

Chapter 7: Conclusion

First, this thesis attempted to identify possible causations that led the “Zionism is racism” resolution to repeal within the framework of three levels of analysis. Second, these findings were used to examine the feasibility of repealing Resolution 2758 and its consequences to Taiwan’s meaningful involvement in the UN later in this chapter.

7.1 Theoretical Feasibility of Repealing Resolution 2758: Implications from Levels of Analysis

Resolution 2758 and the evolution of the “Zionism is racism” resolution shared similarity of the domination of power politics in the United Nations. Recalling that the Zionism revocation was achieved without amending the UN Charter or investigating the question of whether Zionism is racism or not, the adoption or repeal of a resolution at the UNGA exclusively depends on the political decision – namely, the number of votes in the UNGA.

Theoretically, the revocation or amendment of Resolution 2758 will only require a simple majority vote in the UNGA as well.¹ Not until the time will be ripe for Taiwan to receive a majority vote, however, would Taiwan’s annual application for UN membership alone neither accumulate international supports nor urge the US to take a leadership role. Rather, Taiwan’s efforts to solve the original cause of Resolution 2758 – the Taiwan issue – would become a key to propel the international

¹ On the other hand, in the event that Taiwan attempts to become a full member in the UN as a new state, Taiwan must acquire the PRC’s agreement since the PRC is a permanent member in the Security Council.

community supporting revocation as the Middle East peace process produced the revocation of the Zionism resolution. There are two core issues within the Taiwan issue: the legal status of Taiwan and cross-Strait peace.

Because Resolution 2758 was merely *de facto* expulsion of the government of Taiwan from the UN and did not address the Taiwan's legal status, Taiwan needs to address Taiwan's relations with the PRC explicitly. Taiwan's legal status was designed to be ambiguous by the international powers in order to insure the cross-Strait status quo – negative peace. The international community would not treat Taiwan as a state unless peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue is undertaken. One of active steps that the government of Taiwan could do to clarify the Taiwanese position of the Taiwan issue is to officially and peacefully renounce the involvement in the Chinese Civil War at the first time since it ended without signing a legal document – without declaring *de jure* independence or rejecting the idea of future peaceful unification. The merits is that Taiwan could determine Taiwan's own international destiny, to demonstrate Taiwanese desire for the cross-Strait peace development, and to indicate that the current situation of Taiwan is neither limited to the PRC's internal affair nor province of the PRC.

Until a positive cross-Strait peace will be earned, the fundamental advantages Taiwan could materialize to push the revocation forward is the fact that Taiwan has been maintaining *de facto* sovereignty over the islands of Taiwan, Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu like the Israel occupation in the Territories. As long as Taiwan no longer aims to reclaim her sovereignty over the mainland China or seeks unilateral change in balance of power, Taiwan is indeed a regional status quo power. It is not Taiwan but Beijing that is losing patience because a military unification with Taiwan is not tolerable for the international community.

Taiwanese people need to confidently realize the undeniable value of *de facto*

independence and that Taiwan's domestic decision, such as the further economic and political development, the participation in international organizations that does not require statehood, or the formation of a new Taiwanese identity, would not be affected by the government of the PRC. The emergence of internal political unity of Taiwan – no matter what name a country uses – along with a new Taiwanese identity without overemphasizing the nationalism has to be realized under the slogan of 'put county before party.' Without understanding what Taiwan really wants, which only 23 million of Taiwanese can decide, it is not easy for the international community to support for Taiwan's participation in the UN.

