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Thabo Matsau

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Master's Thesis:

The Social and Economic impacts of hosting the FIFA World Cup in the Developing world: A Case Study of the Poor, the Excluded and the Disenfranchised in South Africa 2010..

在發展中國家舉辦世界盃足球賽對於經濟和社會之影響: 針對 2010 南非世足賽排擠窮人工作權與生存權之研究

Advisor: Professor David Blundell

Committee: Professor David Lorenzo

Professor Chang Kuo-Hui (National Taiwan University)

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Abstract

Gone are the days when the hosting of lavish mega-events is exclusive to the wealthiest and most developed nations. Gone too are the days when sporting mega-events were purely sporting spectacles. With tournaments and events generating billions of dollars, developing nations in the global south have, with increasing enthusiasm, bid to host such events. But how does a mega-event actually affect a community, a city, a society? What happens when that community is particularly impoverished and in an under-resourced developing nation? At times, the social security inferiority of developing nations produces results starkly different results to those of the developed world and in other situations the challenges are universal but are exacerbated in the developing world, often with dire consequences. This dissertation seeks to understand how, on social and economic levels, the hosting of sporting mega-events manifests itself to particular groups in society, in particular kinds of nations. This is done with the hope that developing nations bidding and hosting in the future may better appreciate the reality and therefore not only set more realistic expectations but also better prepare to guard against and remedy the inevitable consequences on some sectors of the population.




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Chapter1: Outline, Foundation & Theory

1.1 Introduction and Background

Mega sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics have traditionally been hosted in richer, developed nations in Europe or the Americas but the last decade or two has seen an increasing number of events being hosted in developing nations that would usually not get a looking into. Advocates and supporters of developing nations hosting such events usually cite social upliftment and economic development as the benefits of and justification for hosting such an event. Despite this, there is always a significant faction of people, including organized interest groups and common citizens that strongly oppose the events being hosted in their nations. Most of this discontent is based upon the belief that tax payers money could be far better be spent in different sectors and initiatives within the society and the economy. This is an accompaniment to the claim that economic development and prosperity from the event benefit very few people and/or companies, most of which are closely associated with the host body (FIFA, IOC etc.).

During the 2010 tournament many South African businesses and companies, big and small, that thought they stood to benefit were pushed out the market and could not operate within the World Cup bounds because FIFA sponsors and affiliates essentially monopolize the games. Even poor street vendors and hawkers, who are a mainstay in the South African economy and rely upon business generated by events, were not allowed to operate during that month. Another concern in the time since the world cup is that the stadia that has been built at a cost of about US\$1.5b, money that could have been spent on infrastructure to improve the living conditions

of ordinary South Africans, are for the most part, gathering dust and draining tax payer monies in operating and maintenance costs- a classic white elephant scenario. My papers focus and research question is therefore built around the notion of common South Africans and how much the WC benefitted them. This is with reference to things like number of (sustainable) jobs lost or created and the growth of the economy that can be attributed to the WC.

With South Africa being the first nation of its kind to host the football world cup and one of the very first developing nations to host a mega-sized world event of this magnitude makes my research topic very original. Of course I am not the first person to ask questions of this nature but the field of research (Mega-Events in developing countries) as a whole is very new as the phenomena of hosting these events in the developing world is relatively new. I think this topic and research question is relevant and important as the developing world is increasingly enthusiastic about hosting such events with belief that it will bring the country prosperity in many shapes and forms. It is now finally time to assess if that claim is true. Research like this will also help organizing bodies like the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) make better and more sustainable choices and regulations in the future. Another possibility is the exposure of these governing bodies and their affiliates as money-hungry capitalists who had very little intention of investing much capital in the countries that host such world events.

1.2 Research Question

Thesis title and topic:” The Social and Economic impacts of hosting the FIFA World Cup in the Developing world: A Case Study of the Poor, the Excluded and the Disenfranchised in South Africa 2010”

As the bidding and hosting of most mega-events, regardless of a country’s relative wealth, development or economic standing, raises the same or, at least, very similar eyebrows and questions across the board, I feel it is important to question and attempt to identify if there is a golden thread of reason and logic to explain the phenomena. If indeed there is, then what can be done in the future by host cities and organizations in an attempt to alleviate marginalization and not to leave the proverbial bitter taste in the mouths of host citizens and communities? To this end my broad, fundamental research questions is ‘Does FIFA and the World Cup exploit host nations economically whilst exacerbating their social inequalities and hardships for the poor?’ I would also be interested to investigate and determine just what the social and economic consequences are on these marginalized and excluded groups. Essentially, my research will be asking questions that ascertain just how much South African tax payers sacrificed, financially & otherwise, and what they received in return. In the most simplest terms, this paper will reveal who were the real big winners and big losers of this event, and to determine if the event served the purpose of social upliftment that so many expected of it or if it simply served to enrich the rich and protect private/corporate interests.

Given South Africa’s history, issues of race, class and demography are inextricably tied to this paper. With above topic and research questions in mind I have identified dual Dependent

variables, which could essentially be explained and defined as one, owing to the fact that the notions, namely; evictions and exclusions, are inextricably tied. However, for the sake of clarity and simplification I will point them out as two distinct variables. The first dependent variable is therefore 'informal trader/sector exclusion from economic benefits of FIFA World Cup 2010' (street trader exclusion) and the second is 'the eviction and forced removal of residents of low income or informal settlements' (Evictions/removals). With regards to independent variables, I have identified 'FIFA & their corporate associates financial interests' as one and 'gentrification & urban beautification' as another.

This research topic is of importance and interest for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is an increasing trend of developing nations and emerging economies bidding to host mega-events and we can only assume that more and more of them will be awarded such rights. It is however, imperative for these nations (and the sporting bodies) to fully appreciate that the socio-economic dynamics of developing nations are, most often, not at all similar to those of developed nations, and so the commitments, costs and consequences for developing nations will be vastly different. Developing nations usually have larger proportions of their population in precarious socio-economic situations, thus making those groups more vulnerable and susceptible market forces like a mega-event. As a focus groups, the 'evicted & removed' as well as the 'economically excluded members of the informal economy' are of interest and importance because they are likely to be far more numerous in a developing nation as opposed to a developed one, whilst the state resources and welfare systems that can support these kinds of groups in a developed nations are usually lacking or weak in the developing world, hence sporting bodies wishing to host in these regions need to assess their strategies and

developments through a lens that they have perhaps never had to before. FIFA, on the other hand, is of interest and importance because in the realm of contemporary international relations and socio-economics, FIFA represents the growing trend of extremely powerful and influential NGOs on the global level. This delicate balance of power is of keen interest to social scientists and IR scholars, and only becomes more interesting when nations subordinate themselves to international organizations by resting hopes for development and economic growth on the shoulders of these bodies and their mega-events. This study is important because if it were found that the relationship between international sporting bodies, their mega-events and developing nations is particularly exploitative and exclusionary then we must prepare for and remedy this in the future.

1.3 Methodology

This will fundamentally be a qualitative research paper that uses primary data sources such as government, LOC and/or FIFA reports and statistics, as well as secondary data such as academic papers & journals, and media & news reports.

In the modern era, the 2010 edition of the FIFA World Cup hosted by South Africa was the first World Cup to be hosted in the developing world and certainly the first in Africa. With that in mind there are no prior events with which to make a case study or comparisons. As a result, I will compare to all or any prior World Cups if and when a comparison is necessary or relevant. This could be done to highlight the difference in consequence or problem when hosting in the developing world as opposed to the developed world, or a comparison could be made to show a pattern of problems and issues that repeat themselves throughout World Cups or mega-

events, regardless of location. In similar fashion, owing to its equal status as a sporting mega-event, I shall also compare or refer to scenarios surrounding past Olympic events, particularly Beijing 2008, as China could be described as developing. However, with that said, this study and this paper is essentially a case study unto itself and it presents many nuances and particularities that are unique to South Africa such as the youthfulness of our democracy, our unique and complex economy and our racially divided past that still determines social inequalities today. Hence, the primary focus and case study will be South Africa itself and I will refer to local case studies or scenarios to support or disprove certain theories or beliefs.

The above independent variables very much inform and are part and parcel of my own theories and hypothesis as shall be explained going forward. With regards to the notion/variable of informal trader exclusions, I am referring to the banning and removal of street traders and vendors from stadiums and their surroundings which are declared as 'Exclusion Zones', as well as the harassment and hindering of informal economy activities in general (eThekweni Municipality, 2010:8). Bear in mind that these vendors are most often in the informal sector because of an inability to contribute in the formal, and they have established their 'businesses' in chosen areas because of the foot traffic and relative proximity to clientele and resources they may need to sustain their business. These businesses are traditionally tiny, one-man operations that generate little profit but are essential in supporting families and livelihoods. Proximity to stadia, entertainment areas, trade zones and transport hubs is central to the survival of these informal businesses and subsequently the families supported by them. It is with the above in mind that I ponder just why FIFA, the South African government or the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) would be so adamant on their removal and exclusion. To this end, the first

justification I can think of runs along the lines of neoliberal capitalism where financial interests are vehemently guarded and monopolies are established in the interest of competition eradication (Mabugu & Mohamed, 2008). With that said, my theoretical and methodological approach to this paper will be 'neoliberalism'. Neoliberalism is an ideology that involves a commitment to the rolling back of the Keynesian welfare state's collectivist institutions and the ethos of universal provision to the rolling out of market mechanisms and competitiveness to achieve economic growth (Peck and Ticknell 2002; McGuirk 2005). If, by definition, neoliberalism is the use of policies like deregulation, privatization, tax-cuts and globalization to promote rationale self-interest then, by definition, the FIFA World Cup is monumentally neoliberal. Neoliberal policies are known to encourage economic growth and capital accumulation but due to the laissez-faire approach, benefits, growth and capital flows are never equally spread and are almost always achieved at the expense and peril of an exploited or excluded group. This dissertation will therefore assess if the World Cup and other mega-events perpetuates neoliberal disparities within a society.

My hypothesis and theory with regards to evictions and forced removals of residents is that in an attempt to look as attractive to tourists and international media the country must present itself in its cleanest, most developed fashion imaginable. Unfortunately, in a country like South Africa where the gap between the haves and the have-nots is alarmingly wide and clear and yet they often live within a relatively close proximity to each other, particularly in the cities, the result of this is to deny and hide the existence of sub-par housing and slums. In cases where said informal settlements are thought to be too much of an eye-sore for tourist and investors

then they are simply raised to the ground and their inhabitants are 'asked' to move elsewhere, usually temporary informal settlements with worse facilities etc. than their last homes

The paper will begin with the approach of a critical analysis in the sense that it will identify and assess how, economically and socially, the World Cup manifested itself in South Africa and what this meant for the population and the economy. To this end my empirical research will seek to find statistics and information on issues such as employment and job creation, forced evictions, small business and entrepreneurship rates and just who was excluded and how. This paper will be a distinct and unique contribution to academia in the sense that where other authors and researches have explored the socio-economics of World Cup hosting, whether that be in South Africa or elsewhere, this paper will be primarily focused on the informal economy (street traders and vendors in particular) as well as the housing rights of evicted and removed people. Furthermore, I shall be comparing and contrasting these focus groups with the unique and yet unexplored socio-dynamics of the developing world so that developing nations and their emerging economies are better prepared than South Africa was

1.4 Literature Review

Let us begin with a few definitions and clarifications to avoid confusion. Within the realm of world events and spectacles there is a small niche termed 'mega-events'. These are termed so because of their sheer size and ability to captivate audiences and thus generate massive capital flows. In the field of sports there are no events more mega than FIFA's football World Cup or the Summer Olympics, in fact, the term mega-event is seldom used in sport beyond one of these two quadrennial events. So grand a spectacle are these events that a rigorous (and

expensive) bidding process takes place up to a decade before the actual event and the host is awarded the rights 6, 7 or even 8 years before the event to ensure immaculate planning and infrastructure (Van Kampen, 2008). To highlight this, one need look no further than Qatar which was awarded the hosting rights to the 2022 tournament back in 2010 thus giving them 12years to invest and plan for the event.

When it comes to a nation's hosting of a sporting mega-event like the FIFA World Cup, people's opinions usually fall into one of two categories, and there is seldom any ambivalence.

Observers and commentators either fully support & advocate for the tournaments hosting or they starkly oppose it. The literature around such tournaments reflects a similar pattern inasmuch as most authors appear to have a premeditated agenda and thus present their opinions and findings in a manner that clearly opposes or defends the event without much appreciation for the flip-side of the coin. My hope with this literature review, and dissertation in its entirety, is to present both sides of the argument and thus identify ways in which future events can be better organized for a more equal distribution of benefits and minimizing the reasons to oppose the event in the first place. When such a tournament is hosted in a developing nation such as South Africa, tensions between advocates and detractors can be even more heated with socio-economic ramifications being keenly debated. On one side of the debate there are those that predict and foresee positive economic and social spin-offs such as job creation, foreign investment, infrastructure development & upgrades, increased tourism and more intangible factors such as national pride and positive marketing for the country as a foreign investment potential. The above views are held by authors and scholars such as Preuss (2000), Darkey and Horn (2009) and Jory and Boojihawon (2011), amongst many others. On the

other side of the house are detractors of such states hosting an event of this magnitude due to the socio-economic investments and sacrifices it entails and the belief that they serve a minority but burden the majority. These authors include Lenskyj (2000, 2008), Cornelissen (2004, 2012) and Tayob (2012)

Using these two broad schools of thought, the following literature review will present the socio-economic pros, cons and challenges of hosting a mega-event in the developing world as backed by these and other authors. As the title of my research suggests, this will primarily be a South African case study with the chief focus on the FIFA World Cup staged in 2010. This paper will be discussed in two separate yet inextricably tied subsections, namely; the social and the economic. For the sake of clarity the literature will be presented under several sub-headings or notions that appear recurring, and arguments on both sides of the house will be put forward using grouped authors and arguments, with notions of (economic & social) development and consequences for the poor being the golden thread. It is of interest to note a pattern of gradual growth in discontent and opposition in the time leading up to the tournament. This, according to Cornelissen (2012) and Tayob (2012), is partly attributable to a shift from a positive to negative sentiment within the population, particularly the poor and disenfranchised once they realize that beyond the entertainment spectacle of the event they actually stand to gain nothing economically. Many even stand to lose as the tournaments policies and structure essentially work to serve the interests of a few privileged firms, companies and individuals whilst the marketing rhetoric surrounding the world cup is far more inclusive and suggests potential for equal distribution of benefits and profits.

