,山口益、野澤靜證,《世親唯識の原典解明》。京都:法藏館,頁409-484。
    山口益。2011c [1953]。〈西藏譯觀所緣論の本文並びに還元梵文〉,山口益、野澤靜證,《世親唯識の原典解明》。京都:法藏館,附錄頁1-13。
    印順。1968。《說一切有部為主的論書與論師之研究》。新竹縣竹北市:正聞。
    丘檗。不詳。《二十唯識順釋論略注》。
    宇井伯壽。1958。《陳那著作の研究》。東京:岩波書店。
    宇井伯壽。1963。〈成唯識寶生論研究〉,《大乘佛典の研究》。東京:岩波書店,頁607-811。
    李澈、張傳山。2015。〈盲人夢境中的「視覺影像」是否存在和可能的機制〉,http://blog.sciencenet.cn/blog-2443829-868315.html.
    何建興。2001。〈陳那論感官知覺及其對象〉,《正觀雜誌》,17: 4-31。
    何建興。2002a。〈佛教量論的宗教意義〉,《揭諦》,4: 35-60。
    何建興。2002b。〈陳那邏輯理論探析〉,《佛學研究中心學報》,7: 27-47。
    呂澂。2007。《因明入正理論講解》。北京:中華書局。
    呂澂編校。1991。《成唯識寶生論》,歐陽竟無編,《藏要》。上海:上海書店,頁625-724。
    呂澂、釋印滄。1928。〈觀所緣釋論會譯、附論奘譯本之特徵〉,《內學第四輯第三種》,頁1-42。
    周叔迦。2006。〈成唯識寶生論略注〉,《周叔迦佛學論著全集》第六冊。北京:中華書局,頁3001-3089。
    吳芝瑩。2016。《護法論知覺:以〈廣百論釋論‧破根境品〉為考察核心》。國立政治大學宗教研究所碩士論文。
    林芳民。2017。《覺悟者的心識內容:以〈阿毘達磨俱舍論‧分別智品〉為中心》。國立政治大學哲學系碩士論文。
    林鎮國。2012。《空性與方法:跨文化佛教哲學十四論》。台北市:政大。
    林鎮國。2018。〈論證與釋義:江戶時期基辨與快道《觀所緣緣論》註疏的研究〉,林鎮國、簡凱廷編,《近世東亞《觀所緣緣論》珍稀注釋選輯》。高雄市:佛光文化,頁300-349。
    姚治華。2006。〈論陳那的自證說〉,《現象學與人文科學》,3: 51-83。
    胡志強。2013。〈先果後因?關於逆時因果理論的幾點反思:以達美特與智作護的論述為主〉,《陳百年先生學術論文獎論文集》第九期,國立政治大學文學院,頁141-156。
    胡志強。2016。〈夢、記憶與知覺:《唯識二十論》及其註釋《成唯識寶生論》之研究〉,杭州佛學院編,《唯識研究》第四輯。北京:中國社會科學出版社,頁59-77。
    桂紹隆。1978。〈因明正理門論研究[二]〉,《広島大学文学部紀要》,38: 110-130。
    桂紹隆。2011。《印度人的邏輯學:從問答法到歸納法》,肖平、楊金萍譯。北京市:宗教文化。
    耿晴。2014。〈《辯中邊論》頌文中的兩種唯識三性說模型〉,《臺大佛學研究》,28: 51-104。
    耿晴。2015。〈《大乘莊嚴經論》的兩種唯識三性說模型〉,《臺大佛學研究》,30: 1-64。
    高崎直道等著,李世傑譯。1985。《唯識思想》。台北市:華宇。
    陳一標。1997。〈「識」的詮釋:Vijñāna與Vijñapti〉,《圓光佛學學報》,2: 105-120。
    陳一標。2007。〈唯識學「行相」之研究〉,《正觀雜誌》,43: 5-21。
    陳大齊。2007。《因明入正理論悟他門淺釋》。北京:中華書局。
    陳世賢。2007。〈世親、眾賢對「三世實有」思想所據「認識條件」的論辯〉,《正觀雜誌》,42: 135-187。
    葛詹尼加(Gazzaniga, Michael S.)。2013。《我們真的有自由意志嗎?意識、抉擇與背後的大腦科學》,鍾沛君譯。台北市:貓頭鷹。
    廖本聖、釋惠敏。2002。〈藏本調伏天《唯識二十論釋疏》譯注研究〉,《中華佛學學報》,15: 29-92。
    趙東明。2011。《轉依理論研究—以《成唯識論》及窺基《成唯識論述記》為中心》。臺灣大學哲學研究所博士論文。
    蔡伯郎。2006。〈佛教心心所與現代心理學〉,《中華佛學學報》,19: 325-349。
    蔡伯郎。2017。〈唯識無境在倫理學上的意涵〉,《正觀雜誌》,82: 81-113。
    鄭偉宏。1997。《佛家邏輯通論》。台北市:聖環圖書。
    鄭偉宏。2008。《因明正理門論直解》。北京:中華書局。
    釋仁宥。2015。《陳那現量理論及其漢傳詮釋》。台北市:法鼓文化。
    釋惠敏。1997。《梵本《唯識二十論》研究》。行政院國科會專題研究計畫成果報告。

    (三)西文研究資料
    北川秀則。1985。“A Refutation of Solipsism: Annotated translation of Saṃtānāntarasiddhi”,《インド古典論理学の研究 -- 陳那(Dignaga)の体系》。京都:臨川書店,頁407-429。
    Alston, William P. 1999. “Back to the Theory of Appearing”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 181-203.
    Anacker, Stefan. 2005. Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor, Revised Edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
