

3. OBSTACLES

3.1 Differences

Historically, a raft of distasteful mechanisms has characterized governmental relations with aboriginal or other ethnic minorities, including genocide, deportation, oppression and assimilation. These responses are increasingly seen as illegitimate in today's modern democracies. Indeed, part and parcel of this change of policy on the part of Western governments with regards to dealing with aboriginal claims has been a wholesale acceptance of the majority's culpability in these inappropriate actions on the part of the state, and a desire to redress past wrongs on the basis that the marginalization of aboriginal peoples is no longer considered acceptable (Young, 1995: 260).

In Canada, serious effort is being made to popularize the understanding that the First Nations were oppressed as a matter of course for much of the nation's existence. This widespread acknowledgement of the sins of the past has led to the emergence among the mainstream population of a culture of restitution, which has in no small part paved the way for a desire to redress historical wrongs vis-à-vis the treatment of aboriginal people by the by government. The question remains, however, whether such a culture could arise in Taiwan, and if so, whether it would lead to similar results.

One of the obstacles to this is the differing conception on the continuity of power held by the people of Taiwan compared to the mainstream in Canada. In Canada, there is a multiparty system that nevertheless is part of a continuity of government. In contrast, the conception in Taiwan seems to be one of a change of regimes. That is to say, in Western democracies, there is an acceptance of the alternation of power-holding on the part of two or more parties, whereas in Taiwan, the 2000 presidential election was widely seen by both sides of Taiwan's unique political spectrum as the end of one era and the beginning of another, rather than a placeholder arrangement. This is largely the result of China's history of dynastic succession and inexperience with the ebb and flow of democratic power-holding arrangements.

As a result, a party taking power may not feel responsible for the historical policies of the power recently dethroned, and may therefore not attempt to redresses many of its wrongs with the same zeal that would come if it were complicit in them. In this case, indigenous groups initiating negotiations with a DPP government might find that the government, while eager to be seen as doing something constructive and rights-driven, does not approach the problem from the point of view of a former oppressor, as the sub-ethnic group from which the DPP derives its main support do not conceive of themselves as a former oppressor, but a former member of an oppressed population.

That is not to say that the KMT is solely responsible for the state of aboriginal affairs in Taiwan today. As has been discussed, much had to do with the Japanese colonial government, and even further back in history with the reign of Koxinga and the subsequent period of Ch'ing [Qing] domination. Still, just as each of those periods concluded with a definite and final end and its successor starting anew with a clean slate, so too is there a widespread conception of the KMT era ending and a new, DPP era beginning. This is less apparent in political forces, which have in the past five years done more to destigmatize the aboriginal identity than any regime in the past 400 years, than it is on the part of the man on the street. If the Taiwan street does not feel obligated to make good on past wrongs to the island's aboriginal inhabitants, then there will be little political currency or widespread grassroots impetus for such actions. As a result, the form that Taiwan's aboriginal renaissance has been taking has not been one of restitution or equalization borne of a sense of culpability and equality, but one of increased attention based on a feeling of shared deprivation at the hands of a common oppressor.

This conception is no less valid, however, but it would make the Canadian model harder to follow because certain motivating factors are absent, or at the very least, different. It is also problematic because concepts (that of a common history of oppression) may not be shared with the indigenous minority. Many members of the latter group, far from seeing the ethnic

Taiwanese as cousins in oppression by the KMT, sees them as their erstwhile opponents going back to the initial period of the settlement of Taiwan. The first wave of Han Chinese immigrants that arrived on the island 400 years ago, and the subsequent waves that have arrived since, were the ones who appropriated aboriginal land, assimilated the people of the low-lying areas, and pushed surviving groups into territories previously unfamiliar to them, uprooting groups and creating an imbalance of the tribe-based political delineation of the island's geography that had developed over thousands of years.

The mechanics of decentralizing power to identity groups is more complicated than it might at first seem. Two aspects of this process are of particular importance, especially in the post-war period in the West: those of degrees of territoriality and asymmetry. Basing power-decentralization measures entirely on territoriality typically involves regionalization. Sub-national regions benefit from decentralization by being accorded certain decision-making powers according to the principle that all the inhabitants of a particular territory have the same rights, regardless of ethnicity. Using an asymmetric mechanism, by contrast, inhabitants of one region may find that they have more or different rights than those in other territorialities, simply because of their ethnic identities or membership in another identity group. The former is an example of the *jus solis* principle, and the latter, the *jus sanguinis* principle. In Canada, the

method by which aboriginal claims are dealt with has led to a system that has characteristics of both territoriality and asymmetry, but countries generally operate on a principle that is distinctly either *jus solis* or *jus sanguinus*.