Let me start in the time leading up to the World Cup by looking at the expectations and preparations of the South African public as well as the political elite & Local Organizing Committee (LOC) that are tasked with delivering the World Cup to FIFA's exact and stringent specifications. First and foremost, it is imperative to note that although the World Cup essentially belongs to FIFA, it is primarily funded by the host nation inasmuch as they are financially and logistically responsible for ensuring that all infrastructure around the tournament meet FIFA's world class standards and all systems and market forces are geared to maximize profits for FIFA and her commercial partners. FIFA's corporate affiliates and sponsors, for example, paid a combined total of US\$3.2bn to be World Cup affiliates, in return FIFA and the LOC do everything in their power to protect affiliates from their competitors. This protection includes a monopoly on what may or may not be advertised and marketed in football spaces and what products may be sold in stadiums and their surroundings (Venter et al, 2012; Tayob, 2012). Take South African Breweries as an example. South Africa was home to the world's largest Brewery at the time, SAB-Miller, which produces a host of internationally acclaimed but locally brewed South African beers and alcohols. However, FIFA's liquor associate is Budweiser and so not only did SAB (i.e. South African economy) miss out on that slice of the World Cup pie (neutral: no gains-no loss), SAB loses (negative consequence) income as their products could not be sold in many areas where they had traditionally operated such as stadiums, fan parks, taverns and any other establishment within FIFA demarcated areas. Similarly, McDonald's is the food and snacks affiliate and Adidas the kit sponsor. As a result the traditional South African football scene of vendors, hawkers and street traders with an array of cuisine or countless football jerseys or kits was conspicuous by its absence during the World

Cup month. So conniving is FIFA's business model that Humphreys (2010:1) describes the hosting of the World Cup a "rent extraction scheme" whereby host nation tax payers money is used to fund and host a lavish affair, the profits and benefits of which are thinly spread. Even more frightening is that despite selling just broadcasting rights at a price exceeding US\$2bn and made a revenue of well over R25bn/US\$3.2, FIFA still officially operates as a tax-exempt, non-profit organization. So essentially, in simple English, the government pledges to build all infrastructures and ready all facilities to a very high standard, at a very high cost. They then invite FIFA to come host a party and use all those facilities at no cost, they allow them to invite their affiliates and conduct business of all sorts, whilst unapologetically denying anybody that is not an affiliate from conducting business or benefiting off the World Cup hype. Then, lastly, they allow FIFA and her affiliates to leave without paying tax on the monies they have made and without acknowledgment or compensation for the billions of dollars South African's could have made or their billions wasted making the event happen (Wonacott, 2010; Celik, 2011; Kolo, 2011, Tayob, 2012). One does not need to be an economist to see the lose-lose-lose complexion of this equation. So contentious is FIFA's relationship to the host that some have said that it undermines a countries sovereignty as is evidenced by Brazil's need to amend their national drinking laws, whilst others say that FIFA and the World Cup infringes upon the rights of the poor when local institutions and systems are modified and adapted purely for the purpose of delivering the event without much thought for the consequences on the poor or the population at large (Lenskyj, 2008; Cornelissen, 2012)

Being essentially a public funded affair it is no surprise political elites and government were fully behind the bid and they made an effort to mobilize support. There was a need to justify

such extensive public investment and expenditure on what is essentially a leisure activity, especially when more than half the population lives below the poverty line and the South African GDP per capita is below US\$10.000 per year (Humphreys, 2012; Tayob, 2012). To this end, those responsible for the bid identified the need to ensure that the World Cup be *perceived* as mutually beneficial and encompassing, thus serving as a catalyst for improving the physical environments and social wellbeing of the population, particularly those that were previously disadvantaged and disenfranchised (Pillay and Bass, 2008; Jory and Boojihawon, 2011; Celik, 2011). A general consensus on what South Africans wanted and expected out of the tournament includes tangible economic and material gains, intangible feelings of nation building and pride as well as to take steps towards overcoming international obscurity and marginalization. Political elites including then president and vice president, Thabo Mbeki and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as well as the current president and his then deputy Jacob Zuma and Kgalema Motlanthe all lent credence to the notions of prosperity emanating from the hosting of the tournament. When the hosting rights were awarded in 2004 some of the key legacy areas recognized by Motlanthe included peace and nation building, regional football development, tourism and environment, continental security and improved ICT and communications systems. (Nkemngu, 2012) Zuma went even further by forecasting socio-economic spin-offs for the entire SADC region in terms of job creation, poverty reduction, social upliftment and the quelling of stereotypes, misconceptions and afro-pessimism in general (Desai and Vahed, 2010) whilst Mbeki predicted continental ramifications with effects being felt as far as Cairo, essentially inspiring an African renaissance of sorts (Kolo, 2011). In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world mega events are seen as economic and soft

tools to mobilize international attention and attracting international business and capital investments. The basic idea is that public funds are invested to encourage economic activity and opportunity which reciprocates as entrepreneurial and employment opportunities, thus setting a foundation for a healthier economy and improved standard of living through regeneration, gentrification, skills and infrastructure development and economic growth (Preuss, 2000; Darkey and Horn, 2009; Jory and Boojihawon, 2011; Venter et al, 2011; Kolo, 2011). South Africa's racist history is inextricable from any conversation on development or international perception of South Africa. The idea was therefore to use the World Cup as part of the country's strategy to development and a better international image and status. Looking back on the Rugby World Cup in 1995 or the African Cup of Nations in 1996, both hosted by South Africa, we are reminded of the healing and unifying power sport has and the positive effects it has already had for South Africa (Jory and Boojihawon, 2011; Cornelissen, 2012)

Despite the positivity in rhetoric, Jory and Boojihawon, (2011) and Tayob (2012) agree that the realities and real experience often did not match the predictions or ambitions put forward beforehand. This is not unique to the South African case as it appears to be common in the bidding and hosting of mega events. The South African government and the LOC employed Grant Thornton, a leading firm in the field of consultancy, auditing and business advice to crunch the numbers and make predictions and estimations against a host of financial and social indicators. Over the preparation years and through the World Cup we see a general pattern of rather inconvenient gross under or over estimates by the firm with regards to budget requirements, expected returns and the outcomes of certain actions or activities. The inconvenience I am referring to here is the fact that many aspects of the bid and hosting

process were undertaken precisely because of the forecasts made by firms like Grant Thornton, and so when it is discovered that hosting the tournament costs exponentially more than we had budgeted for or that far fewer tourists arrived than we had estimated then questions of whether it is worth it or if, had we known beforehand, would we have still bid to host then become more pertinent. This is particularly concerning for developing nations as resources and budgets are comparatively less, hence the consequences of bad economic decisions are more detrimental, especially for the poor. Worryingly, when comparing figures between Grant Thornton and other LOC/FIFA affiliated agencies to independent auditors and consultants the numbers are vastly different at times, begging the question of whether these firms generate data and rhetoric that serves and protects the interests of FIFA and the SA government/LOC whilst convincing us, the public, that it is a good idea to bid for and host an event (Jory and Boojihawon, 2011; Tayob, 2012). Figures and facts around these exaggerations and false predictions/estimations will be presented throughout the paper when relevant but it is fair to say that they contribute to the sentiment that the World Cup has a strong impact on poverty reduction when, in fact, Pillay and Bass (2008), Kolo (2012) and Venter et al (2012) all contend that there is no evidence from previous World Cups or mega-events that this is the case.

According to Deloitte's Lwazi Bam South Africa is both a developed and a developing nation, with a solid economic and technological foundation, but without the necessary infrastructure to support the potential. The world cup was seen as the bridge between these two notions. The World Cup was bid for precisely because it was believed that it would help advance the

economy and develop infrastructure at a rate far quicker than any other political or economic activity. By incorporating the World Cup into South Africa's long term development models the event would even help SA meet her Millennium Development Goals (MDG), whilst inclusion of SA into the BRIC(S) states highlights the events ability to attract and inspire confidence.

According to many supporters of the tournament that positive image projection, marketing and inspiration of confidence in the country is all part and parcel of why we bid for events in the first place (Pillay and Bass, 2008; Jory and Boojihawon, 2011; Kolo, 2011; Nkemngu, 2012). On the other hand there is literature that argues that mega events have no significant, direct impact on development or economic activity or, at least, there is very little indisputable evidence to support these claims (Black & van der Westhuizen, 2004; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Humphreys & Prokopowics, 2007). In similar light, others argue that the fundamental issues with using the World Cup as a development tool is that any benefits which are likely to come from the event will not be widespread or equally distributed and that, in many respects, the benefits will only be felt for the duration of the tournament or a relatively short term, in an unsustainable manner. This again raises the question of public funds for private/commercial gains (Matheson and Baade, 2004; Celik, 2011). All the while, Ritchie (2000), Lee & Taylor (2006) and Pillay & Bass (2012) argue that the economic impacts are intangible, variable and ambiguous. A common argument against the tournament is that the vast funds invested in delivering the tournament could be far better spent elsewhere and that the World Cup represents a misdirection of public funds and misplaced priority on the part of our leaders. Desai & Vahed (2010) support this by pointing out that the amount of money invested in the

World Cup is equivalent to the amount of money the government spent on housing the homeless between 2000 and 2010.

Let us now consider the financial numbers and pure economics of the tournament. According to a senior economist at KPMG, Frank Blackmore in Jory and Boojihawon (2011), the World Cup and related activities injected an estimated ZAR93b into the economy whilst Tayob (2012) notes that LOC president, Danny Jordaan, estimated foreign expenditure gains of ZAR30bn when independent firms estimated a figure closer to ZAR13bn. South Africa pledged ZAR400bn between 2006 and 2010 just on infrastructure development across the board (not only World Cup) within the national budgets (Desai & Vahed, 2010) whilst post event figures show direct infrastructure expenditure in the World Cup to have been between ZAR30bn and ZAR33bn (Tayob, 2012). On one hand, the government and LOC forecast and estimated a growth of 0.5% to the GDP but final figures show a growth rate of 1% after the World Cup, leading Minister Gordhan and other commentators to label the tournament an economic success (Jory and Boojihawon, 2011). In fitting in with the theme of overestimations and exaggerated claims by advocates of the event, Tayob (2012) notes that a 2005 estimate made by Grant Thornton and presented by Danny Jordaan forecast a total direct infrastructure expenditure of ZAR3.154bn and by 2010 post-event figures show the cost of Cape Town's stadium alone to be ZAR4.5b again questioning the reliability of firms closely associated with FIFA or the LOC. Some argue that, false predictions aside, the expenditure was not sustainable or considerate of the long-term because most of that infrastructure was geared directly towards the World Cup as opposed to the needs and wants of the general population, particularly the poor and disenfranchised. An example of this is the expenditure on the Gautrain, South Africa's version

of an urban hi-speed metro-rail network which accounts for a majority of the ZAR13b spent on transport infrastructure leading to the games. The argument here is that the price and classing of a ticket makes it inaccessible to a majority of South Africa's poor population, even the routes and areas it currently operates in make it geared towards a very specific demographic of the population which clearly does not represent the population mean. According to Jory and Boojihawon (2011), South Africa's annual revenue is US\$75b whilst the expenditure is US\$100b leaving a 25% deficit. Funding the World Cup adds even more pressure to the countries fiscal reserves, meaning that funds initially earmarked for the betterment of the poor and other functions of government are redirected. This redirection of funds inevitably results in the inferior delivery in basic services whilst the net benefits and profits of the event are unlikely to be felt by those most likely to suffer the negative consequences such as poor service delivery (Bohlmann & Van Heerden, 2008; Desai and Vahed, 2010; Jory and Boojihawon, 2011). This notion ties in neatly with the arguments of misplaced priorities and funds on the part of the government as well as the notion of public/tax funds being used for private profit or the benefit of a select few, as offered in the previous paragraph.

With regards to 'development' I have identified 'infrastructure', 'tourism' and 'employment' (linked to poverty reduction) as recurring themes throughout the literature. The catalyst component of the world cup is captured by the infrastructure drive it sparked with the public sector infrastructure program which committed ZAR846bn over 3 years, ZAR261bn of that coming in 2010. Erasmus (2010) notes that this infrastructure drive created no less than 415000

jobs and markedly improved roads, airports, stadiums, hotels and communications networks. Of course, of interest to us now is to note how many of those jobs were sustainable or long term/beyond the tournament itself as this contributes to social upliftment. Infrastructure is prominent because of all the upgrades and new additions that preparations for the event were expected to usher in, thus creating jobs and boosting the economy. In fact, infrastructure is so closely linked to mega-events and the 2010 World Cup in particular that president Mbeki once identified the event as the vehicle that will deliver modernity to South Africa (Cornelissen, 2012). Total direct expenditure on infrastructure for the games was around the ZAR33bn/US\$4.3bn mark, ZAR11.7bn/US\$1.5bn of which went towards stadiums, ZAR13bn/US\$1.7bn going towards transport infrastructure and ZAR1.5b going towards broadband and communication, creating anywhere between 13000 and 20 000 jobs in the construction and hospitality (Humphreys, 2010; Kolo, 2011). Infrastructure surrounding security, policing and justice were also given an overhaul including the long-term training and employment of 40 000 police officers, thus highlighting one of the few indisputably sustainable benefits that serves to benefit all citizens of the country (Jory and Boojihawon, 2011).

Despite the positives presented above, infrastructure is still one of the most contentious and controversial subjects when bidding and hosting a mega-event. The ideas of sustainability and cost-benefit ratios are of vital importance in any mega-event but issues are further exacerbated when dealing with a developing or emerging economy/society. 3 prominent issues around infrastructure include the already mentioned misplacement and misdirection of public funds and energy, the use and benefits of the infrastructure being below expectations whilst the costs to construct are always above expectations and lastly, the notion of white elephants i.e. lavish

assets whose maintenance costs are more than they bring in whilst they serve very little practical use to local society and cannot be very easily rid of (Matheson & Baade, 2004; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Pillay & Bass 2008, Celik, 2012). An example of FIFA's and the LOC's lack of sustainable foresight or concern for total tax payer dollars spent can be seen by observing the histories of both the Cape Town Stadium and the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban. With regards to the former, most of the football in Cape Town takes place in peripheral, non-white communities and townships. Traditionally, Athlone Stadium has always been regarded as the home and stadium of Cape Town's football. It was proposed that this stadium be upgraded and host games for the World Cup but this idea was vetoed and the reasons offered were that poverty and economic eye-sores to be found in the township are not what tourists want to see (Tayob, 2012) This is a two-pronged issue in the sense that firstly FIFA and the LOC missed a golden opportunity to bring the World Cup to the poor, disenfranchised local communities, which they had promised to do in the bid. Secondly, instead of committing more funds or taking steps towards for the development of the Athlone area to better the lives of its inhabitants and remove the eye-sores FIFA was concerned about, the decision was taken to rather just sweep poverty under the carpet and try our hardest to keep it hidden from tourists and foreigners. Furthermore, Cape Town has for many decades had a world class stadium in the middle class, white suburb of Newlands where Rugby is the preferred pass-time. In a decision that would have saved billions, FIFA opted against upgrading Newlands Stadium and chose to rather construct a stadium by the picturesque Green Point sea side, an upper-class white suburb with virtually no history of football simply because this part of town was deemed more aesthetically pleasing for tourists, with no consideration for post-tournament use or the development of a

suffering community that really need investment. Similarly, in Durban, Kingspark stadium in white suburbia is a world famous institution that has always hosted Rugby events whilst Chatsworth Stadium, where football is largely hosted, is located in a run-down peripheral zone. FIFA again chose not to upgrade either of the 2 already existing stadiums but took the daftest and most expensive decision to construct a brand new stadium literally across the road from the already well equipped Kingspark Rugby Stadium (Tayob, 2012).

This directly opposes South Africa's development agenda with regards to MDG's and claims made during the World Cup bid which stated the commitment to constructing facilities in disadvantaged areas and the periphery. The above is given even more pertinence when it is revealed that outside of football matches involving South Africa's two biggest clubs then the average turn-out to local football matches is less than 5000 which is well below the 60-70-90 000 capacity in stadiums constructed throughout the country, many of which are in areas with no local team or history of football culture (Kolo, 2011; Tayob, 2012). One can argue that beyond football, stadiums and facilities can generate income through events and corporate functions etc. such as is done with Japan's stadiums post-2002 but even this is essentially private use and private profits from the initial public expenditure, a point which has been raised several times already (Whitson & Horne, 2006; Pillay and Bass, 2008). Cornelissen (2004) wrote that South Africa needed to be particularly conscience of the long-term impacts, uses and consequences of the World Cup infrastructure drive if we want to alleviate the negative impacts and wastefulness which plagues most mega-events. Based on examples such as the Gautrain expenditure, building of facilities like King Shaka airport and decisions around stadium construction, it appears that the infrastructure drive was not particularly sustainable or

considerate of benefits to the poor, especially when we cast our minds back to Desai & Vahed's (2010) claim that expenditure on stadiums could have built 90 000 houses a year for the homeless in the four years leading to the World Cup. One cannot but wonder why decisions that seem far more costly and irresponsible were of taken, to this end we must take neoliberal cognizance and assessment of who the real beneficiaries of the infrastructure drive were. Kolo labeled the infrastructure drive as "borrowed prosperity" (Kolo, 2011:25) so let us consider just where that prosperity is borrowed from and by whom. As argued by Tayob (2012), the infrastructure drive funded by the tax paying society was actually very profitable for a select few firms and individuals. Indeed the drive created thousands of jobs in construction etc. but a vast majority of these are unskilled, low paying and short-term, essentially making little difference to poverty or employment rates over time. The real benefit goes to the construction firms, most of which were outsourced 1st world firms meaning tax payer funds moving offshore instead of boosting the local economy and firms (Celik, 2011; Jory and Boojihawon, 2011). In similar light, Desai & Vahed (2010) argue that locally, only a small elite and firms benefited from the infrastructure drive and government investments. Sadly, evidence suggests that most World Cup tenders and contracts were awarded to apartheid era companies like Murray & Roberts or Group5 Construction which are examples of power and wealth still concentrated in South Africa's white minority and their offshore affiliates. In terms of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) which is a notion inextricably tied to Africa's first World Cup, it appears that tenders and contracts were awarded to firms belonging to or associated with South Africa's black elite who are already frightfully wealthy. Even more worrying is that these elites such as Tokyo Sexwale and Bulelani Ngcuka (husband to former Deputy president Phumzile

Mlambo-Ngcuka) are all closely related to the government if not a part of it officially (Desai & Vahed 2010). The above explains why decisions to construct expensive but unnecessary stadiums and infrastructure were taken and how/why very few local companies and firms actually benefitted from the billions available to be earned. Similarly, we begin to appreciate how and why the initial infrastructure estimate was ZAR2.5bn, rising to ZAR8.4bn in 2007 and exceeding ZAR33bn once totaled (Desai & Vahed 2010). Had we been quoted such a hefty bill in the bid stage we may have turned down the opportunity to host, but being given the bill only after eating the proverbial meal can only leave a bitter taste in one's mouth.

