

## Abstract

This thesis attempted to identify possible causations that led the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to repeal the “Zionism is racism” resolution (UNGA Resolution 3379) within the framework of three levels of analysis. Second, these findings were used to examine the feasibility of repealing Resolution 2758 and its consequences to Taiwan’s meaningful involvement in the United Nations (UN).

The international level revealed the limitation of legal or ideological power to propel irreconcilable parties into the negotiation table. The facilitator for the repeal was, rather, the political arrangement that might alter unacceptable status quo in Palestine – the root of the Zionism resolution. The analysis of domestic level indicated that despite of the fact that the Israeli lobby effectively contributed to increase American sympathy toward Zionism, the US national interest defined by the executive leaders undermined the lobby’s influence on the US foreign policy establishment. At the individual level, the exploration of then Secretary of State James Baker who approved the American diplomatic effort for the repeal showed the revocation was the unintended consequence of Baker’s Middle East peace process. While supports from all three levels appeared to be essential basis for the repeal, the timing becomes a crucial factor to determine the outcome.

Taiwan’s UN membership question is as exclusively political as the Zionism resolution. In short, although it is practically feasible to repeal Resolution 2758 with a simple majority vote in the UNGA, the revocation of Resolution 2758 would not directly result in Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the UN.

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