The *jus solis* principle, simply put, means a person's nationality, or identity, is dependent on where he was born. The *jus sanguinus* principle, in contrast, assigns identity on the basis of blood heritage. In most of Europe, for example France, Holland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, they rely on the *jus solis*, as do (almost by their very definition) Canada and the United States. In these nations, citizenship is largely determined by place of birth. Germany, on the other hand, retains even today a philosophy of *jus sanguinus*. This is largely a relic of the creation of the modern German state. Though antiquated, this "law of the blood" is carried on even today, where the German identity is based on race. Those with German ancestry are easily conferred German citizenship regardless of acculturation, whereas second- and third-generation descendents of immigrants, though born in Germany, have a difficult task obtaining such citizenship (Pribic, 2004: 51). It is this conception of blood heritage in Germany that famously contributed to the obsession with racial purity and "Aryan" descent in the first half of the last century.

The prevailing of these two competing philosophies can help predict the mechanism a state will employ in dealing with ethnic minorities. For example, if a state is given to employing a Jus Sanguinus philosophy it is more likely to employ an asymmetric mechanism of power decentralization in which inhabitants of an area enjoy different rights or responsibilities than those in other areas due to their ethnicity. This is often divorced from a commitment to multiculturalism as employed, for example, in Canada. The risk being that absent an acceptance of a diversity in culture within a single nation, there is a tendency to disregard the cultural pluralism and traditional methods of community governance in favour of one imposed from the top down. In Taiwan's case, this would fail to meet the individual needs of its many different aboriginal groups.

States that are more Jus solis in nature tend to be ones that have a commitment to multiculturalism, and they tend to institute power-sharing agreements on the basis of territoriality and regionalization. Using this paradigm, regions are imbued with decision-making powers such that all the region's inhabitants enjoy the same rights, regardless of ethnicity. The pattern that Taiwan will follow is predictable and depends on whether the society, and therefore by extension the state's policies, follows the Jus Sanguinus or Jus solis principle. But how do we determine this?

A good indicator of whether a nation operates on a principle of *jus solis* or *jus sanguinis* is its citizenship laws. The legislative codification of who is and is not allowed to be considered a member of the group is directly influenced by the prevailing conception in that society of membership and how it is achieved. According to a study by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, which compiled information on the citizenship laws of most of the world's countries, the Republic of China confers citizenship according to the principle of *jus sanguinis*. The defining piece of legislation is the Nationality Law of the Republic of China, enacted in 1929, which stipulates that citizenship is based on descent from the father, except in cases where the father is unknown or stateless, but where the mother is an ROC citizen. In other words, being born in Taiwan does not necessarily, in and of itself, automatically confer citizenship rights, but only if the father is an ROC citizen. This applies regardless of the nationality of the mother, or in certain situations whether or not the child is born out of wedlock. The law was amended in 2000 to allow transmission of citizenship through either parent, but a strong patrilineal tendency in Taiwanese society continues to dominate. Clearly, Taiwan is very much a *jus sanguinis* society.

How does this issue affect aboriginal relations with the government? It suggests that government negotiators will tend to favour an asymmetric power-sharing mechanism, whether or not they would be conscious of this predisposition. Under this sort of arrangement, people living

in certain regions may end up possessing more or fewer rights than those in other regions by virtue of their ethnic identities, as decision-making powers would be decentralized based on a conception of asymmetry, characterized by individuals in some areas possessing more rights to self-rule than individuals in other areas. Because this is inconsistent with the Canadian conception of *jus solis*, it suggests that the Canadian experience might be a difficult model to follow, at least insofar as inculcating society-wide acceptance of multiculturalism and acceptance of diversity. It does, however, bolster the argument for examining the process employed to arrive at the Yukon First Nations agreements, which followed an asymmetric model of adopting a dual-government pattern. It is also consistent with the Taiwanese consideration of aboriginal identity as a function of the individual's bloodline, whether or not he is conferred official recognition of this heritage.