One of the prevailing, central notions of this thesis is the idea of sustainability. With regards to tourism, this notion is particularly tricky to define and the World Cup as an event is susceptible to both praise and criticisms in this regard. According to a report by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) sustainable tourism development "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs", whilst the World Trade Organization (WTO) states that sustainable tourism development "requires informed participation of all relevant stakeholders" (Nkemngwu, 2012:2). It is the latter point that raises eye-brows when considering the bidding and hosting of the World Cup in 2010. According to a study by the Department of Tourism, then Tourism Minister, Marthinus van Schalkwyk was quoted as saying that the "World Cup was worth every cent invested" as more than 309000 tourists poured into the country leaving behind in excess of ZAR3.2bn and more than 95% saying they would return to the country (BuaNews, 2010;1). The same study revealed that the outside world's awareness of South Africa as a leisure destination increased by 9% as the world cup played a significant role in changing foreign attitudes towards the country. It's

believed that the June-September tourist rate for 2010 was up about 20% on 2009 whilst hotel occupancy was up 6% and hotel revenue was up 121.7% on figures for the same period in 2009. When considering that every 10 tourists are believed to create one job locally, this seems a worth-while period (Kolo, 2011; Nkemngu, 2012). Conversely, although 309000 total tourists seems positive, it is only a fraction of the 450 000 estimation upon which the bid and investments were made, again highlighting the inaccuracy, significance and purpose of estimations prior to the hosting of an event of this nature (Kolo, 2011; Nkemngu, 2012; Tayob, 2012). 309 000 tourists' amounts to only 4% of 2010's total tourist figures, and the estimated ZAR3.2b they spent is less than 10% of the countries investment which begs the question of whether the event is *really* worth it from the tourist perspective. Furthermore, it is important to understand if and how those tourists engaged with the informal economy as this is the only way their presence can really benefit the poor.

With regards to employment and job creation, Humphreys (2010) reminds us that South Africa is a developing nation with an annual GDP per capita of less than US\$10 000 and an unemployment rate of 24% in 2009, leaving half the population in poverty. As a result, necessity (rather than opportunity) created a large and robust informal economy that supports millions of South Africans. This informal sector is a product of the apartheid era where Africans were offered no opportunities for education or acquiring skills that could be used in the formal economy (Celik, 2011; Venter et al, 2012). In addition to this, apartheid laws prohibited Africans from residing or conducting business in certain areas so, with survival and self-preservation in mind, Africans engaged in hawking, trading, vending and all other manner of informal, entrepreneurial activity. It goes without saying that the jobs and opportunities in this sector are

unskilled and low paying (Matheson and Baade 2004; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Celik, 2011).

With this in mind we see why employment and job creation were so high up on the agenda for the 2010 World Cup. To this end president Zuma claimed in 2009 that more than 400 000 jobs had already been created by World Cup associated activities and SA Info (2010) noted that:

The number of annual jobs sustained in total is 695 000. Of these, 250 000 annual jobs were sustained in 2010 and 174 000 by the net additional economic activity in this year. This is an economic measure of equivalent annual jobs sustained by this amount of economic activity, and not new jobs created

(Kolo, 2011)

Whilst economist Frank Blackmore states that it is obvious to tell that the world cup was a success and he notes the tournament's 1% added GDP growth rate as evidence, opposition to the tournament are more concerned with where that 1% is located and just who, in terms of class and demographic, actually benefitted from the tournament. The world cup and other mega-events are seen as catalysts to and supporters of entrepreneurial activity. The significance of this phenomena is made more poignant when one considers that most of South Africa's informal sector is made up by necessity and survival where most engaged have low levels of qualification and little potential for upward mobility or employability in the formal sector (Wonacott, 2010; Kolo, 2011; Tayob 2012). Although it is hard to accurately calculate, it is estimated that the informal sector makes up 25% of total employment and contributes between 5% and 6% of GDP (Venter et al, 2012). Herrington, Kew J and Kew P (2010) note that although a majority of entrepreneurs did not report an immediate positive impact from the

world cup two-thirds of start-ups less than a year old, 70% of new firms between the ages of 1 & 3 as well as half of all established business believed in the long term benefits for them and the South African economy. Hence the overall start-up increase in 2010 is mostly attributed to the world cup.

This positive outlook can be attributed to what Comaroff and Comaroff have termed as 'millennial capitalism' which describes the process whereby people, societies or nations self-sacrificially consume and spend beyond their means with the hope that such consumption will bring about prosperity in the future. Mega-events such as the world cup are seen as tools of millennial capitalism and they involve a sacrifice by all simply to reinforce the interests and benefit of a few (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001). The notion of millennial capitalism is inextricably tied to that of globalization whereby nations, particularly peripheral or developing nations are desperate for international recognition hence they seek catalysts to foreign investment and economic injections. Although South Africa's millennial capitalism expenditure during the world cup is justifiable and reasonable to an extent, the unfortunate reality is that the world cup essentially serves the interests of large local and international capital entities (Tayob, 2012). In an attempt to sell this millennial dream and convince the nation and its masses to consume and spend with the 'promise' of future returns, host nations and organizing bodies often massively overshoot estimations with final figures across the board seldom reaching what was first predicted and budgeted for. (Tayob, 2012) This is evidenced by the Grant Thornton estimates pre-2010 and their realities following the event. It is also important to note whose agenda or interests are being supported or pushed by reports such as that by Grant Thornton, a firm employed by government. Furthermore, millennial activities such as the

world cup are often referenced as nation building tools, particularly for nations like South Africa which often have dark pasts. This emotive language and millennial promises convince people to invest, consume and sacrifice with the hope of future prosperity which, for most people, never comes (Tayob 2012). The emotive language of millennial hope and capitalism mask the skewed deal FIFA strikes with the host nation which required the host to provide all infrastructure and running costs in return for a percentage on match tickets and the hope of publicity turning into investment. The notion of millennial consumption and capitalism also ties in neatly with neoliberal strategies of development.

Despite job creation and employment being commonly cited justifications for mega-event bids and hosting, Celik (2011) notes that there is no evidence to support the claim that mega-events create or maintain jobs in the long term or sustainably. Furthermore, COSATU, South Africa's biggest trade-Union, claimed that the World Cup was mostly a missed opportunity to create jobs and develop skills as most products were mass produced abroad whilst informal street traders and vendors, a trademark of South African football, were mostly excluded from event activities due to FIFA's stringent by-laws (Tayob, 2012). Inextricably tied to the notion of employment is that of poverty reduction, another factor advocates for mega-events commonly cite as advantageous. The perceptions of poverty reduction and benefits to the poor are based primarily on the hope of a trickle-down effect with the logic being that money injected and circulating in the economy will inevitably spark economic activity resulting in jobs and other opportunities but, of course, this is a highly inaccurate and presumptuous means of analyses (Hiller, 2000; Pillay and Bass, 2008). Mega-events are often commercial successes but they highlight very little change for the poor. Although there is a perception that events nurture

entrepreneurship and support small business, evidence supports the contrary as mega-events offer few opportunities to non-affiliates (Wonacott, 2010; Jory and Boojihawon, 2011). Owing to the temporary nature of jobs provided one cannot regard the jobs created figures to be sustainable or worth any significant impact on employment or poverty rates, thus highlighting how mega-events are actually poor vehicles for economic development in transitional economies, in direct contrast to statements and views provided by presidents Mbeki, Zuma and others (Baade & Matheson, 2004; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Pillay & Bass, 2008). In addition to this, as has been argued by Kolo (2011), Cornelissen (2012) and Tayob (2012) earlier in this literature review, mega-events may even exacerbate the effects of poverty as public funds are misdirected, leading to poor service delivery and negligence of projects aimed at the poor.

It was said earlier in this paper that the World Cup has often been accused of by-passing democratic systems or infringing upon the rights of the poor. One of the most significant ways this takes place is through projects of urban renewal and gentrification which, in reality, were simply forced evictions and an attempt by government to hide poverty and remove eye-sores from the aesthetics of the World Cup (Celik 2012). This urban beautification process often evicted families from cities and urban areas to 'temporary' locations in the periphery, displacing many thousands of people. Even more worrying was the lack of concern or acknowledgement that most of the people being forcibly removed are also being separated from their source of income (informal stalls etc.) and the foot traffic they need in the urban centres to attract clientele. Herein lays the notion of the World Cup leaving many homeless, hungry and jobless when it was sold as a bringer of prosperity (Celik, 2012; Cornelissen, 2012; Tayob, 2012). The

need for urban renewal in South Africa is not debatable, however what is the manner in which it was implemented in 2010 and leading to then.

1.5 Expected Finding

Going forward, this thesis will conduct more research into marginalized and excluded communities and peoples within society. To this end there will be a more thorough analysis of particular case studies in South Africa which led to the eviction and forced removal of people under the guise of urban renewal and beautification. Furthermore, there will be a more in depth investigation into who benefitted (corporate & political entities vs. the poor) in comparison to who was excluded. With 'job creation' and 'entrepreneurship' often quoted as positives from mega-events, I will test this claim or theory by comparing employment statistics over time. This will determine if the World Cup had any particular or significant impact on these figures. I suspect that the World Cup bidding system and FIFA's expectations and regulations may perpetuate or even guarantee a marginalization of a massive proportion of the population whilst a select few firms, corporations and individuals stand to benefit exponentially. This study will address the issue and determine to what extent, if any, this is true.

However, many South African's who were in the country during the 2010 World Cup and made no financial gains out of the event, or even attended a game I still look back on the event with much pride and consider it a relative success....why? By investigating and presenting intangible and non-quantifiable factors and variables, particularly for a country with South Africa's history, I hope find reasonable justification for why South Africa and other developing nations may want to host mega-events.

Chapter 2: Analytical Research and Analysis

The following section of this dissertation shall be a more hands-on investigation of the mega-event with a particular focus on the exclusion of the informal sector as well as forced removals and evictions of inhabitants of low cost housing and the homeless peoples. My attention shall be focused here because, firstly, it is the voices and needs of these groups that are most often unheard, ignored or simply exploited by neoliberal capitalist activities which, as I will argue, the FIFA World Cup essentially is. Secondly, unlike in nations like Germany, where the 2006 World Cup was hosted, poor, disenfranchised peoples and communities of this nature often make up the majority of the populace in the developing world. Hence any activity or event, particularly those that claim to be benefactors or champions of the poor needs to be checked and double checked for its social consequences and encouraged to behave in a socially responsible manner. If developing nations are going to be bidding to host MEs in the future it is important that they and policy-makers know how to protect vulnerable groups. The 2010 edition of the event was indeed informed and underpinned by that 4 years prior in Germany, however, and quite unfortunately, a direct superimposition of one event on the other can only lead to 'unforeseen' discrepancies and social backlash. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the World Cup is organized by 3 major stakeholders, namely; FIFA, the LOC and the national government but a 4th stakeholder in population/society has very little input and, bar entertainment for those that can afford it, receive very little output or benefits either. In essence, commitments and pledges are made without consultation of societal stakeholders and this perhaps explains why FIFA, the government, and elites in general label the event as a success and yet the pulse on the ground can have a different beat.

The size, popularity and reach of the World Cup globally have made the event far bigger than a simple series of football matches. The prestige and, of course, financial repercussions have made it not only the most coveted prize in sport with regards to competing in and winning, but also to host. If this notion holds true for most countries, even those that are not traditional football strongholds, then this sentiment is certainly most pertinent in the developing world, particularly Africa where the tournament had yet to be hosted. This is because the World Cup has transcended far beyond a mere sporting event, into a global spectacle and has evolved into a massive marketing tool for corporations and nations alike. I have already written at length about the marketing and reimagining strategy adopted by many nations when bidding for and hosting mega-events of this nature. This notion was so pertinent and central to South Africa's bid that a National Communication Partnership was established between the International Marketing Council of South Africa and the state government. Whilst working in tandem with a host of public relations firms on the continent and around the world, they were tasked with selling an image of Africa as a continent with prosperity and opportunity, devoid of the poverty and instability that so often characterizes images and perceptions of the continent abroad (Jordaan, 2008; Webb, 2010). The fact that Qatar, for example, a country ill-equipped, horribly suited (desert heat) and with very little history or interest in football, bid and won the rights to host the tournament in 2022 is testament to the perception and public relations element encompassed in hosting, because clearly football in and within itself is not the primary motivation to host for Qataris. Although it is vitally important that the west has more balanced understanding of Africa, which requires the showcase of the 'other Africa' which these firms and their campaigns promote, unfortunately what happens with regards to mega-events is that

the marketing imagery and jargon we use to sell ourselves and convince the world of our hospitality and investment value somehow becomes the only Africa we wish for the world to see. This point is particularly poignant and significant in relation to the World Cup when one considers how and why racialized, classist gentrification in the shape of evictions, removals and exclusions inevitably takes place when any nation, particularly a developing nation embarks on a project where the selling of perceptions, the changing of images or the reshaping of a national brand is a top priority. This type of marketing reduces the complexities and very real struggles of a society like South Africa's to tasteful, inoffensive images that are fed to the world. The trouble lies in maintaining that fabricated, one sided image when the tourists arrive and this manifests as a pretense that no such poverty or deprivation exist, to sweep the scourge of the poor under the proverbial carpet so to speak (Webb, 2010; Bolsmann, 2013). This sequence highlights a neoliberal solution to a neoliberal problem encountered whilst organizing an event in a neoliberal fashion.

With the World Cup being a global event it is highly susceptible to external pressures which can coerce or constrain the state government and organizers of the event. This pressure can be exerted by overt 'recommendations' such as the one that lead to the building of the Green Point Stadium as opposed to renovations to the facilities in Athlone or Newlands. A second way in which FIFA and affiliates impose their will is through bills, acts and agreements which, at times, require a change of state & constitutional law, thus essentially undermining the host nation's sovereignty. By appreciating how the Host City Agreements or the notorious Slums Act operate, for example, we would be better equipped to analyze and understand if, through state legislature, FIFA and the World Cup 'legally' discriminate against and marginalize individuals

and groups that don't share the same interests. Host City Agreements were, for the most part, utilized by FIFA to get guarantees that local and municipal government will pull no stops in assuring that public and marketable spaces are monopolized by FIFA and that the interests of FIFA and her affiliates are always stringently protected. The result of this is the government's cooperation in the economic exclusion of all non-affiliates, and this has a drastic effect on the informal sector and the poor. The Slums Act on the other hand, had a mandate of eliminating substandard housing conditions by giving the Housing MEC authority to prescribe a time in which it would be compulsory for municipalities to evict unlawful occupiers of slums as well as all shack dwellers if landowners failed to do so. Both the Agreement and the Act we criticized by civil society as they were deemed to be anti-poor and in contradiction with South Africa's constitution. The ambition and desire to showcase South Africa as a world class destination at the cost of those that perhaps do not fit in with that definition was of such importance to the organizers that a movement aptly named the World Class Cities for ALL (WCCA) campaign was launched with the purpose of highlighting inequality and uneven distribution of resources and benefits with regards to the World Cup. WCCA, as both a notion and a campaign, shall be explored and further elaborated upon later in this paper, but the golden thread highlights how this World Cup, in rather contradictory fashion, emphasized the notion of world class pan-Africanism and yet the entire event was set against a backdrop of abject poverty and systemic exclusion, whilst FIFA essentially commandeers the government and manipulates the economic/market space to serve herself and her multinational corporate affiliates. As with many areas of social life that would not usually receive such scrutiny in most parts of the world, football in South Africa is a highly politicized and racialized space. Similarly, although racial

apartheid is constitutionally abolished, the cities and the spaces that are hosting the World Cup remain structured and shaped by the past, thus creating politicized spaces that inadvertently adopt a more classist apartheid (which inevitably has a racial tinge itself).