    Antrobus, J S and E J Wamsley. 2009. “REM/NREM Differences in Dream Content”, in Robert Stickgold and Matthew P. Walker (eds.), The Neuroscience of Sleep. London: Academic Press, p. 310-315.
    Avramides, Anita. 2001. Other minds. London: Routledge.
    Avramides, Anita. 2009. “Other Minds”, in Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.727-740.
    Beebee, Helen, Christopher Hitchcock and Peter Menzies (eds.). 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
    Bértolo, Helder et al. 2003. “Visual Dream Content, Graphical Representation and EEG Alpha Activity in Congenitally Blind Subjects”, Cognitive Brain Research, 15: 277–284.
    Bértolo, Helder. 2005. “Visual Imagery without Visual Perception?”, Psicológica, 26: 173-188.
    Bilgrami, Akeel. 2010. “Other Minds”, in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd ed. Wiley-Blackwell, p. 566-571.
    Blackmore, Susan. 2012. “Sleep, dreams and hypnotic states”, in Consciousness: an introduction, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 373-390.
    Brewer, Bill. 2008. “How to Account for Illusion”, in Haddock, Adrian and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 168-180.
    Byrne, Alex and Heather Logue. 2009. “Introduction”, in Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p. vii-xxix.
    Byrne, Alex and Heather Logue (eds.). 2009. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
    Chu, Junjie. 2004. “A Study of Sataimira in Dignāga’s Definition of Pseudo-Perception (PS 1.7cd-8ab)”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens / Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, 48: 113-149.
    Chu, Junjie. 2008. “On Dignāga's Theory of the Object of Cognition as Presented in PS(V) 1”, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 29, 2: 211-253.
    Cox, Collett. 1988. “On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika Theories”, The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 11, 1: 31-87.
    Cox, Collett. 1995. Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence. An Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
    Crane, Tim and Craig French. 2015. “The Problem of Perception”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/perception-problem.
    Crane, Tim. 2005. “What is the Problem of Perception”, Synthesis Philosophica, 40: 237-264.
    Davidson, Donald. 2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Dennett, Daniel C. 1976. “Are Dreams Experiences?”, The Philosophical Review, 85, 2: 151-171.