In the meantime, Taiwan could not neglect the importance of constructive dialogue with Beijing in order to receive international support. As the repeal for the Zionism resolution was the spin-off from international desire for the Middle East peace, a reconcilable win-win situation for Beijing and Taipei – a bilateral peace process or interim agreements – will boost global supports for repeal for Resolution 2758. In the late 1990s, for example, American scholars proposed several ideas of interim agreements (Nye, 1998; Harding, 1999, 2000; Feldman, 1998; Lampton and Lieberthal, 2004; Lieberthal, 2000; Roth, 1999; Yates, 1996).² Most notably, Johnston (n.d.) suggested, "Taiwan should be allowed into all international organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, as a special non-sovereign state participant or observer. The specific condition is that if it declares formal independence it would forfeits status and get expelled from the organization" (p. 3). Taiwan's engagement in constructive peace dialogue with Beijing will be a key to open the door of the UNGA for Taiwan. Therefore, besides patience, Taiwan's future direction on the maintenance of the *de facto* sovereignty, political and social cohesion,

² For example, Nye (1998) proposed "one country, three systems" (C.4). Lieberthal (2000) suggested to maintain 50 years of the status quo before a formal talk of political unification will begin, whereas Roth's interim agreements (1999) was merely a suggestion of CBMs.

and the peace negotiation with the PRC will become the basis of building international environment favoring Taiwan to repeal the Resolution 2758.

Like the case of the Zionism revocation, the US diplomatic involvement in the cross-Strait peace will be another indispensable factor to advance Taiwan's participation in the UN and to confirm the Taiwan is not domestic issue of the PRC. A Taiwanese diplomatic officer (personal communication, September 2007) once told me that Taiwan has not been able to repeal Resolution 2758 mostly because Taiwan's lobby in the US is not as powerful as Israel's. Indeed, as the US government affirmed, "The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China" in the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan of 1982, the US has not sufficiently involved in the cross-Strait negotiation (as cited in Dumbaugh, 1998, p. 21). Taiwan could learn the Israeli lobby's methods to influence governmental or societal sources of American foreign policymaking as described in Chapter Three. Nonetheless, the Bush administration's decision to repeal the resolution did not solely stand on the request from the lobby. Especially, Secretary of State James Baker, who did not have to face re-election, was relatively independent from the influence of the lobby.

In order to increase the US support, Taiwan's UN participation has to incorporate into American interest in the region, based on Taiwan sharing American value of democracy, liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. The promotion of these soft powers with combination of political and economical benefits, such as peace and stability of the region and free market, will motivate the US foreign policy. Thus, in addition to Taiwanese lobby, the Taiwanese leaders shoulder enormous responsibility to promote the US and international commitment for Taiwan's participation in the UN as well as the cross-Strait peace without touching the Pandora's Box: sovereignty issue.

Thus, the revocation of Resolution 2758 is feasible with the cooperation with

international powers. However, one of the differences between Israel and Taiwan is their statehood. Unlike the Zionism resolution, Resolution 2758 may have to directly face the sovereignty issue. After Israel declared *de jure* independence in 1948, statehood and a membership of the UNGA were granted. However, in return Israel had sacrificed their lives for maintaining the statehood for decades and was unable to reach peace with neighborhood countries. Since the concept of statehood produced extreme nationalism in the 20th century and is outdated western value in the globalization era, Taiwan does not need to play political game to insist on her statehood, in spite of the fact it is prerequisite for a full membership in the UN (Davis, 1996).

Table 2: Needs and Advantages for Repealing Resolution 2758

	needs	advantages
International level	Patience (Timing); Bilateral peace negotiation; Reduction of nationalism; Further economic development; Positive peace (mutual respect); and Parting from sovereignty issue	<i>De facto</i> sovereignty; Economic development; and The status quo power/peace
US Domestic level	Taiwanese Lobby; and The US Mediation effort	Taiwan's sharing values (soft and hard power)
Individual level	Effective leadership and Political cohesion within Taiwan	Democracy (direct election of president of Taiwan)

Source: Drawn by the author

7.2 Discussion: Toward Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN: Does really the revocation of Resolution 2758 result in Taiwan's participation in the UN?