2.1 Informal Economy: Marketeers and Street Vendors

Unlike in the developed north, developing nations and emerging economies are likely to have a large proportion of their workforce engaged in informal activities and a noteworthy amount of the economy and fiscal flow will also be concentrated in the informal sector. When government policies and development initiatives do not incorporate or empower poor people and members of the informal sector but focus on capitalist, neoliberal means of development and investment, then the results are inevitably economic exclusion, a lack of upward mobility and an ever widening gap between rich and poor. It should go without saying that the informal economy will continue to grow exponentially as people seek a means to survive. My point here is to highlight and illustrate the irony and contradiction of the economic development policies adopted and encompassed by FIFA and the LOC when delivering the World Cup to South Africa. The notion of 'world class' is one that underpinned South Africa's World Cup right from the bid to its post-mortem, and the countries ambition to achieve such a status became dangerous and irresponsible at times. Dealing with and resolving socio-economic problems seems to have lost its place on the agenda and was replaced with an acceptance to simply hide and ignore said socio-economic problems. The irony I refer to here is found in, for example, the fact that in an attempt to present the country as a 5star, world class destination, the policies past and decision taken very often slowed down the countries progress and ensured that the title 'world class' is

not legitimately earned. A World Cup that incorporated, included and embraced Africa's bustling informal economy would have not only provided a more authentic African experience but would have also encouraged grassroots entrepreneurship and developed the skills, acumen and capital accumulation of those in the informal sector, perhaps even empowering them to enter the formal economy, and thus contribute to the future of a genuinely world class city and country. Instead their exclusion simply reinforced the economic injustices and inequalities that already existed.

Leading to the World Cup, it was estimated that one quarter of South Africa's labour force was engaged in informal employment. This dissertation has and will continue to point out the intersectionality of 'race' and 'class' with regards to the World Cup in South Africa but it is imperative not to forget or ignore a third component in 'gender'. Whilst poor, unskilled, working-class men mostly engage in jobs requiring some kind of physical exertion (construction, mining, garden work etc.), the informal economy, characterized by hawking, vending and marketeering is predominantly the domain of women. Many of these women are mothers and the solitary breadwinners of large families. From an analytical perspective, one can deduce that, based on the intersectionality of race, class and gender, poor black & coloured (a South African term for mixed-race) women were the most ill-affected and certainly the group that benefitted least from South Africa's hosting of the Cup. One of the fundamental ways in which FIFA and their sponsors/affiliates guarantees that the World Cup is off-kilter with the needs and desires of the host population is a persistence in unilateral planning and development of the tournament, as is evidenced by the treatment of a representative body for informal traders. The body in question is StreetNet International (SNI) which is essentially a coalition of informal

traders. In an attempt to seek franchise, or at very least be consulted on world cup developments that would affect them, SNI approached the governments and municipalities of several major cities including Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban in 2007. Although the group was granted the courtesy of meetings, it was quite clear that FIFA and the organizers had very little intention of taking their calls and cries seriously as unilateral decisions continued to be made (Cottle, 2010). Very often the cities had little choice but to hide behind the fact that FIFA by-laws and policies had temporarily usurped the state policy and decision making processes. Having non-governmental organisations and the multi-national corporations they are in bed with essentially writing policy within the borders of sovereign states is extremely dangerous and illustrates the power, scope and influence FIFA has through the World Cup alone. In their defense, FIFA exclaimed that informal vendors would have the opportunity to benefit and they supported this claim by offering skills and trading training then offering the trainees exclusive access to exclusion zones. Again, at the surface this appears commendable and the type of development and investment an emerging economy would require, but our excitement is short-lived when we consider some of the factors involved. First and foremost, the amount of informal vendors that were chosen and received this kind of training and endorsement is miniscule and, in fact, almost irrelevant in comparison to the amount of vendors and informal tradespeople that were displaced, removed and put out of business by the World Cup and affiliated developments. Secondly, an investigation of the kind of work and the kinds of product these people were peddling quite quickly exposes the very sinister intentions of FIFA and her MNCs. Vendors traditionally trade home made goods/foods or inexpensive consumer goods but they are essentially independent and self-employed. Instead of empowering these people and

encouraging their businesses to grow, the very select few informal traders that were chosen were trained in a manner that would only subject them to eternal servitude and not to economic independence or growth. Furthermore, those that were trained were not simply allowed to trade their products and pocket the profits as they usually would. Instead, they were licensed and permitted to deal in FIFA affiliated products only. What this translates to is essentially a system where FIFA and their sponsors have managed to undercut and monopolize the entire market, and have ingeniously found a manner in which to peddle their goods using desperate, vulnerable cheap labour, thus maximizing profits. The very select few who were allowed to peddle their own goods under the auspice that they were not in the product range of any of the sponsors, also found trading not to be as straightforward as they would like. These traders found that they were expected to present and package their goods to a standard imagined by FIFA, and this usually meant the incurring of unnecessary and unforeseen costs. FIFA also established price-scales that those vendors had to adhere to, resulting in many vendors inflating their prices and pricing themselves out of the market. In a final show of FIFA's disregard for poor people in the informal economy, FIFA and the LOC repeatedly identified already existing markets and places with a long history of informal activity and swiftly repossessed those public spaces as part of the exclusion zones, thus evicting existing tenants and traders. Even more troubling was the manner in which vendors and traders were offered stalls and spaces in prime real estate (often where they had operated for years without such a fee) in return for exorbitant registration and rental fees that low income earners are very unlikely to be able to afford. This series of events again highlights how FIFA World Cup policies

can lead to the economic exclusion and even exploitation of vulnerable groups in the society. (Lindell et al, 2010; Bolsmann, 2011; Robbins, 2012)

2.2 Evictions & Displaced People

Evictions and forced removals of people has forever been a symptom of mega-events, with events as far back as the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and recently as the last edition of the World Cup hosted in Brazil 2014 all guilty of the practice. In Seoul, a total of 48000 buildings were demolished, displacing 15% of the city's population, whilst a million people were displaced in Beijing for the 2008 Olympic Games (Wyatt, 2010). The 2014 edition of the World Cup hosted by Brazil is believed to have evicted and displaced no less than 250 000 people (Somin, 2014). What is most concerning about this trend is the pattern in demographic of people that are affected. Victims of forced removals in the name of preparations for a mega-event are almost always poor peoples on the lowest rung of the economic ladder and social hierarchy. These groups are usually targeted precisely because of their financial positions and their inability to access the funds and resources that can defend or represent their interests. Harassment of these groups is usually under the guise of gentrification, beautification and development which, in fairness, are processes cities must undertake every now and then. The problem, however, lies in the practical application of such policies which very often leaves the most vulnerable members of society in very precarious positions, reinforcing and exacerbating the socio-economic upheavals they already face. Regardless of location, these policies are famed for 'othering' and even criminalizing poor or homeless people as opposed to seeking sustainable solutions to deal with their plight. In a developing nation like South Africa, where the poor

dominate the social classes, this is particularly concerning and thus should be prioritized in future bids.

In 2004, the year South Africa won the bid to the hosting rights, the United Nations found that 28.7% of South Africa's urban dwellers lived in slum-like conditions whilst the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) calculated that 57% of the South Africa's population lived below the poverty line. In 2005, an international NGO, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions estimated that 7.5million South Africans were either homeless or lacked the access to adequate living conditions, with the city of Johannesburg alone housing 190 urban informal settlements (Wyatt, 2010). The grim record of evictions in the lead up to other mega-events before this, particularly in cities more developed than those of South Africa, should have been an early cause for concern, whereby a sustainable and socially responsible contingency plan was conjured up in order to avoid slum-like Temporary Relocation Areas spawning throughout the country.

Evictions and removals in South Africa were underpinned and legitimized by the 'Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act', commonly known as the Slums Act. This act was passed in 2007 and swiftly criticized as unconstitutionally prejudicial against the poor. The Act was also denounced by the United Nations when UN Special Rapporteur on Housing, Miloon Kothari stated; "such legislative developments may weaken substantive and procedural protection concerning evictions and increase exemptions for landlords. They may even result in criminalizing people facing eviction" (International Alliance of Inhabitants, 2009; Para 5). One of the hugely frustrating consequences of the Slums act is that in its attempt to eradicate slums,

the policy essentially creates bigger, less resourced and more peripheral slums via TRAs, which are never truly temporary. Their removal not only disjoints people from the city and their livelihoods but also guarantees that they are excluded and have no access to the mega-event or the benefits thereof. Political commentators and legal experts such as Marie Huchzermeyer of Wits University assert that not only is the act reminiscent and reinforcing of apartheid policy but it specifically reintroduced clauses from the 1951 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, an act that was done away with in 1998 (IAI, 2009). This, again, highlights how FIFA policies can undermine a government's sovereignty.

2.3 Socio-Economics

As stated in the opening chapter, with a gini co-efficient of 0.679, 57% of the population below the poverty line and 27.7% of urban residents living in slums, South Africa is amongst the very most unequal societies in the world (Cottle, 2010; Wyatt 2010). The above statistics translate into a very sensitive and complex society, within which development and opportunities are desperately needed. When a society reaches that level of desperation it is far more likely to engage in desperate acts such as those defined by our discussion of 'millennial capitalism'. The hosting of the World Cup is, by definition, a perfect example of a millennial capitalist venture in which mass consumption and self-sacrifice are the prerequisites for a hope of prosperity. The fundamental issues with this notion, particularly when carried out in the developing world, is that 'consumption', 'sacrifice' and the hoped-for 'benefits' are never experienced in equal or even similar proportions by different groups within the society. For example, mass consumption, whether it is of goods & services or of football matches, can only be enjoyed by

those with the resources and finances to do so. Those groups that do not have the resources are simply peripheral or excluded from that consumption, thus highlighting how the event is responsible for excluding groups and individuals that are not of sound financial standing. In similar light, when it comes to 'sacrifice', it is very seldom the upper echelons of society that suffer or sacrifice most gravely. Sacrifices made by societies in preparation for mega-events are most often made by poor, disenfranchised individuals and their communities. It is not very often, if ever, that one hears of a middle or upper-class neighborhood making way for a stadium, or a well-resourced, middle class school being raised to the ground so a car park can be established, as did happen in a South African township. If and when the organizers require people that are better off to make some sacrifices, this is usually done after some kind of bilateral negotiations, an agreement on reasonable compensation and the provision of a reasonable alternative or a guaranteed short-term time commitment. When dealing with poor disenfranchised communities, discussions and agreements are usually conducted unilaterally, and time-scale agreements are so negligible that even today, 5 years after the World Cup, there are still people in what were meant to be Temporary Relocation Areas. Lastly, many of the benefits and positive spin-offs that we desperately hope for are also more likely to befall certain demographics and groups than others. We brag about the growth to the economy and increased GDP for the time period but we fail to acknowledge just how few individuals and corporations drew the bulk of that fiscal flow. We are quick to point to an increase in jobs but we ignore the fact that a vast majority of those are temporary, unskilled labour in activities like construction, which meant unemployment for many before the tournament even began. This is encapsulated in the fact that the final quarter of 2009 recorded an unemployment rate of

24.3% and 1 117 000 employed in construction, and by the first quarter of 2010 unemployment had risen to 25.2% and there had been a loss 110 000 jobs in construction alone (Cottle & Rombaldi, 2013). This illustrates how we ignore indicators such as the amount of people that are displaced or lose their jobs and livelihoods due to the World Cup, and very often those are poor people. With the heavily skewed distribution of resources for and benefits of the World Cup, it is no surprise that many blame it for the exacerbation of inequality, as is evidenced by the fact that the wage gap in construction had a 2004 figure of 166 and that rose to 285 in 2009 (Cottle & Rombaldi, 2014). It is incredible to imagine that these are the ratios of pay difference between a hard laborer toiling 12 hours a day and a paper-pushing executive who essentially 'constructs' nothing.

An event as large and costly as the World Cup takes many years of preparation and planning, as well as the input and expertise of the most qualified and committed individuals in their fields. As a consequence, mega-events are notorious for their diversion of funds and expertise from development initiatives for impoverished groups that could desperately use the funds and attention to better their cause. When some of the most capable administrators and government structures are completely focused upon delivering a smooth and successful tournament, it inevitably leaves a financial and human-resource void in other municipal and government structures, particularly those that champion the rights and well-being of the poor. This, in itself, highlights how event-associated developments and initiatives are praised for their achievements whilst they are simultaneously allowing for an exclusion of poor groups and an ever widening gap between the economic classes. With that said, it is worth noting that, in the aftermath of the World Cup, some of the specialist teams that were put together to organize

the tournament were kept together to pursue other developments and initiatives on the behalf of cities and municipalities. However, there is very little evidence to suggest that these teams were involved in projects that focused on the development of poor people and their socio-economic situation (Robbins, 2012).

On an economic front, South Africa's hosting of the event is believed to have offset the pressure felt by the economic recession of two years prior and, of course, this is of great importance to all members of society, particularly the most poor. On the other hand though, the event adds enormous fiscal pressure on the municipalities and cities that host, often indebting the city for many years to come. One of the obvious ways this happens is through the maintenance of infrastructure, particularly stadiums which run up bills as costly white elephants. This diversion of, not only funds but expertise and human resources too, shows how the preparation, delivery and now the aftermath of the tournament can exclude poor groups from not only the benefits and fanfare of the tournaments during its month, but can exclude vulnerable groups and communities from their rightful funds, attention and administration for many years. When this scenario plays itself out it is undoubtedly the residents of the smaller cities that suffer the most, as it is their municipalities that are hit hardest by a brain-drain or a diversion of even a relatively small amount of funds and resources. It is therefore not surprising to find large number of poor people leaving their municipalities and cities in search of hope, opportunities and better government resources in one of the three big metropolises. Mega-events can be so devastating to the future of a state or a city's economy that the 2004 Olympic games in Athens are often blamed for setting the foundation for their current economic crisis, whilst the Vancouver games in 2010 left the city \$1 billion in debt (Berr, 2010)

Sepp Blatter, president of FIFA was once quoted saying that football, as a global sport, had a “duty to take on social responsibility in human development” (Kahn, 2010, para2). This sentiment is one upon which elites and commoners sold and bought the World Cup respectively. However, the recurring themes of cost-underestimation, benefits-overestimation and rampant socio-institutional exclusions and marginalization of the poor have become expected of mega-events as part of their strategy in garnering support for the event and the aforementioned millennial capitalist expenditure. In an emerging economy, the culmination of these factors has potential to be dire, as seen by the reinforced social divisions experienced by most South African cities. The manner in which the mega-event exacerbated the injustices of the past highlights how government, in partnership with FIFA, had used the event to devise a development plan that did not encourage inclusivity or consensus whilst it actively repressed socio-spatial integration and privatized public spaces for private profit. If this event did not reinforce racial apartheid then it certainly did reinforce class apartheid. Strategies were sometimes so out of tune with the needs and wants of the population mean, even explicit attempts to be inclusive of the poor also missed the mark. For example, whilst acknowledging that a large proportion of the local population was completely priced out of the tournament, FIFA and the LOC admirably reserved 3% of total tickets at a reduced price of R140, with the hope that they would attract poor football lovers. However, there were several factors that were not carefully considered by the organizers. Firstly, at just US\$20, these tickets were indeed a comparative bargain, but when we consider that R140/US\$20 is 10% the average monthly salary of the masses, then the World Cup tickets, even at this discount, still remain out-of-reach for many. Secondly, the ticket application and purchasing procedure was highly

complex, confusing and frustrating for the best of us, whilst it also required the use of the internet and a credit card, which are resources low income earners are very unlikely to have access to, therefore further enabling their exclusion from the mega-event. There was also the less popular option of entering banks and filling out dossiers of application books and pre-purchasing as many tickets as you can afford, as this increases your chances in the raffle that is World Cup ticket purchasing. This system is ideal for people with disposable income, people who can afford to have money held up for several months whilst FIFA distributes tickets accordingly. Even with the idea that one is unlikely to get all the tickets they apply for, hence they would get a good amount of their money returned, poor people, who make up a bulk of South African football supporters simply cannot afford to put aside that kind of money for sports tickets as many live from wage to wage and paycheck to paycheck. It is therefore no surprise that tickets to South African football matches traditionally cost a fraction of R140 at just R20-R30 (\$2.8-\$4) and are almost never purchased in advance. Furthermore, all applications and ticketing systems were in English, which is not the first, second or even third spoken or written language for many millions of South Africans, thus highlighting how the system was insensitive to needs and exacerbated exclusions (Fletcher, 2010). An unfortunate consequence of this ticketing dilemma was people with the resources and means to do so, purchasing obscene amounts of tickets then reselling them on the black-market at an inflated price, thus further guaranteeing the exclusion of the poor.

