

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Purpose

Requiring a simple majority of the UNGA member votes, the revocation of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 would be one of the realistic approaches for Taiwan to participate in the United Nations (Bolton, 1994; Feldman, 1995). A UNGA resolution was repealed twice in the history – once in 1950 and again on December 16, 1991. The UNGA passed Resolution 4686 in 1991 to repeal Resolution 3379 of 1975, which had equated Zionism with racism. The international community, particularly the United States, urged the UNGA members to repeal the “Zionism is racism” resolution.

This paper, applying three levels of analysis, examines the US-led revocation process of “Zionism is racism” resolution as a successful precedent for repealing UNGA Resolution 2758. While the main questions this research attempts to answer are how Taiwan could learn from the revocation of the “Zionism is racism” resolution and develop the feasible methods to repeal Resolution 2758, this paper also elaborate on the question of whether or not the revocation of Resolution 2758 is the best scenario for Taiwan to meaningfully involve in the UN after the examination of the Taiwan’s historical UN membership question.

1.2 Research Motivation

This research topic originated in my lifetime desire to pursue positive peace –

not only the absence of violence but also respecting other ideologies. Washington's current ambiguous policy regarding the cross-Strait status quo has barely maintained negative peace – absence of war. In addition to Taipei's *de jure* independent movement or Beijing's inadequate transparency about her military buildups, the lack of a mutual respect could escalate the security dilemma and then in the cross-Strait crisis. Taiwan's meaningful participation in the United Nations – neither aim to expel the PRC's membership from the UN nor lead to Taiwan's *de jure* independence – is the fundamental rights of the 23 million people of the Republic of China (Taiwan), whose representative had not joined the UN or its affiliated agencies since 1971 and could promote positive peace across the Taiwan Strait.

In 1971 when the UNGA adopted Resolution 2758, the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced Republic of China (Taiwan) as the sole legitimate Chinese representatives in the UN. Since then, Beijing's "one China" policy has undermined the Taiwan's international role despite Taiwan's continuous existent as *de facto* independent state. Although Taiwan's participation in the UN is not essential for Taiwan's genuine existence as a home of twenty three million people who have remarkably achieved a political and economic progress in last decades, the participation in the UN would provide a useful cross-Strait negotiation channel and its affiliated organizations, such as World Health Organization (WHO) for the people of Taiwan. Thus, Taiwan's meaningful involvement in the UN along with the PRC is a constructive development to eliminate potential causes of a cross-Strait crisis as well as to face the reality of Taiwan; however, Taiwan's UN bids have failed 15 times in a row mainly due to the "one China" policy.

1.3 Testimony of John Bolton: Background of Repealing the Zionism

Resolution¹

John Bolton (1999), architect of the revocation of the Zionism resolution, testified before House of International Relations Committee on July 14, 1999, regarding American efforts for the repeal. According to Bolton, the Senior Bush Administration prepared to repeal the resolution in cooperation with the Soviet Union, which their predecessors failed to materialize. The remark from Vice President Danforth Quayle at Yeshiva University in New York on December 10, 1989, was the first public announcement to display the Bush administration's intense campaign to repeal the resolution (Lewis, 1989).² While welcoming the efforts, the American pro-Israel community promptly asked for the visible involvement by the President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, saying that "do not simply leave it to John Bolton and Dan Quayle to pursue" (as cited in Bolton, 1999, Appendix section, para. 7). Despite the presence of American diplomatic efforts, a draft resolution for the repeal was not submitted at the 45th UNGA in 1990 due to two reasons: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait preoccupied the UNGA and the outcome of a vote was still uncertain.³

In early 1991, Israel informed the US that they were ready to push for a vote. American diplomats as well as private citizens from pro-Jewish community and from foreign Jewish organizations intensified lobbying effort on Washington, New York, and foreign capitals. On the other hand, the Department of State, particularly the Near East and South Asia Bureau (NEA) and the Policy Planning staff, was concerned

¹ This section is mainly based on Bolton (1999). John Robert Bolton, graduated from Yale University, served as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs at the Department of State (1989-1993). He is widely regarded as a hawkish, pro-Israel, and neo-conservatism diplomat.

² Moshe Arens Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel (1995) mentioned that Quayle had been "an old friend whom I knew to be well disposed toward Israel" (p. 234).

³ Israel wanted to secure a "clear indication of success," but the US argued that actual voting was only way to receive such an indication (as cited in Bolton, 1999, Appendix section, para 12).

about its potential negative impact on the ongoing peace process and kept away from the active engagement.

In the meantime, American-Israeli alliance was weakened by the controversy over the Israeli settlements in the Territories and housing loan guarantee. Nonetheless, in August 1991, Secretary Baker gave the green light to American efforts for repeal in the Forty-Sixth General Assembly. Subsequently, on September 23, 1991, President Bush urged the UNGA to revoke the “Zionism is racism” resolution in his speech to the UNGA (Rosenthal, 1991). By October, in order to prevent the repeal resolution from being applied to an ‘important question’ or from being simply amended, Bolton developed strategies: the text of the repeal resolution would be only one operative paragraph, which could avoid potential complication; and the number of co-sponsors should be more than eighty four member states, a simple majority of the entire UNGA members.