While this research mainly examined the Zionism resolution in order to seek the feasibility of repealing Resolution 2758 under the hypothesis that the revocation would be most realistic approach for Taiwan to join the UN, this section is to examine what would Repealing Resolution 2758 mean to Taiwan. Recalling the decisions made by the government of Taiwan in the early 1970s and the fact that the PRC already controlled the mainland China, the adoption of Resolution 2758 was a pragmatic way, if not only, to accept the Beijing representatives in the UN in spite of causing the misleading result to the people of Taiwan. The careful investigation on the Taiwan issue in chapter six shows Resolution 2758 does not bind the people of Taiwan, but only Resolution 2758 switched Chinese representations in the UN. Thus, overturning its resolution simply suggests that the ROC would represent the whole China.

Therefore, even if Resolution 2758 is revoked with a simple majority vote, the success of repeal would not result in an automatic admission for Taiwan into the UN as the parallel representation, nor does it address to Taiwan's statehood question. Thus, the revocation or amendment of Resolution 2758 is neither answer for Taiwan's UN question nor a goal for the people of Taiwan (unless the government of Taiwan unreasonably prefers to represent the entire China). Rather, Taiwan's real focus has to be meaningful participation in the UNGA as an observer status and the peaceful coexistence of Taiwan and the PRC in the UN and its affiliated organization without answering the sensitive question of Taiwan's statehood, as the case of repealing the

Zionism resolution question avoided to answer the ideological question of whether Zionism is racism or not.

In short, it is virtually impossible for Taiwan to participate in the UNGA as full membership of a new state under 'one China, one Taiwan' policy unless Taiwan declares *de jure* independence which not only is dangerous to pursue, but also will lose international supports. On the other hand, Taiwan would not accept to send a representation as part of the PRC under 'one China' policy as long as the definition of one China is identical to the PRC. Furthermore, the PRC does not approve dual representation of 'two Chinas:' one for the PRC and one for the ROC. An alternative possibility is Taiwan to join the UN as part of China (not the PRC) under the so-called '1992 consensus: one China, different interpretation.' However, this approach is also dead end for Taiwan unless Taiwan could amend Resolution 2758 since the international community has defined China as the PRC.

Therefore, the best scenario for Taiwan to meaningfully participate in the UN is, while keeping the sovereignty issue a low profile, to attempt to participate in the UN as a special non-sovereign state observer until further resolution between Taipei and Beijing will be reached. In order to join the UN as an observer status, Taiwan still has to gain a majority votes. As this paper discussed before, the way to increase the number of votes in the UNGA rely on the international circumstances, the US diplomacy, and Taiwan's willingness for the cross-Strait peace. And also, it is significant to continue Taiwan's annual membership application to the UN and questioning Resolution 2758 until the UN accommodates Taiwan's meaningful participation. Taiwan's application makes the UN secretary-general as well as the world community aware of the reality of the Taiwan issue: 23 million people living in Taiwan are not under Beijing's jurisdiction, and Resolution 2758 has nothing to do with Taiwan's sovereignty right.

In conclusion, the revocation of Resolution 2758 is feasible but would not directly deal with Taiwan's participation in the UN. Although Taiwan's participation in the UN would advance positive peace in the Taiwan Strait, constructive peace becomes essential for Taiwan's UN participation. Taiwan should be emphasizing international popularity and a peaceful resolution with Beijing that would improve Taiwan's international status, instead of insisting on her symbolism – name or status. As Muste (n.d.) simply put it: “there is no way to peace; peace is the way,” if an international community truly desire everlasting and ideological positive peace in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN as an observer status without provoking Beijing's policy would narrow the gap between Beijing and Taipei.

7.3 Limitations and future research

The research limitation of this study was the failure to collect first hand information, such as interviews. Another limitation was theory development. There is a need for further exploration into theoretical model for interaction of levels of analyses. It also appeared the lack of specific strategy formulation for Taiwan's meaningful involvement in the UN. Future analysis should include tactical approaches to include Taiwan's application for the UN admission into the agenda of the UNGA.