2.4 Case Studies

There are 4 central mechanisms which cities, FIFA and the event organizers adopt, all of which are geared towards the maximization of profits for sponsors as well as an exclusion of anybody who is not. Firstly, the government structure at the municipal level is altered by adding the structure of the Local Organizing Committee (LOC). Second, government must sign Host City Agreements and FIFA by-laws, legitimizing gentrification and beautification projects. Third, decisions are made in an even more unilateral manner than usual, whereby channels of negotiation and social dialogue are increasingly difficult to infiltrate. Lastly, government structures are complicated even further by adding more interest groups, all of whom pass the buck and blame other groups for the woes of the poor and marginalized. The 2010 tournament was held in 10 stadia across 9 cities in South Africa, each of which has a host of different examples and scenarios where evictions, removals and exclusions took place. As a legacy of apartheid's architecture for cities, South African cities have a notoriously bad and inefficient 'form'. This is owing to fact our cities have a very low urban density, where poor people are located at the geographical periphery (Borraine, 2010). As a result, there is a situation where a majority of state resources and expenditure is geographically located to service a minority of the population, whilst the majority is located peripherally, where they are starkly underdeveloped and under-resourced. This pattern of resource distribution as well as labour and capital flows is illogical and unsustainable to say the least. In order to create compact, efficient and equitable cities it is imperative that poor people have access to and reside closer to the employment opportunities that are usually found in the city centres and economic hubs.

The gentrification and urban renewal programs that characterized the world cup reinforced and exacerbated this socio-spatial dilemma through evictions, removals and TRAs.

For the purpose of this study the primary focus will be on South Africa's 3 largest cities, namely; Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban as these cities have subtle differences which a) allows several different factors and scenarios to be analyzed, thus making this paper more useful for cities seeking advice on hosting Mega-Events in the future, and b) Analyzing these three cities in depth allows us to identify the social and economic factors and consequences of both 'exclusions' and 'evictions/removals'.

A: Johannesburg

Located in Gauteng province, Johannesburg is South Africa's biggest and most populace city. Johannesburg is also home to two of the country's most popular & successful football teams, both of whom call Soweto township home, thus making this the city most saturated by football fans. The country's national football stadium (FNB/Soccer City) is also located in Johannesburg and so any attempt to understand and appreciate the socio-economics of South African football and the World Cup cannot but start with Johannesburg. As with politics and socio-economics of the country, South Africa's football culture is also deeply entrenched in class and racial divisions. In years gone by, rugby and cricket were the sports of choice for the white, middle and ruling classes whilst football was considered fit for the black under-classes. To maintain a segregationist, classist ideology these beliefs were taught and entrenched in the youth. Today, of course, these beliefs are not explicitly purported but the demographics of the sports have not changed much in the 20 odd years since democracy. As a result, cricket and rugby are still

managed and funded by predominantly white organisations, maintaining their elitist status and far superior facilities etc. Football on the other hand has remained the sport of choice for the masses but continues to function with limited resources. The state of affairs in South African football is so poor that the middle classes, even those of colour, who can afford cable TV and internet connections etc., are far more interested in English and European football than our local brand. On any given Saturday afternoon you can rest assured that there are far more people in their lounges and bars watching a top flight English League game than there are fans filling all the stadiums or watching local match-ups on TV across the country. Of course, the ever-increasing popularity of European football internationally, coupled with its superior quality makes for an easy understanding in this regard. A lack of interest in local football from those with the capital and resources to develop the sport means that all things football in South Africa, especially leading up to the 2010 tournament, were severely under-resourced, ill-planned and ill-managed. This includes stadia and training facilities, means of access like transportation, as well the facilities and amenities associated with the sport (hence why the informal sector is so closely affiliated with football in the country). “The use of football to forge and maintain an inclusive national identity would have to overcome the profound divisions that have characterized the game’s history and culture in South Africa” (Fletcher, 2013; 32)

Leading to and during the World Cup, Johannesburg was also arguably Africa’s wealthiest and most opportune city, making it a mecca for poor opportunists from other parts of South Africa and the whole continent of Africa, who dreamt of a better life and financial opportunities. As with most places rumored to be the greener grass on the other side, opportunities for employment are often few and etching an existence is difficult, particularly for unskilled,

working class folk. Up until the fall of apartheid in the early 1990s, the Johannesburg CBD was legally a 'whites-only' area in which Africans and people of colour could not reside or visit but could only enter with a permit and for the purpose of menial labour. When segregationist policies were abolished and people were afforded freedom of movement, there was an influx of Africans and other previously marginalized groups into the city. This phenomenon caused paranoia amongst the white citizens leading to what was called 'white-flight' (IRIN, 2010). White flight in the early and mid-1990s meant that a vast majority of white residents, white investors and white-owned business packed up and abandoned ship almost overnight and moved to the suburbs. This created a situation where the increasing amounts of poor and destitute people flooding into the city were met by abandoned apartment blocks, hotels and high-rise buildings where 'landlords' overcrowded the facilities with the urbanizing Africans. It goes without saying that these peoples quickly commandeered and occupied these abandoned spaces which became run-down, slum-like establishments governed by crime. Prior to this, Johannesburg was already home to massive, sprawling townships and slums which are remnants of the bygone segregationist regime, and although that regime is obsolete, the ramifications and consequences of their actions very much stand today. As a result, the inhabitants of the townships and slums of Johannesburg remain poor, unemployed, disenfranchised black Africans who, despite political liberty, are still very much economically constrained, with little opportunity for upward mobility. If one considers this in addition or relation to the 'big city pull factor' mentioned beforehand then it is not hard to imagine just how many people in Johannesburg are unemployed &/or engaged in informal activities, as well as the vast number of people who are homeless, squat illegally or reside in substandard living

conditions. It is with the above context in mind that we need to appreciate evictions and removals in the city of Johannesburg before and during the World Cup.

In the months and years leading to the World Cup, individuals and representative groups in Johannesburg were notably more vocal and active in protesting against World Cup policies, decisions and activities than people perhaps were in other cities. The enthusiasm and persistence of the disenfranchised in protesting and seeking legal recourse stood them in good stead as several cases against removals, exclusions and prejudicial treatment were heard and won by disenfranchised and aggrieved groups, leading to concessions and allowances that would ordinarily not be made. This is of high significance because it shows that although FIFA regulations try to undermine ones sovereignty whilst the government/LOC simply succumbs to demands, civil protest and threats of disrupting the event may be the only way for the disenfranchised to gain franchise. An example of this is the concession to allow informal traders the right to trade at certain select spots at Soccer City stadium, although this concession followed many months of aggressive strikes, protests and the ignoring of bans by vendors, inevitably leading to their arrests and harassment (Cottle, 2010)

However, despite a few shallow victories for marginalized groups, the general sentiment for most did not bode well. The city of Johannesburg had undertaken a project of urban renewal since 2001. This project had identified 235 'bad buildings' (old hotels and apartment blocks) in the inner city, 125 of which had seen the removal and eviction of Johannesburg's poorest and most vulnerable by 2010. The years and months preceding the World Cup saw the most aggressive and enthusiastic enforcement of evictions and removals in the CBD, with landlords,

owners and investors, some of whom had not been heard of in 10 or 15 years, suddenly resurfacing and laying claim to property and the rights thereof. This, of course, is a highly complex and delicate situation as South Africa's constitution protects squatters, particularly those that have been in a place unbothered for a substantial amount of time. The number and scale of evictions grew exponentially in the build-up to the tournament as part of the city's attempt to reach or, at very least portray the image of itself as a world-class city. Whilst it is difficult to ignore the fact that previous landlords and owners perhaps still have a right to their properties, or the fact that, theoretically, urban development and renewal is necessary and supposed to be positive, what we certainly cannot ignore is that gentrification projects of this manner almost always target the poorest, most vulnerable people in a society and almost never provide them with adequate or sustainable alternatives and options, thus rendering them homeless and/or cutting them off from their places of employment and means of earning a livelihood. Furthermore, it is frightfully obvious that, as evidenced by renewed capitalist interest in the build up to the 2010 event, renewal projects are seldom embarked upon for the betterment of human lives or social cohesion which they claim, but are almost always for neoliberal capitalist intentions encouraged and encapsulated by events such as the FIFA World Cup. In March 2006 the Johannesburg High Court again showed the power and use of the legal system in combatting what appear to be unlawful evictions when they agreed that indeed the evictions were unconstitutional. This decision was a morale-building, albeit short lived victory for squatting communities of abandoned buildings in the CBD as it temporarily put all evictions on hold in the region. I say 'temporary' and 'short-lived' because the City council took the case to the Supreme Court of Appeals where judge Louis Harms eventually ruled against the

squatters, making evictions and removals legal, allowing those that wished to develop in time for the World Cup to do so. In defense of Judge Harms, he did state in his judgment that evictions were permissible on condition that adequate alternative accommodation had been guaranteed. This judgment gave rise to the infamous Temporary Relocation Areas (TRA) which sprung up throughout the country. With this loophole in mind, cities and investors established what were supposed to be alternative places of living for evicted and removed peoples but unfortunately these facilities often resembled refugee camps or slums where the number of people sardined in was far more than the place was designed for. Furthermore, not only were TRAs seldom 'temporary', they were always established on the outskirts of the city, where no World Cup tourists would be subjected to the eyesore, thus further excluding the poor from event whilst simultaneously separating people from their income. (Irin News, 2007; Bolsmann, 2011)

The most significant changes and developments ushered in by the World Cup for residents of Johannesburg was infrastructure, particularly the two stadiums that were upgraded at a cost well into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and the transportation system upgrades exceeding the billion dollar mark. These developments brought both tears and joy to the poor people of Johannesburg. Let us first consider the transport infrastructure. As part of FIFA's requirements and the Host City Agreements, cities are expected to develop safe, integrated public transportation networks and systems. With that in mind, the reader must appreciate that, like everything else, 'transport' & means thereof is a racialized and socio-economic concern. Simply put, in South Africa those that can afford a car or some sort of privately organized transport, will always exercise their ability to do so. Public transport in South Africa is primarily used to

transport poor, working class masses from their peripheral places of residence to the cities and hubs where they can earn a living. The use of public transport is often dangerous and always stigmatized. If one can marry this thought with an understanding of Johannesburg's (and other cities) social-geography (upper-middle class cores & working class peripheries) then their understanding of how and where transport infrastructure in the name of the World Cup failed or truly benefitted the people will be heightened.

With regards to World Cup inspired infrastructure, the Gautrain was undoubtedly Johannesburg and the entire country's crown jewel. The Gautrain is the country's, if not the continent's first hi-speed or rapid transit rail system, and so from the perspective of modernity and development then it is a welcome addition to the country's infrastructure. Although its development would have eventually taken place, the project was very much part of the World Cup budget and plans so there is no doubt that the World Cup bid elevated the train's importance and guaranteed that it be completed timeously. Although the train became a beacon of pride and a show of 1st world progressiveness and modernity, it is imperative to note just who, in terms of demographic, the train would serve. Although the very long term plan for the train network is to reach and service many parts and regions of the city, it is currently still conspicuous for its exclusivity and limited reach. As mentioned above, although millions of South Africans rely upon public transport, those that can afford not to almost certainly never do. However, those that do use public transport and require upgraded networks are the working class and unfortunately the Gautrain represents another avenue of World Cup related inaccessibility. Firstly, the location of the stations and the routes the train runs exemplify the train's middle-class agenda inasmuch as the train runs from the airport to the hugely affluent

northern suburbs and other middle-class neighbourhoods (where people own cars and are not likely to use public transport). Secondly, with average Gautrain tickets of about R100/US\$10 (more than many informal workers earn in a day) as opposed to the less than R10/US\$1 average for a ride in a minibus taxi, it is obvious that poor, working class people would have no practical use for the network. It is easy at this juncture to label the train's development as using the World Cup name to fund exclusionary practices and infrastructure, or to accuse it of impracticality and a lack of sustainability. However, there is a positive and practical light at the end of this tunnel. Unlike in New York, London or even Taipei, the use of public transport in South Africa is a matter of need and lack of options as those that can, will drive. This has obvious congestion and pollution ramifications amongst many others, hence building a middle-class rail network that meets the comfort, safety and convenience standards of the middle classes is perhaps more inclusive, insightful and sustainable than not addressing the matter at all. The fact that pre-tournament estimates were somewhere between 4 and 5000 people a day but the reality saw over 13000 people a day, highlights how the train and public transport in general is being embraced the middle classes and just how bright a future the network may have (Prinsloo, 2010). On the other hand, the city of Johannesburg developed a new bus network under the auspices of World Cup development. Based on price and routes covered, this development is far more inclusive and practical for poor people and their needs. Furthermore, this network is considered far safer than the notoriously dangerous minibus taxis most Africans use. As a result, not only did this network service countless fans and tourists during the tournament but it still proves to be a mode of transport that the middle-classes would at least consider. What is perhaps exclusive about these networks, as was characterized

by the sometimes violent protests from minibus taxi associations, is the fact that this World Cup development did nothing to include those taxi associations, and actually undercut them in many ways. Minibus taxis are the traditional means of transport for the masses, with the routes and territories covered by different drivers and associations highly contested. I would also argue that minibus taxis are a part of the informal economy. The introduction of an advanced bus network of this nature certainly undercut the subsistence drivers that operate taxis. A socially responsible project that was more inclusive and considerate of poor people and the informal economy should have more carefully considered this. Perhaps to alleviate some of that pressure, they could have devised a recruitment plan whereby informal taxi drivers are trained and employed to drive busses, not only for the World Cup but thereafter too, as this would be a more sustainable, inclusive use or benefit of the event.

In Cape Town and Durban, for example, football, a working class sport, was repackaged and delivered by the LOC & FIFA almost exclusively for middle and upper-class consumption in social and economic spaces that are inaccessible to the population mean. In Johannesburg, hosting was more positive and inclusive in some ways. As was mentioned in the opening chapter and will be elaborated upon later in this chapter, stadiums and facilities in Durban and Cape Town were built in areas with no football history or culture and fan parks etc. were established in middle class areas, with heightened policing and inaccessibility. Johannesburg on the other hand was very fortunate that both its stadiums were proximately closer to the working classes and the true local football lovers. Ellis Park is in the heart of the CBD and, as a result, the neighbourhoods and buildings in the surrounds received much attention and a much needed overhaul, some of which, as is discussed above, was detrimental and reinforced exclusions

whilst some factors facilitated inclusion and positivity. The second stadium, Soccer City or 'The Calabash' is a renovation of the FNB Stadium established in 1987 in Soweto, South Africa's largest black township. The stadium has always been the national football stadium and has also hosted significant political events as well as the funeral services of many prominent public figures. It goes without saying that this stadium is to the black people of South Africa, far more than just a patch of grass, and so, despite the many dubious and poor decisions FIFA and the government took, the decision to not only revamp this stadium but to make it the iconic centerpiece of the entire event was a highly commendable one. Just 16 years before the World Cup, inhabitants of Soweto used the stadium as a place to mobilize resistance against the oppressive regime as well as memorialize their fallen leaders and comrades. At that stage nobody in their right mind would have imagined a multi-million dollar facility hosting a multi-billion dollar event would ever be in Soweto, hence giving Soweto at least that is significant and would have particularly positive social ramifications, even if they were short-lived. In addition to refurbishing the stadium, the LOC placed the main fan park in Soweto, a township which, up until recently, would be avoided by most white South Africans. This is important because it delivered the game or, at least, the World Cup crowds, buzz and frenzy, to the townships where, not only the local football supporters are, but also where poorer South Africans are, thus giving them access and inclusivity. Furthermore, particularly outside the exclusion zones, entrepreneurial members of greater Soweto were more easily able to financially benefit and this World Cup zone had a more authentically South African feel about it. The significance and symbolism of people of all races, classes and genders sharing public transport and travelling into parts of the city they would otherwise never enter, and doing so hand in hand and with no

fear is truly important to South Africa. This constitutes some of the intangible social benefits hosting the event brings.

