損失準備金估計之正確與否，對於保險費率之公平性具有重要影響力。根據以往之研究發現，損失準備金可能受到保險人之人為操縱，以配合公司之財務目標。為防止造假與不適 當費率，監理機關通常要求費率必須事先核准，然而冗長之審查程序往往影響費率反映損失經驗之時效性，進而部份抵銷事先核准規範之效果。本文之主要目的在於提出一理論模型，以說產險費率決策過程中，由於保險人與監理機關雙方之資訊不對稱，保險人操縱準備金之道德危險與事先核准規範二者間之關係。本文之研究方法主要是以最佳控制理論(optimal control theory)為基礎，分析監督稽核策略對於保險人操縱造假程度之影響。本文之研究結論主要包括下列二點：(1)保險人造假程度程度愈嚴重，則愈容易受到監理單位之稽核；(2)監理審查時間長短將影響保險人之造假行為，審查拖延愈久，則造假程度愈高。因此根據研究結果，本文建議監理機關可藉由改善審查效率而抑制保險人之操縱造假行為。
The accuracy of loss reserve estimation is important for determining the fair price of an insurance policy. According to the previous studies, the loss reserves are vulnerable to manipulation by the insurer in order to pursue certain financial purposes. To prevent the manipulation and inadequate rates, the insurer is required to obtain the approval of rates from the regulator. However, the regulatory review process may cause time lag between price and claim losses information and thus offset the effect of prior-approval.The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical model to explain the relationship between the moral hazard of loss reserves manipulation and prior-approval rate regulation for property-liability insurance rating decision,with consideration of asymmetric information between the insurer and the regulator. Based on the optimal control theory, this paper develops a dynamic optimization model to analyze the manipulation behavior of the insurer. The findings of this paper imply the following two points. First, the higher level of manipulation, the higher probability for the insurer being audited. Second, the regulatory reviewing lag will induce the level of manipulation, i.e., the longer the lag, the higher the level of manipulation. The results of this study suggest that the regulator can reduce the level of loss reserves manipulation through the improvement of efficiency in the regulatory review process.