From December 3, 1991, the State Department concentrated their resources on the revocation because despite earlier diplomatic effort, only sixteen member states were willing to join co-sponsorship at that time. Followed by numerous letters from Bush, Baker, and influential Congressmen, not only the staff of the International Organization Affairs Bureau (IO) but also staffs from all of the regional bureaus utilized telephone diplomacy to press foreign ambassadors in Washington and New York. As a result, by December 9, the US secured 42 co-sponsors and 81 votes in favor of repeal.

At a meeting on December 6, the twenty one Arab member states concluded not to support the revocation process unless the condition of the Palestinians in the Territory would visibly improve (Lewis, 1991). On December 10, the Soviet Union refused co-sponsorship but at least agreed to vote for repeal. After three days of the lobbying effort, the Soviet agreed to join co-sponsorship. The PRC, on the other hand,

concerning over their relations with the Arabs, refused to participate in voting.


On December 12, Baker ordered to submit a one-line resolution that simply stated, “The General Assembly decides to revoke the determination contained in its Resolution 3379 of 10 December 1975” (United Nations, 1991, para. 1). By December 13, the supporters for the revocation resolution increased to 73 co-sponsors and 94 votes. For another tactical reason, the repeal vote was deliberately delayed until December 16, one day before the last day of the 46th UNGA. The number of co-sponsors had reached 86 member nations. At 3:00 P.M. on December 16, after rejecting to the motion to declare an important question, the UNGA adopted to repeal the “Zionism is racism” resolution.

John Bolton’ article (approved by Baker) appeared in New York Times on December 16, 1991:

Some say the US should forget about Resolution 3379 – “after all, it’s old and outdated, just words on paper.” We disagree. The US believes that what the UN says – rightly or wrongly – is important. The General Assembly’s willingness to adhere to the Charter and its most essential principle – the right of each state to exist in peace – is crucial (A. 19).

In brief, according to Bolton’s testimony, the Israel lobby in the US played the central actor to induce the US diplomatic effort for the repeal. After receiving the permission from the executive branch, the American diplomacy successfully created the movement against the “Zionism is racism” resolution within the UNGA member states. In addition to the importance of the US diplomacy, this paper also seeks various other direct and indirect causes that affected to revoke the “Zionism is racism” resolution in order to develop the methods to repeal Resolution 2758.

Figure 1: A Structure of Repeal Policy Establishment
(according to Bolton's testimony)



Source: Drawn by the author based on Bolton's testimony

1.4 Research Question

This paper will explore the specific following research questions consisting of main question and sub-questions:

Main Research Question: Is Resolution 2758 feasible to repeal? What would be the consequences to Taiwan's meaningful involvement in the UN?

Sub-Question 1 (international level): What were the main reasons that the UNGA adopted the "Zionism is racism" resolution and revoked the resolution. Why did the revocation take place in 1991?

Sub-Question 2 (domestic level): How did Jewish interest groups in the US influence the Bush administration's repealing policy? How effective was it?

Sub-Question 3 (individual level): How did Secretary Baker come to agree to the repeal efforts despite his concern over its negative impact on the peace process?

How did Baker change the attitude of the international community toward the Zionism resolution?

Sub-Question 4 (the levels of analysis): What conditions would lead to repeal Resolution 2758? Which level is most significant for policy establishment?

Sub-Question 5 (the Taiwan issue): What has been preventing Taiwan from participating in the UN? Did Resolution 2758 address the representation of Taiwan?

1.5 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

In the late 1950s, with the rise of behavioral movement, Waltz (1959) introduced the levels of analysis, a method for understanding the international relation mechanisms based on three different images, namely individual, state, and international system. In attempt to introduce the methodology of the natural sciences into social science, the levels of analysis provides forth-dimension analysis on one event with a combination of different lenses and a diverse time period. The international level describes how the sequences of international events affect state behavior. The state level examines the process to define the so-called national interests under the competition between interest groups and bureaucracies. The individual level focuses on the role of individual leaders on policymaking. While the importance of all three images is emphasized in his 1959 book, Waltz's original idea was rather a methodological approach than a theoretical one.

Singer (1961), focusing on two levels of international system and national units, pointed out that the problem of levels of analysis was that the preference of one particular level would result in a different outcome of explanations; therefore, two or

more levels can not simply be combined to create one overall explanation.⁴ Nonetheless, for Singer, in order to apply level of analysis as a theoretical model of international relation, resolving the interaction of each level was not focal point, rather the levels of analysis should have a capability to describe, explain, and predict.

Followed by the epistemological argument about holism and reductionism, there was a big controversy among scholars over the representation of a level. In the other words, does a system determine the behavior of a unit or vice versa? Waltz (1979) in *Theory of International Politics* attempted to construct a systematic theory for international politics by isolating a chain of cause and effect to reduce an observational error that Singer argued. As a holist who claims a system (the whole) is more than the sum of its parts, Waltz criticized reductionism for overemphasizing on variation in the behavior of the individual level or national level (the parts) as a source of the explanations in international politics and argued the structure of an international system which is defined by arrangement, function, polarity, and interaction of units, is a key factor in shaping the behavior of units and the most important source of explanation since dissimilar units produce similar behavior.