In concluding Johannesburg's analysis, we note that consideration and inclusivity of poor communities and disenfranchised people was perhaps higher and more positive than in other parts of the country. This, for one, is attributable to the fact that Johannesburg is larger, more integrated metropolis than the others. This meant the city could afford to host several fan parks and FIFA affiliated zones. Of Course, these zones carried with them FIFA's exclusionary policies but the size and bustle of the city meant that vending, trading and trying ones hand at entrepreneurial activities at the border of the exclusion zones can bear fruit. Secondly, the City of Johannesburg was particularly efficient at taking the game and the crowds to communities that would otherwise be excluded and not benefit from the World Cup whatsoever. Lastly, disgruntled members of civil society, as well as organized representative groups in Johannesburg were particularly good at mobilizing, striking and protesting for their rights or their inclusion. They may not have always been successful but they did raise attention to their plight and sometimes received concessions. This highlights the power of collective action as a strategy against FIFA and the LOC.

B: Durban

Durban is located on South Africa's east coast and is home to Africa's largest trading port allowing the city to grow to be the country's second largest and second most populace city. The warm water sea-side setting and tropical weather also make Durban an extremely popular tourist destination for South Africans and foreigners alike. The World Cup encouraged and

ushered in new engagements and uses of public spaces and whether it was for better or for worse, these new engagements were underpinned and characterized by neoliberal pro-tourist and pro-business initiatives. On one hand, as has been mentioned in the opening chapter, we had the dubious and controversial building of the iconic Moses Mabhida stadium literally across the road from the already well equipped King Park Stadium. This fact alone highlights the complex and often contradictory developments and processes. A critical analysis of the city's official fan parks, beach front and stadium surrounds during the World Cup encapsulates how these public spaces can be specifically geared towards inclusions and exclusions. Although these are public spaces which usually present themselves spontaneously, the structured planning of the tournament creates a distinct set of negotiations for the use of space. To have the stronger hand in these 'negotiations' FIFA and the cities adopt an array of by-laws which are conspicuous by their use of very vague language. These bylaws resemble 'civility-laws' which have become frightfully common in many cities around the globe and they come under criticism for facilitating the harassment and exclusion of poor peoples. Like all World Cup cities and zones, Durban's bylaws included restrictions and bans on informal markets and the selling/marketing of all manner of consumer products on the streets. There was also a marked increase in policing and security but not necessarily for the control of violent or petty crimes like pickpocketing etc. but rather to monitor "nuisance" behaviours. Nuisance behaviour, as Patrick Bond was unfortunate enough to learn on two occasions, include distributing flyers that were critical of FIFA and the World Cup (Roberts & Bass, 2013)

One of Durban's most iconic features is the many beachfront piers. These piers have a long history as contested and disputed public spaces and the World Cup only served to amplify and

exaggerate these contestations. In the build up to the tournament fishermen who earn subsistence living (and sometimes even live on the piers) were harassed, removed and banned from those piers. This is particularly concerning as the piers were equally contested during the apartheid years with the oppressive regime enforcing similar laws against people of colour on the coast. The new democratic dispensation explicitly and constitutionally gives subsistence fishermen, many of whom are simply fishing to feed their families, rights to those spaces as a refusal to do so quite literally denies those people and their families their next meal. As with all things South African, class and race underpins this scenario inasmuch as beachfront subsistence fishermen and informal fishmongers are traditionally poor, working class folk of Indian (or dark-skinned mix raced) origin and so an attack on them whilst other users of the piers are not harassed can quickly and easily be labeled as racial discrimination. As part of the reimagining and international marketing campaign that the whole country seemed to embark on, Durban wished to market itself as a world class leisure/elite sport & tourist destination and the image of subsistence/survival activity carried out by the poor was an antithesis to this vision. Durban's official fan park was located on the beach front amongst the abovementioned piers and so in addition to a loss on income & means to feed oneself, this set of removals also highlights just how the poor &/or working class were excluded or at least discouraged/pushed out of any World Cup activity. Let us appreciate, for example, that most of those subsistence fishermen (whom also make up most of the demographic of Durban's football loving people) do not reside terribly close to the more affluent beachfronts hence their banning means they seek employment and livelihoods elsewhere and are unlikely to come to the beach anymore. This means they then miss the opportunity to enter the fan park and enjoy even that little bit of the

event. On the other hand, middle-class, corporate and commercial activities were encouraged and accommodated on and around the piers. The result of this, for example, is that predominantly white, middle class surfers who traditionally have no interest in football or the World Cup were allowed to use the piers and continue unhindered as this fits in with the image the city wished to portray. This access to the public space means they were there or thereabout when the football was on and the fan parks were in full swing, they would therefore inadvertently enter the parks and savour some the football frenzy. Hence we again see how the World Cup allowed & encouraged access to a certain demographic whilst it overtly & covertly excluded others, and most disappointing for South African's is that it was the traditional supporters of the sport that were usually left out. (Allegi & Bolsmann, 2013; Roberts & Bass, 2013)

It is frightfully obvious that the spaces close to the stadium and the beachfronts were closely controlled and geared towards formal leisure activities that marginalized many and reinforced privilege in historically advantaged areas of the city. However, my analyses of Durban would perhaps appear scathing and one-sided if I did not acknowledge that the LOC and the City did make an attempt to provide fan parks and public viewing spaces to residents of peripheral, apartheid created townships such as KwaMashu, Chatsworth and Umlazi. What is, however, worth interest is to note who attended these fan parks and spaces and just how much time or money the City, FIFA or the LOC invested in these sights. These parks were seldom, if ever, visited by middle-class South Africans let alone the deep-pocketed tourists nor were these parks frequented by media or given international TV airtime and so we see a situation where commercial investments by any of the affiliates was close to zero. Furthermore, policing and

harassment at these peripheral zones was far less than at the beachfront parks for example, hence vendors and hawkers were allowed to trade relatively undeterred. This seems like a cause for celebration until we realize that it was precisely because tourists and middleclass locals with disposable income are not likely to spend their money there so commercial/corporate interests are not under threat, whilst poor locals try to hustle a living off their equally poor neighbours. So, not only did FIFA and the City of Durban miss out on the opportunity to focus attention on and develop a peripheral area by building them a stadium and hosting matches, but they missed a similar opportunity by not making the city's primary fan park in one of these neighbourhoods. By doing so would be advantageous to the community in a number of ways. Firstly, it seems the least they could have done to include, involve and allow access to the event to the people who are actually the football supporters of the region, especially when one considers that most of those people are completely priced out of the market for match tickets and attendance. Secondly, a big, well marketed fan park would bring in tourists and people with disposable income who would inevitably spend some much appreciated money in the township. This could have spawned all manner of entrepreneurial activity such as B&Bs and township tours whilst simultaneously providing a more authentic African experience as opposed to the generic, west-centric feeling felt in the CBD's and beachfront. Lastly, if the LOC had opted to invest in a big commercial fan park in a township then all commercial partners and opportunists would have no choice but to invest in the area in order to market or move their product and this kind of investment would leave a positive and long lasting legacy on the inhabitants of these neighbourhoods and communities.

Besides fishermen, the greater Durban Municipality saw the removal of no less than 25000 informal traders in the lead-up to the World Cup. Amongst these were vendors that operated at the Beach Market which has a history exceeding 20years. Again, the LOC and the municipality hijacked public facilities and spaces it previously had no interest in from poor, vulnerable people who were using those spaces for survival purposes. In this particular example, in order to make the beach market commercially lucrative whilst giving it a 1st world shine, thousands of vendors were removed and only about 500 vending stalls were made available to a very select few vendors through bids and exorbitant fees. This increased competition not only created rifts between traders who are usually amicable and even help each other, but was also instrumental in creating corruption and inequality amongst traders. Furthermore, in addition to the many traders who were removed, those that remained had to pay the City and FIFA renting and licensing fees far larger than is to be reasonably expected of people earning the tiny pittance vendors do. This is assuming they do not have additional bribes and greasing fees many vendors reported paying. Although those affected repeatedly tried to make their grievances about exclusion and the loss of income as well as police brutality heard, their complaints mostly fell on deaf ears (Lindell, Hedman & Nathan-Verboomen, 2010). Although the cries of these people were unheard, when individuals and groups had the ability to seek litigation and be heard in court which, of course, is not often as these are poor, disenfranchised groups, they were sometimes able to rely on the justice system to defend their rights as stipulated in the constitution. An example of this is of the attempted demolishing of a 99 year old morning market which not only had great cultural and historic significance but was also a source of living and income for over 10 000 vendors. With the World Cup on the horizon developers wanted

the market raised to the ground and a fancy, modern mall to take its place. Fortunately, the traders were able to raise awareness and secure themselves legal counsel which was able to win them the court battle allowing the old market to remain.

C: Cape Town

Cape Town, located on the west coast of South Africa, is the country's premium tourist destination, and is as famous for its vineyards and wines as it is for its iconic Table Mountain and immaculate coast line. Cape Town's status as a top tourist destination was established long before the advent of the World Cup but there is no doubt that the tournament helped to spread the city's good name and contribute to its ever increasing tourist volumes. Cape Town also has the title of South Africa's most unequal city and, in a country which has the title of one of the most unequal in the world, this does not bode well for Cape Town. Apartheid's legacy of structured racial segregation still has a very strong and distinct hold on the city, with thick and obvious lines between the black, the white and the coloured (mixed-race) populations. The World Cup took much flack for reinforcing these lines through its aggressive evictions and removals campaigns. Cape Town has mind-boggling affluence and opulence in some neighbourhoods juxtaposed against the squalor, poverty and crime in others, all of which is characterized by race, hence social cohesion is unlikely to be achieved as levels of inequality continue to rise. "The old apartheid race divisions that existed in race-based townships will continue unless deliberate action is taken by the state. These divisions continue to split communities along race lines as they see themselves competing for scarce resources" (Ehrenreich, 2010; Para. 7)

To begin with, Cape Town's main fan park was located on the Grand Parade, and although this venue is quite a distance from the townships in the east, it was rather conveniently and inclusively placed in a part of the CBD that is generally cosmopolitan in terms of class, race and accessibility for all. However, with that said, this part of town is well known for its informal economy, underpinned by all manner of vendors and hawkers earning a living on the Parade or on the network of streets in that part of the CBD. Despite this, the LOC and event organizers took the decision to locate the fan park directly on the Parade and to remove the 300+ informal traders already established there. One must also bear in mind that, owing to the FIFA exclusion zones, not only these 300 vendors were removed but so too were countless others within the radius of the exclusion zone. The City/LOC & police force was so enthusiastic that they created an Informal Trading Unit whose sole purpose was to harass, arrest and confiscate the goods of all informal traders who crossed 'the line' or dealt in products FIFA and her affiliates had claimed right to. Bear in mind that this did not only take place for the duration of the tournament but began at least a year earlier when the Confederations Cup was hosted in South Africa. This practice led to many arrests and a general sense of exclusion on the part of many members of the working class community (Cottle, 2011).

On the plus side, the City did make an attempt to relocate those that were cooperative to different locations and markets around the city, and this is commendable in the sense that it certainly was not a blanket practice amongst all removals throughout the country. However, as commendable as it may be, this was not a consolation to many of those vendors for at least two reasons. Firstly, the decision to set up an informal trading business in one place and not another, is based on simple but critical socio-economic factors, the most obvious of which is a

demand and clientele for your goods. The Grand Parade is prime estate to pedal ones goods at any given time, hence the existence of the decades-old market. The World Cup would obviously create an abundance of tourist foot-traffic, making it a particularly ideal time to have a stall or space on the Parade. The organizers could have, just as easily established a fan park and exclusion zone elsewhere, therefore allowing the vendors, traders and artists to reap the trickle-down benefits of the World Cup's deep pocketed crowds. I am of the opinion that removing them from a popular, public space in town, from a market many of whom had traded from for many years, and then replacing that market with commercial venture the removed peoples are explicitly excluded from, is adding insult to injury. Secondly, what is often missed by authorities that relocate marketeers and informal vendors are factors like one's distance from home to market or transport &/or security logistics for their products. Relocation, as 'kind' a gesture as it may seem, severely changes these variables , and for such low income earners, some of whom live each day on what is earned that day, increasing the distance/price on their daily commute or creating unbudgeted for expenses (e.g. levies & security) can be a drastic financial burden.

If the above is an example of the World Cup's economic consequences on some communities then the following is primarily concerned with the social. In reinforcing the Cities reputation for inequality as well as the notorious apartheid geography of the Cape Town, the City engaged in an aggressive and far reaching program of gentrification, resulting in the displacement and evictions of countless individuals, families and communities in the months and years leading to the World Cup. Many thousands of people ended up in Temporary Relocation Areas such as Blikkiesdorp, located on the outskirts of the City. Blikkiesdorp, which has a literal meaning of

Tin-can Town, is one of the Cape Town's and indeed the country's biggest but most tragic legacies or consequences of hosting the tournament and therefore, provides a good example of how the City's enforcement of World Cup associated policies fail the poor in any city through evictions and removals.

Having adopted World Cup by-laws like all other cities, privatization of public space became part of the beautification process. With the World Cup on the horizon and a program of evictions to enforce, Blikkiesdorp is a TRA established in 2007 in the Delft area of the Cape Flats, at a cost of about R32m and with the purpose of housing those evicted from the city. The municipality-funded establishment was first designed and intended for 1600 families on a temporary basis but by 2010 the 'camp' had an estimated 15 000 residents (Smith, 2010). At conception, there were 1600 tin and zinc structures, containers essentially, measuring 18sq meters, each intended to house one family with water and ablution facilities to be shared between four families. In the years leading to the World Cup countless new structures were added, often illegally and built by the residents to maximize space. This obviously led to overcrowding and slum-like conditions. In a September 2014 interview, Blikkiesdorp resident Willy Heyn explained how he and his family had lived in Salt River for generations but were forcibly removed by the municipality in 2009 with the World Cup in mind. Heyn describes how he and many other families were offered no choice or alternative but to accept the relocation and shabby living conditions. He also explains how all removed peoples were promised that residing in Blikkiesdorp would be a short-lived, temporary situation and that Reconstruction & Development Programme (RDP) housing will be provided soon thereafter (Knoetze; 2014). Evidence suggests that these promises were empty ones as, according to Siyabonga Sesant of

EWN, only 33 families had been moved out of this TRA and into RDP housing in the 7 years between 2007 & 2014, and Blikkiesdorp is still home to 1600 people today. In many cases, the City and the Human Settlements Committee were unrepentant, noting that many of the removed and evicted were squatting illegally or were unregistered back-yard dwellers (Sesant, 2014). The legality and circumstances under which people are removed to this TRA is debatable, however, what is for certain is that the conditions in the camp were appalling, and in serious breach of the country's constitutional rights as well as international human rights. Interviewed in 2010, then 54 year old Jane Roberts and fellow residents explained how Blikkiesdorp is more akin to a concentration camp under police rule than a facility where free, sovereign people were expected to live. There were many reports of police brutality and the enforcement of curfews after dark. The rows of corrugated-iron shacks are enclosed by a concrete fence designed to keep people in, as opposed to keeping them out, essentially making this a large prison camp, where, as one resident stated "It's a dumping place...it's like a jail, a concentration camp...if you're not inside at night, the police beat you" (Smith, 2010; Para 13). What was often most frustrating and insulting to people evicted to TRAs, many of whom have actually been waiting for RDP housing since the mid 1990's, is the urgency and enthusiasm with which the state can fund and build multi-billion dollar projects but promises to build simple infrastructure were not kept almost 20 years later. It is, therefore, no wonder many people believe the World Cup to be a neoliberal, capitalist venture that encourages growth and economic activity but takes very little social responsibility or care for impoverished individuals on a social level. Conditions were so poor in this TRA that not only was it compared to a concentration camp by several respondents but some residents and commentators even went as far as calling the

conditions and amenities provided worse than those provided by the apartheid government (Amnesty International, 2010; Doherty, 2012).

