|其他題名: ||Criminal Sanctions on P2P File-sharing under Proposed ACTA Are No Panacea|
|關鍵詞: ||Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement(ACTA);Non-commercial P2P File-sharing;Economic Effects|
|上傳時間: ||2016-08-31 17:09:46 (UTC+8)|
|摘要: ||「反仿冒貿易條約」草案（以下簡稱本草案）乃一多邊協議的條約，欲為有效平衡智慧財產權人（以下簡稱智財權）與消費者間的權利，此亦為著作權人、商標權人乃至專利權人所企盼。反之，本草案內容一旦過於嚴苛，跨國企業不僅無法達到其所期盼的目標，甚至可能須面臨本草案衍生的負面效應。舉例而言，先前日本與美國共同提案所揭露的刑罰條款，本草案欲拘束非商業性質之仿冒與偽造的目的更臻明確。頗具爭議的是，經由網路傳輸與資訊科技產生的非商業活動，例如點對點的檔案傳輸，也將為本草案刑罰規定所約束，此舉恐就資訊社群造成二大影響。其ㄧ是本草案與TRIPS 第61條間扞格，或者更精確地說，本草案擴張了「與貿易相關之智慧財產權協定（TRIPS）」的範圍；此外，本草案亦與「電子通訊隱私法案（ECPA）」及「千禧年著作權法案（DMCA）」未合，乃因本草案之令狀豁免條款將免除網際網路服務提供者之責任；其二是就智財侵權行為施以刑罰，將造成抑制創新與反競爭現象，乃係市場力量反而成為激發偽造與仿冒的誘因。知名經濟學者Oberholzer-Gree 和Strumpf 的實證研究，更足以質疑本草案提議刑罰條款之實效，該研究指稱非法音樂下載並非造成音樂銷售下滑的主因，恰與影音產業之指控相悖。易言之，對非商業性質之檔案分享施以過度嚴苛的刑罰，無法有效抑制侵權；反就經濟學角度觀之，有效減少侵權活動的方法，乃使智財權人就其投資獲得對等之回報。故本文旨在提出一種新的態樣，重新分配數位內容固有製造與傳播之邊際效應，與降低智財權人所需負擔的訴訟成本，以促智財權人與公眾利益二者之衡平。|
The proposed “plurilateral” Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)intends to effectively “re-balance” the rights between intellectual property right (hereinafter as IPR) owners and consumers, as copyright, trademark and even patent holders believe. Yet, once the ACTA goes too far, the multinationals who wish for a double windfall, may be disappointed later when the adverse outcomes follow contrary to their expectations. More specifically, the criminal enforcement provision in the earlier leaked text of the ACTA, makes it clear that the Japan - U.S. joint proposal would like the ACTA to go well beyond cases of commercial counterfeiting and piracy. Arguably, non-commercial activities that take place through internet distribution and information technology such as peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing would be captured by this provision, which would likely result in unprecedented impacts to an information society in two aspects. First, such proposed ACTA would be inconsistent with Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, or, more accurately, has expanded the scope of the TRIPS Agreement; in addition to the clash with the TRIPS Agreement, the ACTA would contradict the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as well, owing to the omission of subpoena provisions that protect ISPs from liability of privacy violations. Second, the imposition of criminal sanctions in cases of IP infringements would highly possibly to bring about thefallouts of anti-innovation and anti-competition and thus may not turn out as the ACTA purported, rather, such approach would conversely encourage motivation to piracy and counterfeiting conducts, arising from market forces. As a convincing rebuttal against the criminal enforcement provision in the proposed ACTA, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf’s empirical study found that illegal music downloads have had no noticeable effects on the sale of music, contrary to the claims of the recording industry. Stated another way, over-strict criminal sanctions on non-commercial file-sharing users should not be the way to effectively deter infringement; instead, while prosecutions will not stop illegal file trading altogether, what IPR owners need to do, economically, is to reduce infringement enough that they can make a return on their investment. Therefore, this article aims to provide a new paradigm that both re-allocates the marginal costs inherent in the production and distribution of digital content, and lowers enforcement costs burdened on IPR owners, to maintain the equilibrium of IPR holders and the general public.
|關聯: ||政大智慧財產評論, 8(1), 1-28|
NCCU Intellectual Property Review