羅伯特．布蘭登(Robert Brandom)主張意義(meaning)是規範性的概念：語意或概念內容的理論角色在 於決定字詞或概念之正確用法。因此他建議， 關於意向內容的解說可以只應用規範性或義務性的概念，而毋須訴諸真理或指稱等語意概念。然而，「意義」表面上並不同於「善」或「正義」等一般規範性的概念；而關於意義或信念之陳述表面上亦不是評價、規範或規則的表述。若然則意義究竟在甚麼理解下是規範性的？而在此理解之下，義務性的概念是否真的足以說明意向內容？本文認為，意義提供了規範指導說話者如何作出真實的斷言：僅在這薄弱的工具義上，意義才是規範性的。因此，「意義是規範性的」這主張要另行補上對斷言的解釋才能成立。然而，本文會論證，布蘭登對斷言的解釋是失敗的，因為其理論並不能將制定斷言的規範與其他指導語言行為的規範（例如禮節）區分開來。這是由於在他的理論架構之下，只能用規範性概念來解釋斷言，而不能訴諸語意概念之故。這便意味著布蘭登的推論主義(inferentialism)的基本信條可能是錯誤的：純粹規範性的後設語言並不足以說明語言的意義。 Robert Brandom contends that meaning is a normative concept, in that the role of the notion of meaning or conceptual content is to determine the correct use of words or application of concepts. Hence he proposes that an adequate account of intentional content can be given solely in terms of normative or deontic concepts, without appeal to semantic notions such as truth or reference. Yet meaning clearly is not overtly normative, in the way that concepts such as ‘good’ or ‘just’ are, and statements about meaning or belief are not obviously evaluations, prescriptions, or expressions of rules. So in what sense is meaning normative? And given that sense, can intentional content indeed be explained by appeal to deontic notions alone? I argue that meaning is normative only in the weak, instrumental sense that it provides norms to guide speakers in making true assertions. The claim that meaning is normative is thus tenable only if supplemented by an independent account of the concept of assertion. I then argue that Brandom’s attempt to provide such an account using only normative concepts is unsuccessful, because it is unable to distinguish the norms that institute assertions from other, broader norms that apply to speech acts generally. This conclusion suggests that one of the fundamental tenets of Brandom’s inferentialism is mistaken: A purely normative metalanguage is not sufficient to explain meaning.
政治大學哲學學報, 12, 71-100 The national Chengchi university philosophical