As a consequence of World Cup evictions, residents of Blikkiesdorp TRA included the 366 residents of the Spes Bona hostel in Athlone, all of whom were evicted 5 months before kick-off. The hostel, which essentially represented low cost housing, was demolished to make way for a car park adjacent to a FIFA affiliated training facility. What makes this more poignant and disheartening is the fact that when bidding and planning for hosting rights, Cape Town's bid was based on the development and inclusion of peripheral townships, Athlone in particular, as this is the traditional hub of Cape Town's football and its fans. But, under FIFA pressure, the decision was taken to make the picturesque Green Point seaside the central focus of Cape Town's tournament, reneging on their promises for social upliftment. When interviewed in April 2010, Spes Bona evictees, Sandy Roussouw and Fatima Booysen testified to how evictions of this nature can exacerbate other socio-economic problems and pressures. They told of how employment in the camp was high and rising as people had lost the jobs they could no longer reach under transport constraints. Others struggled to gain employment as the TRA does not constitute an official postal address and cannot be linked to one's identity document. The youth in the camp had collectively chosen to abscond from school and their studies as money and effort required to travel the distances required was a burden many could not bear. As a result, poverty and lawlessness were rife, with gangsterism and drugs affecting the lives of all residents (Smith, 2010). FIFA's insistence that Green Point be the focal point as opposed to Athlone so that tourists are not subjected to the look of poverty was a point certainly not missed by the residents of Blikkiesdorp as evidenced by Badronessa Morris' statement;

“I know we were moved because of the World Cup, they don’t want people to see shacks on the roads of South Africa...They’re creating a tin city. They’re doing worse things than the apartheid regime did to the people. Under apartheid they gave us a brick house. The World Cup was supposed to bring a higher standard of living. But it’s making it lower”

Smith, 2010; Para 24-28

The experiences of Blikkiesdorp, Athlone and other peripheral areas are in stark contrast to the experiences of other parts of the city where the World Cup proved to be a catalyst to investment and development of infrastructure. However, the nature of the developments shines a light on the motivations of FIFA, inasmuch as financial and economic incentives were prioritized above the human and the social, as would be expected in a neoliberal development strategy. What is particularly concerning, especially for weaker, developing economies that wish to host mega-events in the future, is the manner in which government is often complicit or out-muscled in negotiations with FIFA. The very fact that the area of Green Point and the V&A Waterfront were developed and upgraded due to their proximity to the new stadium is disappointing not only because it was a missed opportunity to take the sport to the true fans, but particularly because it highlights a failure of the municipality, the government and FIFA policy to meet very simple social redress and upliftment. The R6.5b (not including stadium) private and public investment was hugely beneficial to the area, making it even more attractive to tourists and investors but this was already a pristine, well developed and popular part of the city. This investment has added 4% to Cape Province’s GDP but unfortunately that money and its benefits accrued in an already disproportionately advantaged area. In developing this area

not only were poor people removed and physically excluded from the football and World Cup events but the physical and financial benefits of the development will forever be inaccessible to them as Green Point is amongst the most prestigious and class sensitive areas in all of the Cape. (Strachan, 2010)

2.5 Human Rights & Constitutionality

Armed with an understanding and an appreciation of how evictions, exclusions and removals manifested themselves in different cities, we are now better equipped to appreciate how planning for and initiating the World Cup holds up against international human rights standards. Although, admittedly, our practical application of the doctrine is not always admirable, in theory however, South Africa is renowned for having one of the world's most inclusive and liberal constitutions. The constitution is writ to hold local and foreign, as well as public and private structures to not only South African standards but the highest international standards of human and civil rights. However, some decisions taken and policies passed suggest that there may have been some infringements on these as a result of the World Cup. With that said, claiming to have an immaculate constitution and then admitting that it doesn't hold up much is a contradiction or oxymoron in terms, and so it is imperative for us and future World Cup policy makers to understand where and how their policies are questionable in the eyes of some constitutions and international human rights regulations.

The root of the evil is, of course, the FIFA rules, regulations and by-laws which the LOC and local municipalities are contractually bound to implement and carry out. This paper has already alluded to the fact that an agreement to host the World Cup is akin to a forfeiture of state

sovereignty, as FIFA's demands appear to supersede state law and policy at times. As evidenced by events at Blikkiesdorp TRA, not only did the World Cup sanction the harassment as well as unconstitutional evictions and expulsions enforced by policemen, but it also led to innocent people being kept against their will, in slum-like conditions, where they were reportedly subject to police brutality and abuse. In addition to infringements like the denial of education, freedom of movement and the right to adequate housing of one's choice, TRAs often resembled concentration camps of false imprisonment (Amnesty International, 2010). Host City Agreements are part of the bureaucratic process in organizing all mega-events but there was a general sentiment, even amongst the officials that put together the 2006 event in Germany, that the level and extent to which South African cities had to commit was unprecedented and bordering draconian. For the purpose of this study, the most relevant examples of this are the removals and evictions which have been spoken about at length throughout this paper. The Host City Agreements, particularly Section 6 on 'Obligations', were purposefully vague and broad so that FIFA and the organizers could lay claim to or rights over very many aspects if and when they needed to. Given how vague they were, these by-laws and agreements allowed for interpretation by the police or whoever else wished to enforce them. This led to the harassment and arresting of peaceful protestors, all of whom are protected by state legislature in the constitution. The goods peddled by vendors were confiscated and never returned. Having discussed the socio-economic situations of most informal vendors, the reader can quickly identify just how detrimental that can be to vendors and the families that they support. Even activities like begging and car-guarding (informal security guard) led to arrests, thus highlighting how World Cup policy was responsible for criminalizing innocent poor people and undermining

(Robbins, 2012). These initiatives are not congruent with the accepted international policies that appreciate the importance of the informal economy and therefore support poor people.

Section 26(1) of the South African constitution asserts “everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing” whilst Section 26 (3) goes on to state that “no one may be evicted from their home or have their home demolished, without an order of the court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions”.

Internationally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which South Africa is privy, also recognizes the rights of all individuals to adequate housing whilst stipulating in General Comment No. 7 that “the removal of people against their will, from the homes they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection, constitutes a violation of the right to housing”. Despite being bound to these and other human rights agreements, preparations for the event continued to tread and, in my opinion, cross the line of violation. This author cannot accept that the hosting of an entertainment spectacle and the stringent requests of an external organisation constitute exceptional enough circumstance for such basic but imperative rights to be infringed upon. Beautification of cities for tourists and FIFA’s insistence on not showing the world the poverty and socio-economic struggles of the host nations cannot be legitimate reasons for violating people’s human rights. As acknowledged by Amnesty International, evictions leading to the World Cup were not compensated, were seldom met with adequate alternative housing and occurred without warning, thus making it a violation of the law and a breach of the country’s human rights commitments (Amnesty International, 2010). Swiss based NGO, Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) noted in their assessment of Johannesburg’s inner city

that the World Cup inspired redevelopment plan infringed upon the human rights of 26 000 squatters and residents of low income housing in the city.



Chapter 3: Lessons Learnt & the Future for M-Es, Policy Makers & Impoverished

groups

When analyzing or assessing an event of this scale and magnitude, an event with so many different interest groups and an event which touches and impacts the lives of many different kinds of people in many different ways, it is always difficult to ascertain one's opinion and position on the overall usefulness of and need for such an event. Of course, in academia, we are encouraged to make only objective, scientific analyses. The problem herein lies in the fact that the hosting of mega-events can never be an objective matter of the head only, but tugs incessantly on the subjective components of the heart too. When the host nation you are referring to is a young democracy with an emerging economy and a dark history, the likes of which cannot be forgotten or taken for granted, then the analysis of such an event becomes even more complicated as the factors and notions of importance are more complex, contested and far reaching. This is important because developing nations and states located in the global South usually have sensitive histories and socio-economics to contend with, hence, if they are going to bid to host a mega-event then organizers & promoters should tread more delicately. Using this dissertation, particularly this final chapter, I hope I can inform and advise future hosts and policy-makers.

3.1 Pros & Strengths

If this dissertation primarily focuses on 'evicted and removed poor peoples' as well as the 'exclusion of the informal sector' then the two chapters above as well as the negative connotation in the focus titles themselves, should inform the reader that a conclusion section

entitled 'positives' may read a bit thin. However, this would be an unfair assessment of the situation and the socio-economic consequences of the World Cup. In presenting case studies and describing how poor, impoverished and homeless people were treated in the years leading to the World Cup, the reader may be forgiven for thinking this paper is an attack on FIFA and the South African government, which it most certainly is not. There is no doubt that development and regeneration strategies were, at times, too aggressively implemented whilst full scope of the social consequences was not appreciated. However, we also cannot deny that the overall need for regeneration etc. plagues many developing nations. In developing nations, a lack of funds, resources and expertise means that development; even the provision of basic infrastructure can be many frustrating years in the waiting. When this is met with incompetence, corruption and self-enrichment, as is often the case in the global south, then the only development that occurs is to the private estates of the elites. Although the pros, cons and nuances surrounding the notion of 'development' have been discussed and critiqued at length, what is an indisputable positive is the fact that a mega-event is a catalyst for investment and infrastructural developments. Incentives that improve efficiency and 'get things done' in the developing world will always be welcome, but the onus is on host nations to make these as equitable and socially responsible as possible, and that is the challenge to developing nations hosting mega-events.

Although this paper has repeatedly highlighted the ill-treatment and criminalizing of homeless people and opportunist squatters, one could just as easily write a dissertation questioning why, after 16 years of democracy (in 2010), the number of such people remained astronomically high. One is also within their rights to ask just why it takes an event of this nature to highlight social

injustices and discrepancies within a society. With that said, then the World Cup could be seen as a positive for poor, vulnerable groups as the event can remind us and government of their forgotten, marginalized existence. If utilized correctly, as exemplified by WCCA and StreetNet International, then the event can be one around which impoverished people and those engaged in the informal economy can mobilize and rally, thus garnering international attention to exert domestic pressure. Of course, with the lack of mega-events hosted in developing nations, South Africa's application represents a stage of infancy for the strategy, however, a solid foundation upon which future hosts can build has been laid.

Some cities and municipalities acted with pro-activity and initiative, inasmuch as they sought to include members of the informal economy if and when it would not step on FIFA and the sponsors' toes. This was done through, for example, volunteer programs where people could acquire skills and training that could hold them in good stead in the future. Unfortunately these programs and initiatives were few and far between and only occurred at the micro-municipal level, in a select few municipalities. They were seldom enforced or endorsed by FIFA and when FIFA was involved, the exploitative ulterior motive illustrated in Chapter 2 rears its ugly head, which is rather disappointing. Whether driven by FIFA or the state, host nations that adopt this strategy in future mega-events should ensure that the training and opportunities are not simply reinforcing socio-economic inequality or designed to keep trainees in a perpetual cycle of servitude or poverty. Unlike the FIFA program utilized in 2010 which, essentially trained participants on how to sell Coca-Cola, Budweiser beer and any other sponsor's product, future World Cup organizers and policy-makers should strive for programs and initiatives that educate and empower people, perhaps even support their entrepreneurial ventures such that they may,

one day, enter the formal economy, thus contributing in real economic terms. Only then can the fabled labels of 'poverty alleviation' and 'economic growth catalyst' be branded upon mega-events. Again, I refer to isolated situations that by no means represent the norm when I say that there were reports of some municipalities or stakeholders encouraging tourists to engage with the informal economy or to visit informal taverns ('shebeens') in Soweto township, for example. According to Robbins (2012), in the grander scheme of things, the benefits of this were short-lived, sporadic and thinly spread. It is, however, the opinion of this author that, if this strategy were carefully thought out, vested in and implemented then it certainly could work in favour of the informal economy. If vendors are going to be removed from prime vending estate for this event, a small compensation on behalf of the organizers and the city should be to establish markets or zones of informal activity that the city affiliates with and therefore markets and advertises to tourists. It is important that city or other benefactors do not seek to also profit through exorbitant rents or anything of that nature. This strategy would be important as it would give credence to the claim of 'trickle down' affects all the while also economically including those who FIFA and the official face of the World Cup actively exclude. A concerted effort by organizers and municipalities to support an initiative like this would not only be fiscally beneficial to the informal economy but is positive on a social and humanitarian level too.

On a macro-economic level, not only did the country's GDP and economy grow, but the growth and improvement were greater than had been predicted beforehand. Despite my earlier critique that the growth was relatively minuscule and concentrated in certain sectors, one cannot but see any growth of the economy, particularly in an emerging one, as a positive spin-

off. Future hosts would be advised to ensure that the development initiatives they implement to spurt the growth are inclusive of and will benefit the poor and trickle down to the informal economy too, therefore making the notion of 'economic growth' relevant to all those who live under that economy. On a macro-social level, the positive spin-offs were perhaps even greater and more significant, albeit less tangible. It is my hope that constant referral to our history has made the reader aware of just how unique and special the country is to have experienced that length and severity of racial oppression and tension it did but, somehow, stabilize and democratize without civil war or violence. However, as 'beautiful' a narrative as this may provide, one should not be disillusioned into thinking it is all roses and butterflies on the ground. Tensions, whether racial or classist (socio-economic) are still quite palpable. Since democratization 16 years before this mega-event, South Africa had repeatedly and ingeniously used sport and the hosting of its tournaments and events as a means around which to mobilize and garner national pride and unity. The image of Nelson Mandela handing the Rugby World Cup trophy to South Africa's victorious captain in 1995 and the nationwide euphoria that followed is something that every South African that witnessed and experienced will cherish to their grave. Our winning of the football African Cup of Nations or the hosting of the Cricket World Cup, for example, also gave rise to the rare solidarity, patriotism and pride amongst citizens but the magnitude and significance of 1995 remained unmatched until the country hosted 2010. Personal financial benefits aside, most South African's, including the poor and marginalized were impressed and proud of the grandeur we delivered. The image and reality of South Africans of all races and classes interacting, sharing amenities like public transport and using public spaces with little fear of becoming a victim of crime is an all-inclusive positive for

all South Africans. In a country with deep and old scars of pain and suffering but very little to remedy them, distractions that bring pride, joy, happiness & unity to any extent and for any period of time are important, perhaps most especially for the poor and impoverished who have little else to rejoice over.

3.2 Cons and Weaknesses

With fear of contradicting myself, this last point above can quite simply be turned on its head and used as negative, as I shall now elaborate. As explained above, socio-economic circumstances are tough for many in S.A and as a result there is a fair amount of civil tension. When this is the socio-political landscape a government and its leadership must navigate through, then the old Latin adage of *panem et circenses* or 'bread and circuses' can, at times, provide the compass. One could argue that the World Cup is simply an elaborate diversion, distraction and avoidance strategy which temporarily appeases the masses and diverts attention from that which is actually important. Although the actual 'circus' only lasted a single month, preparations were no less than 6yrs, 10yrs if one counts our failed bid for the 2006 tournament. In that time, countless man hours and mind-boggling amounts of state resources, funds and expertise were focused solely on delivering the best 'circus' show ever.

Unfortunately these are resources, funds and expertise that many people feel were not adequately prioritized. All the while, hype and anticipation were strategically being brought to the boil over the years so that when the event finally arrived the anticipation turned to euphoria, swiftly numbing and blinding the masses from the realities waiting for them when the final whistle blows. In sticking with our circus analogy, many detractors of the mega-event

question why so much time and money is invested in the hope that the benefits of the show will be universal and all-encompassing, and yet many of the people the circus claims to benefit are actively excluded and unable reap any benefits, even simply watching the circus. This is akin to an excitement that the circus is in town but the challenge for many people is maintaining that excitement in the knowledge that not only will they miss the show but their house will be demolished to make way for the Big Top.

