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    题名: 金融控股公司對壽險子公司盈餘管理之影響
    The impact of financial holding company on the earnings management of subsidiary life insurance company
    作者: 張維容
    Chang, Wei-Jung
    贡献者: 陳彩稚
    張維容
    Chang, Wei-Jung
    关键词: 金融控股公司
    壽險業
    盈餘管理
    Financial holding company
    Life insurance company
    Earnings management
    日期: 2018
    上传时间: 2018-07-24 10:59:53 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討金控公司對旗下壽險子公司盈餘管理之影響。首先,探討壽險公司之盈餘管理是否與隸屬金控集團有關而有不同的情形。其次,將金控與非金控下之壽險公司區分為兩組,探討兩組公司盈餘管理行為影響因素的差異。最後,則探討金控之壽險公司盈餘管理的影響因素,包括金控集團對壽險子公司董事會之影響,以及金控本身經營狀況及風險之影響。本研究以台灣壽險公司2005年第一季至2017年第三季之季資料進行研究,研究結果如下:
    一、金控之壽險公司相較於非金控之壽險公司,傾向使用會計政策裁量權來從事盈餘管理行為,然而非金控之壽險公司會較金控之壽險公司,則因有達成市場預期之考量,而有較高的盈餘管理可能。
    二、金控與非金控下之壽險公司的盈餘管理行為之影響因素,主要差異包括外部董事比率、董事會規模、保險業務多角化及資產規模。
    三、若壽險子公司董事會規模愈大,且董事會成員有較高比率來自金控母公司或金控集團,則使用會計政策裁量權之盈餘管理的程度愈低。
    四、金控公司本身的經營成果與風險,會影響壽險子公司的經營決策及盈餘目標。壽險子公司為了達成目標,會從事盈餘管理行為,而其主要影響因素為金控公司之經營風險及旗下子公司多角化程度。
    This purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of financial holding company (FHC) on the earnings management of its subsidiary life insurance company. First, this study investigates whether the earnings management of the FHC life insurers is different from that of the non-FHC ones. Secondly, these life insurance companies are categorized into two groups to explore the differences in their earnings management behavior. Finally, the influential factors for the earnings management of the FHC life insurers are analyzed, including the appointment of the board directors for the subsidiary life insurance company and the FHC’s operational performance and risks. Based on the quarterly data of Life Insurance Companies in Taiwn during 2005Q1 -2017Q3, the empirical results are summarized as follows.
    1. The FHC life insurance company tends to use the accounting policy discretion to engage in earnings management. However, the non-FHC life insurance company will have higher possibility of earnings management in order to achieve market expectations.
    2. The differences in the influential factors for the earnings management behavior between the FHC life insurers and the non-FHC peers mainly result from their board independence, board size, diversification in insurance business and asset size.
    3. If the subsidiary life insurance company has a larger board and more board members from the parent FHC or the affiliated firms under the same FHC, the degree of earnings management through accounting policy discretion is lower.
    4. The performance of the FHC, especially the operational risk and the degree of diversification in business, can influence the subsidiary life insurer’s business decisions and earnings targets.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    風險管理與保險學系
    105358006
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105358006
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.RMI.002.2018.F08
    显示于类别:[風險管理與保險學系 ] 學位論文

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