It should be noted in this context that, during the struggle to create a unique Taiwanese identity that gathered political strength in the 1980s, genetic studies were widely cited as proving that up to 80 percent of non-mainlander Taiwanese had some aboriginal blood and therefore, it was claimed, shared in the genetic inheritance of the island (Weller, 2000). As previously mentioned, former President Lee Teng-hui was among their number. Of course, there was a

political component to this claim, deriving from competing visions of group identity in Taiwan, which is a dynamic that cannot be ignored.

3.2 Identity

Although there are many commonalities, there are certain conditions that were characteristic of the Canadian example that are not present in the Taiwanese example. Perhaps the most important of these is the fact that the various levels of government in Canada with which the indigenous negotiators dealt had a firm position with respect to their own autonomy and sovereignty. This political stability does not exist in Taiwan, and although it does not necessarily impact directly the relationship between government and aboriginal groups, it can have a tremendous influence on the substance of negotiations and the conception of whether or not the central government truly has a mandate to forge such agreements.

Taiwan, per se, is not a “country” as Canada is. The Republic of China on Taiwan is recognized by about a score of countries and is routinely denied accession and association with the world’s international organizations as a result of its complicated relationship with the PRC. The vast majority of world policy on the Taiwan question includes adherence to a “one China” policy, which generally recognizes Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. It was only thanks to Taiwan’s strong economy that these countries were compelled to find ways to

establish unofficial ties with the island in order to trade with it, but political recognition was never part of such arrangements.

Given this precarious arrangement, there is also the ever-present possibility that the government in Taipei will cease to exist if Beijing decides to actively assert its claims over the island. Whether by force of arms or through political manipulation, the manner is irrelevant. What is important is that, given the PRC's size and growing military and economic might, that possibility is becoming less and less unrealistic. This affects not only the perception of indigenous rights negotiators, but also the ROC officials with whom they would be negotiating.

For much of the KMT rule over Taiwan, it was an accepted proposition that the seat of the ROC government being located in Taipei was meant to be a short-term state of affairs. The aim, in the early days, was always to retake the mainland and leave as quickly as they had come, leaving the administration of the island in the hands of the provincial government, which operated in parallel with the central government until its dissolution in 1998. Although this is no longer the prevailing worldview, its legacy still permeates much of Taiwanese political culture and its administrative structures.

More than just a political or ideological dichotomy, this phenomenon has given rise to competing views on what it means to be Taiwanese. As mentioned earlier, there are two distinct

views of identity that are vying for prominence on the island at the present time. One faction espouses the notion that Taiwanese are a subset of the Chinese identity, and that while politically Taiwan may or may not be part of China, certainly the majority of people on the island are ethnically Han Chinese. The other prefers to self-identify with an emerging sense of being Taiwanese, divorcing itself from the larger Chinese culture to form a dynamic new conception of Taiwanese identity that, though it borrows heavily from its Chinese heredity, is sufficiently different in substantial ways as to merit its own unique subclass.

These competing visions of national identity play out their expression in the culture war. On one side, the mainlander faction sees Taiwan as part of China and goes to great lengths to organize events and exhibitions that celebrate the images and values of Chinese culture, and to emphasize the line of continuity from the ancient China of thousands of years ago (often cited as 5,000 years of history) to the Han Chinese people of Taiwan today. This faction, that has been the power broker for much of the post-Japanese-colonial period, is collaborating in this effort with forces across the strait. The PRC does not want to risk alienation in the international community by launching an exercise in military adventurism in order to annex Taiwan. Therefore it must compel the Taiwanese to willingly give themselves over to the center of the Chinese world: Beijing. To do this, the PRC knows that the emerging sense of Taiwanese

identity is a threat, and goes all out to help its allies on the island—expressed politically as the pan-blue coalition of the KMT, PFP and New Party, all of which are committed, to varying degrees and each with its own idiosyncratic envisioned methodology, to unification with the motherland—to win the culture war and consolidate a widespread sense of Chinese identity in Taiwan.

The new Taiwanese, whose political expression is accreted in the pan-green coalition of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union—both parties that, directly or indirectly, work for the sovereignty of Taiwan. Proponents of this camp organize cultural and social exhibitions and events that aim to inculcate a widespread sense of pride in Taiwan and everything that distinguishes the island from China. Although it is this camp that represents the most likely ally for aboriginal forces hoping to negotiate a political power-sharing agreement, it is also this camp that has all but appropriated the images and identities of the Taiwanese aboriginal groups for its own use.