    Deshpande, Vijaya. 2000. “Ophthalmic Surgery: A Chapter in the History of Sino-Indian Medical Contacts”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 63, 3: 370-388.
    Dhammajoti, KL. 2007a. Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, 3rd. ed. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong.
    Dhammajoti, KL. 2007b. Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception, 3rd. ed. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong.
    Dhammajoti, KL. 2007c. “Ākāra and Direct Perception (Pratyakṣa)”, Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies, Third Series, 9: 245-272.
    Duckworth, Douglas, Malcolm David Eckel, Jay L. Garfield, John Powers, Yeshes Thabkhas, Sonam Thakchoe. 2016. Dignāga's Investigation of the Percept: A Philosophical Legacy in India and Tibet. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Feldman, Joel. 2005. “Vasubandhu's Illusion Argument and the Parasitism of Illusion upon Veridical Experience”, Philosophy East & West, 55, 4: 529-541.
    Feyerabend, Paul K. 1993. Against Method, 3rd. ed. London: Verso.
    Fish, William. 2010. Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge.
    Ganeri, Jonardon. 2013. The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-person Stance. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
    Gold, Jonathan C. 2015. Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu’s Unifying Buddhist Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.
    Grice, H. P. 1961. “The Causal Theory of Perception”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 35, 1: 121-152.
    Haddock, Adrian and Fiona Macpherson (eds.). 2008. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Hadot, Pierre. 2002. What is Ancient Philosophy?. Michael Chase (trans.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Hattori Masaaki. 1968. Dignāga, On Perception. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Ho, Chien-hsing. 2007. “Consciousness and Self-awareness”, Asian Philosophy, 17, 3: 213-230.
    Hoornaert, Paul. 2004. “The Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka debate as presented in Dharmapāla's Commentary to Catuḥśataka XVI.23”,《金沢大学文学部論集 行動科学・哲学篇》, 24: 119-149.
    Hu, Chih-chiang. 2018. “Self-cognition? Saṃghabhadra, Armstrong, and Introspective Consciousness”, Philosophy East and West, 68, 3, doi: 10.1353/pew.0.0130.
    Hurovitz, C. et al. 1999. “The Dreams of Blind Men and Women: A Replication and Extension of Previous Findings”, Dreaming, 9: 183-193.
    Inami, Masahiro. 2001. “The Problem of Other Minds in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 29: 465-483.
    Iwata, Takashi. 2004. “The Negative Concomitance (vyatireka) in the Case of Inconclusive (anaikāntika) Reasons”, in Shoryu Katsura and Ernst Steinkellner (eds.), The Role of the Example (Dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, p. 91-134.
    Kachru, Sonam. 2015. “Minds and Worlds: A Philosophical Commentary on the Twenty Verses of Vasubandhu.” PhD diss., University of Chicago.
    Kajiyama, Yuichi. 1965. “Buddist Solipsism: A Free Translation of Ratnakīrti’s Saṁtānāntaradūṣaṇa”, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 13, 1: 435–420.
    Kanō, Kyō. 1999. “On anyathānupapatti and avīta/āvīta”, in Shoryu Katsura (ed.), Dharmakīrti’s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Vienna: Verlag Der Österreichischen Akademie Der Wissenchaften, p. 173-184.
    Kanō, Kyō. 2001. “Pariśesa, Prasaṅga, Kevalavyatirekin – the Logical Structure of the Proof of Ātman”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 29: 405-422.
    Katsura, Shoryu. 2004. “The Role of dṛṣṭānta in Dignāga’s Logic”, in Shoryu Katsura and Ernst Steinkellner (eds.), The Role of the Example (Dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, p. 135-173.
    Keenan, John P. 1997. Dharmapāla’s Yogācāra Critique of Bhavāviveka’s Mādhyamika Explanation of Emptiness. The Tenth Chapter of Ta-ch’eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih. Commenting on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka Chapter Sixteen. Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press.
    Kellner, Birgit. 2014. “Changing Frames in Buddhist Thought: The Concept of Ākāra in Abhidharma and in Buddhist Epistemological Analysis”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 42: 275–295.