One could also argue that the sense of unity and inclusivity is disingenuous, fabricated and that, except for a few nostalgia-inspiring scenes and memories that show cross-cultural and cross-racial unity, the reality, particularly in the long term is that hosting a mega event has little significant impact on domestic socio-economic or socio-political relations. The fact that some white middle class South African's used traditionally African modes of transport for the first times in their lives, with some crossing into neighbourhoods or parts of the city that are usually locations of their nightmares, does not mean this became a norm or bridged too many gaps or misapprehensions. In fact, I would bet that a frightening majority have not used a taxi or returned to the townships since the 12th of July 2010. In similar light, a working class blue-collar worker or social pariah who may have felt somewhat accepted or at least tolerated at a fan park in suave Green Point for example, is unlikely to be financially better-off today as a consequence of the World Cup. With that said, with the clothes on his back and the shallow pockets in his pants, that person would not be completely welcome in Green Point suburbia today. In fact, there is a growing and disturbing trend in South Africa whereby civilians and law enforcement are repeatedly classing and racially profiling people who do not have the right look or skin tone to be in certain neighbourhoods or establishments. It is this kind of thing that

bidders and lobbyists claim hosting the event can help alleviate. Let it be known to future host nations, particularly those with sensitive social narratives, that hosting is not a magic elixir that will solve social problems or tensions. The event does, of course, have potential to ease or mask tensions temporarily. Perhaps in the future, host and organizers can better harness this potential to make substantive social awareness and, if possible, positive long-lasting change in that regard.

The notion of an all-African World Cup, with benefits from Cape to Cairo, became part and parcel of the event lexicon through politicians and lobbyists who were constantly repeating it for years. The notion is a sentimental one and perhaps it is heartwarming to have seen Africans generally support their home nation and any other African team on game day, but in reality the sentimentalities ended there. With benefits and spin-offs so thinly spread locally, it was beyond ambitious of the organizers to predict the far reaching spill-over effects on the continent. In pure footballing terms, nothing illustrates this more clearly than the fact that only 100 000 of the 3 million tickets were sold to Africans (Webb, 2010). This was the first time the host nation has not bought the most tickets, even with the help of the rest of the continent, we could not top the list as the participation of Africans was shockingly low. Furthermore, how can the event be bid for and marketed under the 'African' name and yet when we deliver the event, FIFA and the LOC do everything in their power to sugar coat the 'African' aspects? A truly inclusive African World Cup would have made more effort to genuinely Africanize the tournament as opposed to allowing the tournament to generically and artificially westernize Africa. The point I am making here is that the World Cup, at all levels, from bidding to planning and implementation, is illustrative of top-down decision making where the voices and promises of

the elite do not meet the demands and needs of the general population, particularly the poor. If the event unapologetically marketed itself as a neoliberal, business venture working for vested interests then that bitter pill would be easier to swallow. However, according to this author, it is the fact that the tax-payer funded event is sold to us with promises of prosperity when the promise-maker is fully aware that that will not be the reality for most that frustrates us. In this sense, the event reinforces disparities and disjuncture between the political elite and the people whilst socio-institutionalized marginalization and exclusion of the poor underpin the event and its development strategies. I have alluded to the three primary stakeholders, FIFA, state government and FIFA sponsors/affiliates all having substantial sway in how the event is consumed. This author believes that a stronger civil voice needs to be heard in the bidding and preparation process to ensure that exclusion and marginalization are not the norm at these events

One of the fundamental flaws and difficulties host nations face when bidding and dealing with bodies like FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is the power structure and dynamics in the relationship between the host nation and the body. Although I can explain and critique this relationship, I fear that for as long as mega-events remain neo-liberal cash-cows and the bodies in question have more power and fiscal revenue than many small nations then the proverbial ball will remain in their court. The relationship between sporting bodies and states has skewed in the sense that it is nations chasing favour from the bodies and not vice-versa. This manifests into extraordinary displays of power and influence, to the extent that state laws and legislation are repealed to serve and protect outside interests, often, as this dissertation has argued, to the detriment of the local population. My advice to policy-makers

and organizers in the future would be to negotiate themselves a better deal, particularly for their masses, by not allowing FIFA to essentially commandeer the government resources and policy. This 'advice' unfortunately holds little water as neoliberal, corporate FIFA and her bedfellows have their own set rules and regulations that they will not waiver. Any nation that refuses to allow her sovereignty to be undermined is entitled to do so but with the stiff competition and many nations bidding to host, FIFA (or the IOC) would simply disregard their bid and move on to a more cooperative one; a classic catch22 which preys on the desperation of nations and the poor people within them. For as long as FIFA is allowed to pass her by-laws and operate with very few checks and balances then unfortunately the future of mega-events looks bleak for poor people.

3.3 Resistance

Rewriting mega-event policy in a manner that is more equitable and both socially and economically inclusive of the informal economy and impoverished groups will be a difficult challenge for all parties concerned, particularly smaller developing nations that come to the negotiation table with far fewer bargaining chips. When challenging one of the wealthiest and most powerful organisations on earth, the task is daunting before it even begins, however, when you are amongst the poorest, most uneducated and under-resourced peoples to be found anywhere then that challenge becomes near impossible. With that said, poor South Africans put up as sturdy a fight as could be mustered against the might of FIFA and the government. As a lesson to be learnt for future host cities and states or, at least, a lesson for the poor and disenfranchised in those cities, South Africa's poor were reasonably efficient at

mobilizing, campaigning and protesting in a plea for their rights. As Robbins acknowledges; “where negative impacts were lessened or positive impacts secured, these were invariably the result of pressure placed on relevant actors by organizations mobilizing the affected groups” (Robbins, 2012; 8). They were not always successful, in fact, they often failed as their very protesting was unconstitutionally criminalized in some places and at some point. However, outside of the few morale boosting victories they did achieve, these groups also managed to bring their plight to policy makers and scholars such as myself, thus allowing us to make academic/scientific analyses like this one, which should be useful and beneficial to organizers/policy-makers and poor people respectively during the planning of future mega-events.

These people formed organisations such as ‘Abahlali baseMjondolo’ (translates to Shack-dwellers Association) and they joined and cooperated with international organisations like StreetNet International (a federation of street vendor organisations) which is critical for getting the voices and grievances of these groups to be heard by the international audience. FIFA and local government is trying so hard to dupe. When you consider that in its attempt to present the picture-perfect utopian football environment in Africa, FIFA even go out their way to censor and control the media. According to the organization’s rules and regulations regarding journalism, media personnel and their reports should not “harm the reputation of the FIFA World Cup” nor should they “engage in conduct which expresses...charity or ideological concern which could impair the enjoyment of the FIFA World Cup by other spectators, or detract from the sporting focus of the World Cup” (FIFA, 2007). This, of course, only applies to journalists that want FIFA affiliation and accreditation, which is not imperative but reporting at

an event of this size and exclusivity without the access makes the task very difficult. Journalists and media houses that were known to oppose or offend FIFA were not granted accreditation and it was not uncommon for journalists and their publications to lose accreditation in the lead up to or during the event. This control and manipulation of the media is unethical and bordering on a human rights violation in itself. The fundamental point I was trying to make regarding organisations like StreetNet International and Abahlali baseMjondolo is that forming international networks with other international representatives of poor and vulnerable peoples is essential as FIFA will do what it takes to mute voices both locally and internationally. Abahlali baseMjondolo, for example, was structurally well suited to their task because many of the spokespeople and representatives of the organisation are in fact homeless or live in low cost housing themselves. This is important because poor people are seldom afforded the opportunity to defend and represent themselves. Very often the 'benevolent', liberal organisations that lobby on their behalves are also too far removed to fully appreciate their concerns and grievances. One of the fundamental flaws with this World Cup, as with many mega-events is the lack of consultation with the different interest groups, particularly the poor. Establishing lobbying organisations in which they make up the majority ensures that the grievances are articulated and heard from the horse's mouth.

With a strong and influential trade union in culture in South Africa, poor and impoverished people ingeniously used their trade unions as spaces to mobilize and voice grievances against FIFA and the LOC. In January of 2007, the 'Campaign for Decent Work Towards and Beyond 2010' was launched, making it the first ever trade union-guided campaign to challenge a mega sporting event. August 27 of the same year saw the first ever strike at a World Cup site and this

sparked a series of nationwide strikes and protests which lead to agreements and concessions throughout the country. This kind of action became a characterization of South Africa's hosting and even threatened to disrupt the games at some stage but thankfully common sense prevailed and compromises were able to be reached (Cottle & Rombaldi, 2013). It should, however, be noted that the government eventually suspended the right to protest which, if it were not so concerning, would be quite comical for its irony inasmuch as an archaic apartheid law has made a return but with the intention of advancing and promoting the country internationally. Another resistance campaign that is relevant to this study is the World Class Cities for All (WCCA) campaign and their mandate was to seek inclusivity and increased participation for street vendors and marginalized groups. Again, partnering with other organizations championing the rights of the poor, the campaign was able to mobilize more support and present a united front which emphasized the fact that although city's were receiving world class upgrades, for many millions of inhabitants to those cities, the world class gains remain socially and financially beyond their means.

3.4 Where to From Here? For Organizers & Policy-Makers

This final, concluding section aims to highlight some of the missed opportunities and ways mega-events as a whole can, firstly, infringe upon and abuse human rights and state laws with no impunity and, secondly, be more tolerant and inclusive of the poor in all considerations concerning them in particular.

As already stated, a fundamental issue that exacerbates the plight of poor, marginalized and disenfranchised groups is that they, more than the already muted general public, have no voice

or input at any stage. Of the three stakeholders (FIFA, LOC, Sponsors), the LOC is the one most responsible for protecting our interests, but even the LOC is mostly made of government structures and personnel. The few civilian representatives in the LOC usually have a capitalist agenda of their own and are certainly not lobbying on the behalf of excluded minorities. In essence, nobody with real clout is lobbying for the fourth stakeholder (civilians in general) but even less so for the disenfranchised. It is the opinion of this author that preparations for future events should allow a means of access to negotiations and decisions for impoverished and marginalized groups. This call is even more imperative when it comes to policies and decisions that will directly affect the lives and wellbeing's of the disenfranchised. When this is the case then a bottom-up negotiating strategy and development approach that stimulates grass-root participation should be preferred to a top-down approach which might not benefit the poor but could also severely hurt them. It is imperative that citizens have say and control on the matters that most closely concern them as this is one of the basic tenets of democracy, hence it is important for policy makers to fully democratize the policy and decision making procedures concerning international mega-events.

FIFA is an NGO and a non-profit organization, albeit a NPO that pocketed R25bn or 3.4 billion, tax free US dollars in South Africa, \$2bn of which is 'surplus', a FIFA euphemism for profit. With that said, FIFA policies and approach to the World Cup need tone down on the neo-liberal, cut-throat capitalism and entertain a more altruistic, humanitarian approach. The very fact that, at the time of writing, FIFA is embroiled in scandal and controversy accusing the executive and senior members of the organisation of fraud, embezzlement and bribery to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, is testament to how profit oriented the organisation is, with

little concern for those trod upon as a means to their riches. One approach to altruism is to develop policy and strategy that is specifically concerned with the protection of the rights and livelihoods of poor people and their interest groups. Either, through external pressure or self-policing, FIFA needs to adopt checks and balances into their policies such that for every negative action on the poor (e.g. eviction) there is a reciprocal positive (e.g. adequate, well located alternatives). Understandably, FIFA does have business interests to protect but more inclusive and less socially/economically alienating strategies must be devised. Even policy that simply cushions the fall for poor groups would be appreciated. If FIFA prerequisites and policy explicitly stated, for example, that no removals or evictions could take place without alternative housing or means of earning an income then, as part of the bid procedure and contractual obligation, the host nation would have to articulate their strategy and secure a budget for exactly that purpose. If the sporting bodies are going to wield so much power and influence, enough to coerce state policy, then throwing in a few socially responsible and protective policies and expectations should not be too difficult. Instead of behaving like parasites, these sporting bodies really do have the means and resources to make truly positive social changes but, for the most part, it seems the will and desire is lacking. Bids and proposals are usually centered on lavish infrastructure developments and the like, but social responsibility is not afforded the attention it deserves. To this end, the typically neoliberal financial and economic indicators we use to gauge a mega-event's success should be given equal importance to the social and humanitarian indicators. This is particularly important if the bid process and preparations are all fuelled by promises made in this regard. The fact that FIFA does not have policy or a strategy on displacements, let alone a budget to support those that may fall victim is

indicative of this fact. After the decades of evictions, removals and marginalization surrounding their events, event bodies should by now have substantial budgets for housing and displacement so they are ready to remedy the problem they know is inevitable. This should only be necessary after they, using their infamous by-laws, also pressure states and municipalities to act responsibly, equitably and democratically in the efforts to deliver the mega-event. “What is required is an institutionalized structure that promotes intra-governmental and civilian co-operation with joint planning that leads to co-ordinated delivery and a sustainable development program that ensures that the communities we are meant to serve are the greatest beneficiaries” (Ehrenreich, 2010; Para 25)

3.5 Conclusion & Afterword

Sport, football in particular has incredible weight, importance and influence on the human race as a whole and it can inspire, unite and give hope like very few other things can. Sports are so important and influential that, in the contemporary field of IR, we have allowed sporting representative bodies incredible amounts of power, to the extent that public policy and national development strategies can be hinged on the hosting and delivering of sporting mega-events, as is exemplified by South Africa 2010. In a summative answering of the research question which has guided the writing of this dissertation, ‘does FIFA and the World Cup exploit host nations economically whilst exacerbating their social inequalities and hardships for the poor?’, I would conclude that in many ways ‘exploit’ may be the wrong word, but the relationship between host nations is most certainly a top-down one, with FIFA unambiguously at the top. Some would argue that FIFA’s business model is nothing more or less than one

would expect in a capitalist, neoliberal environment. From this angle, the monopolizing and exclusionary practices, many of which guarantee the off-shore flow of profits, taxes and capital with debts and deficits left to municipalities and tax-payers, certainly looks 'exploitative' of the economy as a whole. The case studies above also illustrate quite clearly that hosting of mega-events, regardless of whether they are hosted in the developed or developing world, generally have dire consequences with regards to the housing rights of poor people and access to economic benefits for members of the informal economy. This should be a concern to developing nations.

However, with that said, this paper is but an analysis of two small variables or interest groups in the greater scheme of the massive mega-events. Despite the poor records concerning evictions and the informal economy, mega-events still do a lot of good for their hosts but they could do a lot more, particularly on a social level. Using this paper, particularly the analysis in Chapter 3, mega-event planners and organizers have been made aware of some of their flaws regarding their practical application of their agenda's on poor, vulnerable communities. In the same chapter, they have also been provided with potential solutions, remedies and mechanisms to minimize exclusion and negative socio-economic consequences.

Lastly, perhaps what needs to happen is that civilians, governments and leftist scholars like myself all need to change their perspective and the manner in which they not only see FIFA and sporting bodies but the purpose and function of mega-events too. If we change our expectations from mega-events then we are less likely to be disappointed or shocked. We live in a world where laissez-faire capitalism and MNCs wield incredible power, resources and

capital. Some may shake their heads disapprovingly but their exploitative, profit driven activities will continue with or without our consent. If we as fans, civilians and state governments in particular continue to think of mega-events as benevolent affairs with our interests at heart then we will be sorely disappointed every 4 years. The disappointment comes in investing millennial hope on events like this when we should perhaps not. The reality is that mega-events are not charitable events with social issues at heart (although they may sometimes claim otherwise), mega-events are not for the poor and impoverished and mega-events are not going to solve social tensions and issues. The sooner we can accept that and appreciate sporting bodies and their mega-events as simple entertainment spectacles, for those that can afford it mind you, the better. With that said, the first step to doing so is for bid focuses and claims to be changed with far more transparency and realistic, achievable promises and ambitions to be made such that all concerned parties are fully aware of what they are signing up and how they will be affected.




Table of Acronyms

| | |
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| ANC | African National Congress |
| BRIC(S) | Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa |
| COHRE | Centre For Housing Rights & Evictions |
| COSATU | Coalition of South African Trade Unions |
| HSRC | Human Sciences Research Council |
| IAI | International Alliance of Inhabitants |
| ICESCR | International Convention on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights |
| IOC | International Olympic Committee |
| LOC | Local Organizing Committee |
| MDGs | Millennium Development Goals |
| RDP | Reconstruction and Development Program |
| SA | South Africa |
| SNI | StreetNet International |
| TRA | Temporary Relocation Area |
| WCCA | World Class Cities for All |
| WCED | World Commission on Environment & Development |
| WTO | World Trade Organisation |

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