The problem for aboriginal relations with the larger society rests in the fact that society at large does not have a clear conception of its own identity, and can therefore hardly be expected to develop a relationship with a minority group that is concise and symbiotic. The Taiwanese do not yet know who they are, so how can they know how they relate to indigenous people?

As hinted at earlier, there is also the risk that the aboriginal identity could be steamrolled over by the Taiwanese drive to develop its own identity. Ironically, while previous governments from Koxinga to the KMT have tried to eliminate aboriginal culture through assimilation into the larger whole, the emerging Taiwanese power brokers now appear to be trying to appropriate aboriginal culture to their own ends. While this extra attention paid to aboriginal culture and imagery is a positive thing, and one that must be steered in the right direction by aboriginal leaders, the risk lies in dilution of the indigenous identity and its being reduced to its most basic, and stereotypical, form for easy consumption by the masses.

This trend can be seen in a multitude of places. The former director general of the Government Information Office (GIO) Pasuya Yao adopted as his nickname an aboriginal given name, even though he himself is not a member of any of Taiwan's aboriginal groups. This in and of itself is not a negative thing: in fact, it could be quite positive, if the individual involved were a champion of aboriginal rights and a friend to the indigenous peoples of Taiwan. Indeed, such an ally so high up in government would be an asset. However, in this case, there is little evidence to suggest that the individual in question is in any real way an ideological ally of Taiwan's aboriginal peoples. Rather, he is a savvy media worker and deft manipulator of public opinion who chose the name because he is keenly aware of modern trends, and the modern trend is for

aboriginal culture to enjoy a certain cachet in Taiwan today. In choosing the name, he appears to have been hoping to appropriate some of the respect and admiration people are developing for aboriginal culture. It is not unlike the prevalence of black culture in the United States, or “urban culture” to use the politically correct term, being appropriated by white, middle-class teenagers.

Another example can be seen in the almost ubiquitous presence of aboriginal traditional costumes and dancing that accompanies nearly every major event in Taiwan. Again, this in and of itself is not a negative thing: it helps to promote indigenous culture, gives aboriginal people pride in their heritage and impels non-aborigines to want to learn more about the culture.

However, it can also be a cheapening of that culture. Many, though not all, dances are for specific rites and rituals and, by tradition, should only be performed under certain strict conditions and circumstances. They are, moreover, often akin to religious expression. When the wider society at large appropriates these dances, they reduce them to mere entertainment.

Whether or not the majority of Taiwan’s aboriginal people are aware of it, they are the holders of a very valuable commodity: their culture. It is therefore important that they do not allow that commodity to be reduced in value. Rather, it must be carefully guarded to ensure that it is treated with respect and honoured not only by those who hold a hereditary stake therein, but also by those who would appropriate it for their own use.

In addition to those forces that would dilute aboriginal culture by appropriating it, there are those who completely oppose aboriginal rights on grounds that are ostensibly rooted in a skewed conception of equality, but are in reality little more than racially based. It must be noted that there is considerable resistance in modern Taiwan to the movement to return land and autonomy to the island's aboriginal peoples. Organizations such as the Plains Peoples Rights Association (PPRA), though hardly representative of the mainstream level of commitment to the matter, are nevertheless politically and financially powerful enough to exert considerable influence in the areas in which it operates, and is therefore worthy of consideration in any attempt to determine whether or not Taiwan is in a developmental position that would make self-government for its aboriginal groups a political reality. The group, organized in the early 1990s by non-indigenous businessmen residing in districts that are primarily aboriginal, is concerned with promoting the economic opportunities of Han Chinese residents of these high-mountain areas. In a country as geographically small and as densely populated as Taiwan, competition for land resources is fierce, leading to resentment over the current policy that sets land aside for exclusively aboriginal ownership. As a lobby group, the PPRA seeks to open aboriginal reserve land to free-market forces.

Research indicates that businessmen formed the group in the motel business in Nantou County before its members used their political and corporate connections to create branches in Taichung, Yilan, Pingtung, and Taoyuan. It was initially founded as a reaction to the land tenure and reservation system discussed earlier that made it illegal for private interests to purchase land set aside for aboriginal peoples. Despite this prohibition, swaths of land were appropriated by the central government and illegal land sales took place, leading indigenous rights groups to launch a land recovery movement. The PPRA was formed in reaction to this. Its adherents want the reservation land system abolished, arguing that the island's aboriginal peoples should have no special claim to reservation land and that Han Chinese interests should be allowed to develop it. Moreover, they argue for changing the designation of aboriginal people in the Constitution back to "mountain compatriots." Today, it is a lobby group that operates at the national level and is pressuring the central government to legalize the sale of aboriginal land. In reality, this racist organization seeks to strike down any law that favours special rights for aboriginal peoples.