    Kellner, Birgit and John Taber. 2014. “Studies in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Idealism I: The Interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā”, Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques, 68, 3: 709-756.
    Keng, Ching. 2018. “Three Senses of Atomic Accumulation—An Interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśikā Stanzas 12-13 in Light of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun”, (forthcoming).
    Kerr, N., & G. W. Domhoff. 2004. “Do the Blind Literally "See" in their Dreams? A Critique of a Recent Claim that They Do”, Dreaming, 14: 230-233.
    Kobayashi, Hisayasu. 2011. “On the Development of the Argument to Prove vijñaptimātratā”, in Helmut Krasser et al. (eds.), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, p. 299-308.
    Lewis, David. 2002. “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision”, in Alva Noë and Evan Thompson (eds.), Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, p. 135-150.
    Lin, Chen-Kuo. 2009. “Object of Cognition in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti: On the Controversial Passages in Paramārtha's and Xuanzang's Translations”, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 30, 1-2: 117-138.
    Lowe, E. J. 1995. Locke on Human Understanding. London & New York: Routledge.
    Lowe, E. J. 2005. Locke. London & New York: Routledge.
    Lowe, E. J. 2008. “Against Disjunctivism”, in Haddock, Adrian and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 95-111.
    Malcolm, Norman. 1956. “Dreaming and Skepticism”, The Philosophical Review, 65, 1: 14-37.
    Malcolm, Norman. 1958. “Knowledge of Other Minds”, The Journal of Philosophy, 55, 23: 969-978.
    Martin, M. G. F. 2009a [1997]. “The Reality of Appearances”, in Byrne, Alex and Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p. 91-115.
    Martin, M. G. F. 2009b [2004]. “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, in Byrne, Alex and Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p. 271-317.
    Matilal, B. K. 1974. “A Critique of Buddhist Idealism”, in Lance Cousins et al. (eds.), Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, p. 139-169.
    Matilal, B. K. 1998. The Character of Logic in India. Albany: State University of New York Press.
    McGinn, C. 2004. Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    McGinn, Marie. 1997. Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge.
    Menzies, Peter. 2014. “Counterfactual Theories of Causation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/causation-counterfactual.
    Nasu, Ensho. 2010. “Debates on the Concept of dharmaniḥsvabhāva in Dharmapāla’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiratnasaṁbhava”, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 58, 3: 113-118.
    Nasu, Ensho. 2013. “A Study of the Theory of ‘Consciousness-Only with No External Objects’ Discussed in Dharmapāla's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiratnasaṁbhava”, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 61, 3: 159-165.
    Noë, Alva. 2003. “Causation and Perception: the Puzzle Unravelled”, Analysis, 63, 2: 93-100.
    Okazaki, Yasuhiro. 2006. “The Development of āvīta”, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 54, 3: 21-26.
    Palmer, Stephen E. 1999. Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
    Ricoeur, Paul. 1974. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essay in Hermeneutics, Don Ihde (ed.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
    Ricoeur, Paul. 1981. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, John B. Thompson (ed. trans. intro.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Rosenthal, David M. 2009. “Higher-order Theories of Consciousness”, in Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.239-252.
    Sastri, N. Aiyaswami. 1942. Ālambanaparīkṣā and vṛtti with the Commentary of Dharmapāla. Madras: Adyar Library.
    Saygin, Ayse P., Ilyas Cicekli and Varol Akman. 2000. “Turing Test: 50 Years Later”, Minds and Machines, 10: 463-518.
    Schmithausen, Lambert. 2015. On the Problem of the External World in the Ch’eng wei shih lun. Electronic Edition with Corrections and Additions. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies of The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies.
    Searle, John. 1980. “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417-424.
    Siderits, Mark. 2007. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Indianapolis: Hackett.