Hollis and Smith (1990) proposed simplified, two-dimensional levels of analysis to settle the dispute over the interplay between system and unit. First, bureaucracy level was inserted between state and individual levels to create a sequence of an independent contribution. Second, they introduced three pairs of system-unit relations: system-state, state-bureaucracy, bureaucracy-individual. Thus, it would be able to address where explicit causation is located depending on the point of either holism view (top-down) or individualism view (bottom-down).

Buzan (1995) argued that the classic literature of the levels of analysis failed to

⁴ However, a natural scientist also selects an applicable theory among many existing theories to explain only selected natural phenomenon.

distinguish between units of analysis and sources of explanation. Buzan indicated that there were five levels as units of analysis (not the source of explanations but locations): system, region (subsystem), state (unit), bureaucracy (subunit), and individual.⁵ Furthermore, Buzan suggested three aspects: structure, process, and interaction capacity as for the sources of explanations. The structure refers to the arrangement of units within a system, and the process refers to the patterns of interaction among units. The interaction capacity is defined as “level of transportation, communication and organization capability,” considering the factors of geography, physical technology, and social technology (language or religion) (Buzan and Little, 2000, p. 68-89; 441). While attempting to develop levels of analysis into scientific theory in his own fashion, Buzan (1995) shared the idea with other scholars regarding which level plays more powerful role to explain a whole system:


No one level of unit or source of explanation is always dominant in explaining international events... The question of which level is winning (or losing) is not a very interesting one except in relation to some specific phenomenon to be explained. In international relations generally, all the levels are powerfully in play. The important theoretical question is: if two or more units and sources of explanation are operating together, how are their different analysis to be assembled into a whole understanding? To this there is yet not clear answer (p. 213).

In brief, while the levels of analysis contributed to further systematic theory for international relations, scholars view toward what a level are supposed to represent or how levels are integrated differs largely depending on their stance on the epistemological question. Waltz, an introducer of three levels of analysis, shifted to focus only on international systematic level; however, Waltz’s parsimonious approach regrettably resulted in a partial explanation of international affairs (Rosenau, 1966;

⁵ An ontological idea shapes the number of units. For example, Rosenau (1966) used five levels: idiosyncratic, role, government, societal, and systemic variables, while Russett et al. (1992) used six: world system, relations, society, government, role, individual.

Buzan, 1995). Found in a variety of locations and from the combination of multiple contributing factors, a root cause of an international event would have to be determined on a case by case basis. This paper uses the levels of analysis not only to organize the historical events to get some idea of what might initiate the repeal of UNGA “Zionism is racism” resolution, but also to discover the essential condition for repeal.

Figure 2: Conception Differences among Levels of Analyses



Source: Drawn by the author based on the readings

1.6 Research Method and Scope of Research

The fundamental research method of this paper is the traditional approach of international relations with an instrumental case study on repealing UNGA “Zionism is racism” resolution. In-depth, qualitative examination of the revocation process will identify the gap between idealistic and realistic aspects of the UN as well as the

process of American foreign policy establishment. The real intention of this paper, however, is to examine the feasibility of repealing UNGA Resolution 2758 as a way for Taiwan to participate in the UN. Like the comparative case study, three levels of analysis reduce the risk of two major criticisms of the case study method: the limited objectivity and generalizability (Berg, 2007).

From the international perspective, the chronology of Arab-Israeli relations is used to provide clear understanding of the root cause of the “Zionism is racism” resolution and how international society had changed their stances. In fact, international circumstances in 1975 were very much different from that of 1991.

This paper does not seek to answer whether Zionism is racism or not due to its irrelevancy to the main questions of the paper. Rather, the domestic level focuses on the impact of Israeli interest groups on the US foreign policymaking. Secondary information, particularly internet resources, is carefully selected to stave off extreme opinions on this controversial topic. The US domestic level attempts to understand the role of the lobby to construct a future strategy for Taiwan’s case.

The individual level of analysis focuses on a descriptive case study mainly based on the autobiography of then Secretary of State James Baker, whose authority was crucial to execute the repeal policy within Washington. Although the relation between the peace process and the revocation was initially considered to be a zero-sum game, Baker converted it into a win-win situation through his dilemma.

As for the conclusion of levels of analysis, interaction behavior and relative value of three levels will be suggested and constructed theoretical mechanism on the case of the Zionism resolution.

As the second parts of this paper, Taiwan’s UN member question will be analyzed based on the historical and legal documents on Taiwan’s statehood, in order to rebut Beijing’s claim that the Taiwan issue is internal affair of the PRC as well as

Ban Ki-moon the UN General-Secretary's interpretation that "it was not legally possible to receive" Taiwan's application for the UN admission due to Resolution 2758 (UN Secretary-General, 2007).

The conclusion of this paper consists a feasibility study for repealing Resolution 2758 and Taiwan's meaningful involvement in the US as the consequences of the revocation, based on the findings from the levels of analysis of repealing "Zionism is racism" resolution.