Membership in the group is extensive, and includes members of the Han Chinese majority working in the tourist industry, officials from farmers' co-ops, and even elected representatives. Its methods are to appeal for its vision of legal equality between Han Chinese and aboriginal peoples living in mountainous areas, painting itself and its members as the

aggrieved victims. The PPRA takes its rhetoric further, however, with oblique threats of violence if the government's special treatment of indigenous groups does not end.

Although the PPRA's political contacts are primarily to the KMT, at least at the central-government level, there are indications that it also enjoys support among members of other political parties as well, including the DPP and New Party. Again, the group is not representative of Taiwanese society at large, however, the very fact that such a racist organization is allowed to exist in Taiwan, and to gain support at the highest levels of government, speaks volumes to the conditions on the island regarding attitudes toward aborigines. What is more telling, however, is the group's reason for being. While the group is clearly an institutionalized expression of an ideological sentiment of perceived racial superiority, it is also very much an economic lobby group that has a very specific policy aim: the right to buy land at depressed prices from poverty-stricken aborigines. The fact that an economic lobby group could so easily adopt rhetoric and principles akin to virulent racist organizations is what is so unsettling to many observers. The influence of the PPRA has waned in recent years since its leader fled to the PRC to escape prosecution on charges of corruption and bribery (Chen 2002: 10).

3.3 Economic considerations

Any effort to restore a marginalized population to self-sufficiency must include an economic component. In Taiwan, the quest of the indigenous peoples' movement for economic independence has evolved from a focus almost entirely on forestry and agriculture to one predicated on tourism, especially such sub-categories as eco-tourism and cultural tourism. Tourism campaigns generally incorporated three basic attractions, forested environs, culture and food, to attract Han Chinese tourists from around the island to their remote tourist destinations. They have found reasonable success in transforming villages by opening conduits for tourist dollars to translate into economic development.

The development of the villages in this way began in the 1990s when the aboriginal movement called on educated members of the community, most of whom were living in the large cities, to return to the villages (Lee, 2006: 75). The reasoning behind the move was that, despite the advances being made by these elites in terms of indigenous rights on the legal, political and social fronts, very little had been accomplished to improve life in the villages themselves. In that time, many villages have sought to improve the local economy by recognizing that the aboriginal identity had been experiencing something of a renaissance in terms of public perception throughout Taiwan, and indeed had acquired something of a prestige, and putting that trend to

work in moving toward economic self-sufficiency through the revitalization and commodification of identity.

One of the villages that chose to focus its efforts on reviving its cultural identity was Nanwang, a Pinuyumayan village in Taitung County, which revived a cultural ceremony known as the Monkey and Hunting Festival and began using it to promote village unity, strengthen cultural identity and derive economic benefits by opening parts of the ritual up to tourists. By tradition, after reaching the age of puberty, Pinuyumayan boys spend six months preparing for their new roles as men, leaving home to study under the tutelage of a tribal elder from whom they learn how to build houses and engage in the hunt. After this training period is over, the young men return home to undergo a test of manhood, in which the entire village takes part. Traditionally, it involves the slaughter of a monkey. This is followed by a three-day sojourn in the mountains—a part of the ritual not open to tourists—in which the young men go on a hunt. The entire village welcomes them back with songs and dancing upon their return. Now that the ritual is open to the public, the boys' simian quarry has been replaced with a straw doll after animal-rights activists decried what they saw as animal cruelty and lobbied to put an end to the Pinuyumayan tradition.

Another example of reviving culture and repurposing it as an economic activity through tourism revenue is the Amis harvest festival, which takes place every year from July to September. With 167,700 members, the Amis group is the largest indigenous ethnic group in Taiwan by population. Traditionally, the event begins with the young men of the tribe leaving the village to live a few days on the seashore where they spend the time catching fish. Young women are forbidden from interfering during this period of bonding and fishing, except for a certain day when they are allowed to bring supplies, such as wine, tobacco and betel-buts, to the men as they stand their vigil. Upon completion of the task, the men return to the village, whereupon they are greeted with song and dance. The event is heavily promoted by the Taitung County Government in a way that divorces it from any understanding or appreciation of its social importance and reduces it to the level of a commodity:

The 40 aboriginal tribes under the jurisdiction of the East Coast National Scenic Area Administration, Tourism Bureau of the Ministry of Transportation And Communications will launch a series of celebratory activities pertaining to the symbolic Amis cultures from July 9 to August 23 in a row. These are the most important annual cultural events among aborigines from Taitung to Hualien. It is recommended that travelers enjoy the pluralistic cultures of the Amis with an open mind. [“The 2005 Amis Harvest Festival in the East Coast to Start in July,” 2006]

Many of the dangers inherent in this commercialization of culture are self-evident. For one, it risks leading to a “theme park” mentality that distils indigenous culture down to its most visible attributes and reduces them to mere ritual without consideration of the importance of the meanings behind the ceremonies being commodified. For another, it places such ceremonies under the power of market forces, as in the example of the Pinuyumayan monkey hunt. In that case, the monkeys were replaced by dolls to appease the increasingly sensitive consumers, thus adulterating the primary reason for the ritual: helping boys become men through a time-honoured ritual of physical and psychological trial.

For another, aboriginal entrepreneurs can often be restricted to a narrow position on the industry chain. Travel agencies, for example, are often operated by Han Chinese businesspeople who themselves get a cut of each tour. Often, “improvements” are made so that aboriginal villages and ceremonies are more accessible to tourists, such as paving concrete steps into mountain paths and providing non-traditional, but more popular, food items for paying visitors to enjoy—to say nothing of the problems of overcrowding, littering and disputes about how to distribute income. Finally, in cases where the central government gets involved in the sponsorship and organization of cultural events, there is often an attempt to broaden the appeal by adding activities to the program, such as inviting performance troupes from abroad to

demonstrate their own cultural activities. This can have the effect of creating a carnival atmosphere and turning a solemn cultural or religious ceremony into a circus.

The Wulai Aboriginal Culture Village is a successful business enterprise that is predicated on tourists, primarily from Taipei, having an interest in the aboriginal way of life. There are dancing shows, native food restaurants and several shops selling indigenous products and products adorned with aboriginal motifs. Of the almost forty such shops and restaurants along the main street of Wulai Village, however, only one restaurant and one shop are owned by aborigines, even though all of the businesses once belonged to aborigines (Harrell et al, 1994: 190). The Atayal people of the area, unpractised at business affairs, have allowed Han Chinese businessmen displace them to meet market demand for an authentic aboriginal experience in the tourist area.

One way to mitigate the negative affects of this foray into the economic sphere would be to promote the creation of indigenous chambers of commerce or business associations, giving aboriginal businesses a stronger voice in their own economic development and leading to a renewed spirit of unity. A Canadian example of such an organization is the Labrador Inuit Association, which was founded in 1973 to support Inuit culture and protect Inuit rights to their

traditional land, and its business arm the Labrador Inuit Development Corporation, which was formed in 1982 help give the Labrador Inuit control over the local economy.

The LIDC focused on promoting the use of traditional Inuit skills in ways that diversified the economy and improved living conditions by providing training and jobs on the north shore of Labrador, whose economy had previously been dominated by the fishing industry and propped up by government subsidies. One of its first projects was to hold a commercial hunt of George River caribou. After a few years, the corporation obtained a license to sell the meat throughout the province, and then outside of Newfoundland, which led to the construction of a processing and packaging plant that provided jobs for several locals. In addition to providing the Labrador Inuit with invaluable experience in sales and marketing, the venture led to the region's first meat inspection service certified by the federal government.

More recently, the LIDC has diversified the local economy, forming ancillary companies and subsidiaries and engaging in several entrepreneurial projects. It has managed to attract investors by building a strong equity position through the judicious creation of partnerships with Canadian corporations. One of these joint ventures, and one which illustrates how the LIDC manages to create employment opportunities and generate economic benefits by merging the traditional Inuit skill set with the demands of the modern world, is the Pan Arctic Inuit Logistics

project. The company, which is contracted by the federal government to man outposts throughout Canada's north, operates and maintains the radar line in the arctic called the North Warning System. LIDC's partners in the venture include several like institutions, including Kitikmeot Corporation, Inuvialuit Corporate Group and Makivik Corporation.