    Silk, Jonathan A. 2016. Materials towards the Study of Vasubandhuʼs Viṁśikā (I): Sanskrit and Tibetan Critical Editions of the Verses and Autocommentary, an English Translation and Annotations. Cambridge, Mass.: Department of South Asian Studies, Harvard University
    Snowdon, Paul. 2009a [1981]. “Perception, Vision, and Causation”, in Byrne, Alex and Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p. 33-48.
    Snowdon, Paul. 2009b [1990]. “The Objects of Perceptual Experience”, in Byrne, Alex and Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p. 49-74.
    Soteriou, Matthew. 2014. “The Disjunctive Theory of Perception”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/perception-disjunctive.
    Springett, Ben. 2013. “Philosophy of Dreaming”, in Internet of Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/dreaming.
    Stcherbatsky, Th. 1969. “Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds: Annotated Translation of Saṃtānāntarasiddhi. A Free Translation of Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi with Vinītadeva's Santānāntarasiddhiṭīkā.” Hasrish. C. Gupta (trans.). Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky, Soviet Indology Series, 2, 73-121.
    Taber, John. 1994. “Kumārila’s Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: the Nirālambanavāda-Adhikaraṇa”, in R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in Mīmāṃsā: Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, p. 27-52.
    Tachikawa, Musashi. 1971. “A Six-Century Manual of Indian Logic ( A Translation of the Nyāyapraveśa)”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1: 111-145.
    Thompson, Evan. 2015. “Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness – The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive Science”, in T. Metzinger and J. M. Windt (eds.), Open MIND: 37(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group.
    Tillemans, Tom J.F. 1999. “Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva and Dharmapāla on Scriptural Authority”, in Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and his Tibetan Successors. Somerville (Mass.): Wisdom Publications, p. 27-36.
    Tillemans, Tom J.F. 2004. “Inductiveness, Deductiveness and Examples in Buddhist Logic”, in Shoryu Katsura and Ernst Steinkellner (eds.), The Role of the Example (Dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, p. 251-275.
    Tillemans, Tom J.F. 2008. Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla, and Candrakīrti. The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva, Chapters XII and XIII with the Commentaries of Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti: Introduction, Translation, Notes, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese Texts, Indexes. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
    Tillemans, Tom J.F. 2011. “How to Talk About Ineffable Things: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Apoha”, in Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans and Arindam Chakrabarti (eds.), Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 50-63.
    Tola, Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti. 2004. Being as Consciousness: Yogācāra Philosophy of Buddhism. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
    Tononi, Giulio. 2009. “Sleep and Dreaming”, in Steven Laureys and Giulio Tononi (eds.), The Neurology of Consciousness: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology. London: Academic Press, p. 89-107.
    Turing, A. M. 1950. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind: A Quarterly Review, 59, 236: 433-460.
    Tye, Michael. 1982. “A Causal Analysis of Seeing”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 42, 3: 311-325.
    Tye, Michael. 2017. “Qualia”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/qualia.
    Watanabe, Toshikazu. 2013. “Dignāga on āvīta and prasaṅga”, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 61, 3: 171-177.
    Windt, Jennifer M. 2013. “Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be skeptical about dream reports”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 708: 1-15.
    Windt, Jennifer M. 2015. “Dreams and Dreaming”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/dreams-dreaming.
    Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1963. Philosophical Investigations (3rd ed.) [簡稱 PI]. G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
    Wood, Thomas E.. 1991. Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
    Yamabe, Nobuyoshi. 1998. “Self and Other in the Yogācāra Tradition”, 《北畠典生博士古稀記念論文集》上卷。京都:永田文昌堂,p. 15-41.
    Yao, Zhihua. 2005. The Buddhist Theory of Self-cognition. London & New York: Routledge.
    Zhao, Fei. 2016. “A Study of the Usages and Meanings of Ākāra in Abhidharma”. MA thesis, University of Washington.
    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    哲學系
    100154501
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100154501
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/DIS.NCCU.Phi.002.2018.A02
    Appears in Collections:[哲學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    450101.pdf3029KbAdobe PDF0View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback